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Robert A. Dahl — Myth of the Presidential Mandate

Fareed Zakaria — The Reagan Strategy of Containment

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Book Reviews

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Volume 105
Number 3
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Contents

Myth of the Presidential Mandate	ROBERT A. DAHL	355
The Reagan Strategy of Containment	FAREED ZAKARIA	373
The "New" New Deal: FDR and American Liberalism, 1937–1945	JOHN W. JEFFRIES	397
President Carter and the Press: Perspectives from White House Communications Advisers	MARK J. ROZELL	419
Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect	DAVID P. FORSYTHE	435
Liberal Democracy in Africa	ROBERT FATTON, JR.	455
Book Reviews		475

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Book Reviews

Lewis, The Economics of Apartheid — CRAWFORD YOUNG 475

Clark, The Hierarchy of States : Reform and Resistance in the International Order — INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. 476

Scalapino, The Politics of Development: Perspectives on Twentieth-Century Asia — MARY BROWN BULLOCK 478

Castles, ed., The Comparative History of Public Policy — HUGH HECLO 479

Cleva, Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy — ROBERT L. BEISNER 481

Lange and **Regini,** eds., State, Market and Social Regulation: New Perspectives on Italy — JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA 482

Lesch and **Tessler,** Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada — NAOMI WEINBERGER 483

Colby with **McCargar,** Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam — LLOYD C. GARDNER 485

Welborn and **Burkhead,** Intergovernmental Relations in the American Administrative State — DONALD F. KETTL 486

Sinclair, The Transformation of the U.S. Senate — JOSEPH COOPER 488

Meiners and **Yandle,** eds., Regulation and the Reagan Era: Politics Bureaucracy and the Public Interest — PAUL L. POSNER 489

Gallup and **Castelli,** The People's Religion: American Faith in the 90's — ANDREW GREELEY 491

Mezey, Congress, the President, and Public Policy — ERIC M. USLANER 492

Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies — LEWIS A. COSER 494

Allison, The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World — ZALMAY KHALILZAD 495

Lacey, The Truman Presidency — HERBERT S. PARMET 496

Preston, Herman, and **Schiller,** Hope and Folly: The United States and UNESCO 1945–1985 — DONALD J. PUCHALA 497

McGhee, The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets in the Middle East — LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN 499

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Ben-Zvi, Between Lausanne and Geneva: International Conferences and the Arab-Israeli Conflict — WILLIAM B. QUANDT — 500

Hanson with **Backstrom** and **McCormack,** Tribune of the People: The Minnesota Legislature and Its Leadership — GERALD BENJAMIN — 501

Krehbiel, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe: The Stockholm Conference — PHILIP GORDON — 502

Herzstein, Roosevelt and Hitler: Prelude to War — DAVID M. KENNEDY — 504

Haass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes — JOHN SPANIER — 505

Borjas, Friends and Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy — ELI GINZBERG — 507

Tomasevksi, Development Aid and Human Rights — DAVID P. FORSYTHE — 508

Kofas, Intervention and Underdevelopment — HARRY J. PSOMIADES — 510

Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement — JOHN BRESNAN — 511

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From the Editor:

ROBERT A. DAHL argues the provocative thesis that policy mandates claimed by successfully elected presidents are largely myths used to subvert the democratic process.

FAREED ZAKARIA evaluates the Reagan administration's strategy of containment. Looking at the administration's conception of interests, threats, and resources, he concludes that the Reagan strategy of containment was simple and successful.

JOHN W. JEFFRIES traces the development during Franklin D. Roosevelt's second and third terms of a new New Deal. He argues that this new liberal program, based on Keynesian economic analysis and aiming at a full-employment economy of abundance, marked a significant redirection of New Deal liberalism and shaped the postwar liberal agenda.

MARK J. ROZELL examines President Jimmy Carter's press image problem from the perspectives of the former president's own communications advisers. These advisers' candid assessments reveal that Carter's negative press image grew primarily from his failure to focus White House efforts on public relations and that this failure made difficult the achievement of many policy goals that Carter valued.

DAVID P. FORSYTHE traces U.S. foreign policy on human rights since 1945, ultimately suggesting that internationally recognized human rights have something to teach America about its domestic as well as its foreign policy.

ROBERT FATTON, JR. analyzes the problems confronting the emergence of liberal democracy in Africa. He concludes that the current economic and political crises besieging the continent are more favorable to the accentuation of existing authoritarianism than to the development of liberal democracies.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Myth of the Presidential Mandate

ROBERT A. DAHL

On election night in 1980 the vice president elect enthusiastically informed the country that Ronald Reagan's triumph was

> . . . not simply a mandate for a change but a mandate for peace and freedom; a mandate for prosperity; a mandate for opportunity for all Americans regardless of race, sex, or creed; a mandate for leadership that is both strong and compassionate . . . a mandate to make government the servant of the people in the way our founding fathers intended; a mandate for hope; a mandate for hope for the fulfillment of the great dream that President-elect Reagan has worked for all his life.[1]

I suppose there are no limits to permissible exaggeration in the elation of victory, especially by a vice president elect. He may therefore be excused, I imagine, for failing to note, as did many others who made comments in a similar vein in the weeks and months that followed, that Reagan's lofty mandate was provided by 50.9 percent of the voters. A decade later it is much more evident, as it should have been then, that what was widely interpreted as Reagan's mandate, not only by supporters but by opponents, was more myth than reality.

In claiming that the outcome of the election provided a mandate to the president from the American people to bring about the policies, programs, emphases, and new directions uttered during the campaign by the winning candidate and his supporters, the vice president elect was like other commentators echoing a familiar theory.

[1] Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Interpreting Elections* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 217.

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Origin and Development

A history of the theory of the presidential mandate has not been written, and I have no intention of supplying one here. However, if anyone could be said to have created the myth of the presidential mandate, surely it would be Andrew Jackson. Although he never used the word mandate, so far as I know, he was the first American president to claim not only that the president is uniquely representative of all the people, but that his election confers on him a mandate from the people in support of his policy. Jackson's claim was a fateful step in the democratization of the constitutional system of the United States – or rather what I prefer to call the pseudodemocratization of the presidency.

As Leonard White observed, it was Jackson's "settled conviction" that "the President was an immediate and direct representative of the people."[2] Presumably as a result of his defeat in 1824 in both the electoral college and the House of Representatives, in his first presidential message to Congress, in order that "as few impediments as possible should exist to the free operation of the public will," he proposed that the Constitution be amended to provide for the direct election of the president.[3]

> "To the people", he said, "belongs the right of electing their Chief Magistrate: it was never designed that their choice should, in any case, be defeated, either by the intervention of electoral colleges or by . . . the House of Representatives."[4]

His great issue of policy was the Bank of the United States, which he unwaveringly believed was harmful to the general good. Acting on this conviction, in 1832 he vetoed the bill to renew the bank's charter. Like his predecessors, he justified the veto as a protection against unconstitutional legislation; but unlike his predecessors in their comparatively infrequent use of the veto he also justified it as a defense of his or his party's policies.

Following his veto of the bank's charter, the bank became the main issue in the presidential election of 1832. As a consequence, Jackson's reelection was widely regarded, even among his opponents (in private, at least), as amounting to "something like a popular ratification" of his policy.[5] When in order to speed the demise of the bank Jackson found it necessary to fire his treasury secretary, he justified his action on the ground, among others, that "The President is the direct representative of the American people, but the Secretaries are not."[6]

Innovative though it was, Jackson's theory of the presidential mandate was less robust than it was to become in the hands of his successors. In 1848 James Polk explicitly formulated the claim, in a defense of his use of the veto on matters of

[2] Leonard D. White, *The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829–1861* (New York: Free Press, 1954), 23.

[3] Quoted in ibid., 23.

[4] Cited in James W. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 160, fn. 58.

[5] White, *Jacksonians*, 23.

[6] Ibid., 23.

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policy, that as a representative of the people the president was, if not more representative than the Congress, at any rate equally so.

> "The people, by the constitution, have commanded the President, as much as they have commanded the legislative branch of the Government, to execute their will. . . . The President represents in the executive department the whole people of the United States, as each member of the legislative department represents portions of them. . . ." The President is responsible "not only to an enlightened public opinion, but to the people of the whole Union, who elected him, as the representatives in the legislative branches . . . are responsible to the people of particular States or districts. . . ."[7]

Notice that in Jackson's and Polk's views, the president, both constitutionally and as representative of the people, is on a par with Congress. They did not claim that in either respect the president is superior to Congress. It was Woodrow Wilson who took the further step in the evolution of the theory by asserting that in representing the people the president is not merely equal to Congress but actually superior to it.

Earlier Views

Because the theory of the presidential mandate espoused by Jackson and Polk has become an integral part of our present-day conception of the presidency, it may be hard for us to grasp how sharply that notion veered off from the views of the earlier presidents.

As James Ceaser has shown, the Framers designed the presidential election process as a means of improving the chances of electing a *national* figure who would enjoy majority support. They hoped their contrivance would avoid not only the populistic competition among candidates dependent on "the popular arts," which they rightly believed would occur if the president were elected by the people, but also what they believed would necessarily be a factional choice if the president were chosen by the Congress, particularly by the House.[8]

In adopting the solution of an electoral college, however, the Framers seriously underestimated the extent to which the strong impulse toward democratization that was already clearly evident among Americans—particularly among their opponents, the anti-Federalists—would subvert and alter their carefully contrived constitutional structure. Since this is a theme I shall pick up later, I want now to mention only two such failures that bear closely on the theory of the presidential mandate. First, the Founders did not foresee the development of political parties nor comprehend how a two-party system might achieve their goal of insuring the election of a figure of national rather than merely local renown. Second, as Ceaser remarks, although the Founders recognized "the need for a popular judg-

[7] Ibid., 24.

[8] Although Madison and Hamilton opposed the contingent solution of a House election in the event that no candidate received a majority of electoral votes, Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson accepted it as not too great a concession. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection*, 80–81.

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ment of the performance of an incumbent" and designed a method for selecting the president that would, as they thought, provide that opportunity, they "did not see elections as performing the role of instituting decisive changes in policy in response to popular demands."[9] In short, the theory of the presidential mandate not only cannot be found in the Framers' conception of the Constitution; almost certainly it violates that conception.

No president prior to Jackson challenged the view that Congress was the legitimate representative of the people. Even Thomas Jefferson, who adeptly employed the emerging role of party leader to gain congressional support for his policies and decisions

> was more Whig than . . . the British Whigs themselves in subordinating [the executive power] to "the supreme legislative power". . . . The tone of his messages is uniformly deferential to Congress. His first one closes with these words: "Nothing shall be wanting on my part to inform, as far as in my power, the legislative judgment, nor to carry that judgment into faithful execution.[10]

James Madison, demonstrating that a great constitutional theorist and an adept leader in Congress could be decidedly less than a great president, deferred so greatly to Congress that in his communications to that body his extreme caution rendered him "almost unintelligible"[11]—a quality one would hardly expect from one who had been a master of lucid exposition at the Constitutional Convention. His successor, James Monroe, was so convinced that Congress should decide domestic issues without presidential influence that throughout the debates in Congress on "the greatest political issue of his day . . . the admission of Missouri and the status of slavery in Louisiana Territory," he remained utterly silent.[12]

Madison and Monroe serve not as examples of how presidents should behave but as evidence of how early presidents thought they should behave. Considering the constitutional views and the behavior of Jackson's predecessors, it is not hard to see why his opponents called themselves Whigs in order to emphasize his dereliction from the earlier and presumably constitutionally correct view of the presidency.

Woodrow Wilson

The long and almost unbroken succession of mediocrities who succeeded to the presidency between Polk and Wilson for the most part subscribed to the Whig view of the office and seem to have laid no claim to a popular mandate for their policies—when they had any. Even Abraham Lincoln, in justifying the unprecedented scope of presidential power he believed he needed in order to meet seces-

[9] Ibid., 84.

[10] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Offices and Powers, 1789–1948*, 3rd. ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1948), 20.

[11] Wilfred E. Binkley, *President and Congress* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), 56.

[12] Leonard D. White, *The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829* (New York: Free Press, 1951), 31.

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sion and civil war, rested his case on constitutional grounds, and not as a mandate from the people.[13] Indeed, since he distinctly failed to gain a majority of votes in the election of 1860, any claim to a popular mandate would have been dubious at best. Like Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt also had a rather unrestricted view of presidential power; he expressed the view then emerging among Progressives that chief executives were also representatives of the people. Yet the stewardship he claimed for the presidency was ostensibly drawn—rather freely drawn, I must say—from the Constitution, not from the mystique of the mandate.[14]

Woodrow Wilson, more as political scientist than as president, brought the mandate theory to what now appears to be its canonical form. His formulation was influenced by his admiration for the British system of cabinet government. In 1879, while still a senior at Princeton, he published an essay recommending the adoption of cabinet government in the United States.[15] He provided little indication as to how this change was to be brought about, however, and soon abandoned the idea without yet having found an alternative solution.[16] Nevertheless, he continued to contrast the American system of congressional government, in which Congress was all-powerful but lacked executive leadership, with British cabinet government, in which parliament, though all powerful, was firmly led by the prime minister and his cabinet. Since Americans were not likely to adopt the British cabinet system, however, he began to consider the alternative of more powerful presidential leadership.[17] In his *Congressional Government*, published in 1885, he acknowledged that "the representatives of the people are the proper ultimate au-

[13] Lincoln drew primarily on the war power, which he created by uniting the president's constitutional obligation "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed" with his power as commander-in-chief. He interpreted the war power as a veritable cornucopia of implicit constitutional authority for the extraordinary emergency measures he undertook during an extraordinary national crisis. (Corwin, *The President*, 277ff.)

[14] "Every executive officer, in particular the President, Roosevelt maintained, 'was a steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people. . . .' He held therefore that, unless specifically forbidden by the Constitution or by law, the President had 'to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded. . . .' 'Under this interpretation of executive power,' he recalled, 'I did and caused to be done many things not previously done. . . . I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power,'" See John Morton Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt* (New York: Atheneum, 1954), 108.

[15] Woodrow Wilson, *Cabinet Government in the United States* (Stamford, Conn.: Overbrook Press, 1947), orig. publication in *International Review*, 1879.

[16] "He seems not to have paid much attention to the practical question of how so radical an alteration was to be brought about. As far as I know, Wilson's only published words on how to initiate the English system are in the article, *Committee or Cabinet Government*, which appeared in the *Overland Monthly* for January, 1884." His solution was to amend Section 6 of Article I of the Constitution to permit members of Congress to hold offices as members of the Cabinet, and to extend the terms of the president and representatives. See, Walter Lippmann, *Introduction* to *Congressional Government* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), 14-15.

[17] Wilson's unfavorable comparative judgment is particularly clear in *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956; reprint of 1885 ed.), 181. Just as Jackson had proposed the direct election of the president, in his first annual message Wilson proposed that a system of direct national primaries be adopted. See Ceaser, *Presidential Selection*, 173.

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thority in all matters of government, and that administration is merely the clerical part of government."[18] Congress is "unquestionably, the predominant and controlling force, the center and source of all motive and of all regulative power." Yet a discussion of policy that goes beyond "special pleas for special privilege" is simply impossible in the House, "a disintegrate mass of jarring elements," while the Senate is no more than "a small, select, and leisurely House of Representatives."[19]

By 1908, when *Constitutional Government in the United States* was published, Wilson had arrived at strong presidential leadership as a feasible solution. He faulted the earlier presidents who had adopted the Whig theory of the Constitution.

> . . . (T)he makers of the Constitution were not enacting Whig theory. . . . The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit; and if Congress be overborne by him, it will be no fault of the makers of the Constitution, – it will be from no lack of constitutional powers on its part, but only because the President has the nation behind him, and Congress has not. He has no means of compelling Congress except through public opinion. . . . (T)he early Whig theory of political dynamics . . . is far from being a democratic theory. . . . It is particularly intended to prevent the will of the people as a whole from having at any moment an unobstructed sweep and ascendancy.

And he contrasted the president with Congress in terms that would become commonplace among later generations of commentators, including political scientists:

> Members of the House and Senate are representatives of localities, are voted for only by sections of voters, or by local bodies of electors like the members of the state legislatures.[20] There is no national party choice except that of President. No one else represents the people as a whole, exercising a national choice. . . . The nation as a whole has chosen him, and is conscious that it has no other political spokesman. His is the only national voice in affairs. . . . He is the representative of no constituency, but of the whole people. When he speaks in his true character, he speaks for no special interest. . . . (T)here is but one national voice in the country, and that is the voice of the President.[21]

Since Wilson, it has become commonplace for presidents and commentators alike to argue that by virtue of his election the president has received a mandate for his aims and policies from the people of the United States. The myth of the mandate is now a standard weapon in the arsenal of persuasive symbols all presidents exploit. For example, as the Watergate scandals emerged in mid-1973, Patrick Buchanan, then an aide in the Nixon White House, suggested that the president should accuse his accusers of "seeking to destroy the democratic mandate of 1972." Three weeks later in an address to the country Nixon said:

[18] Wilson, *Congressional Government*, 181.

[19] Ibid., 31, 72–73, 145.

[20] The Seventeenth Amendment requiring a direct election of senators was not adopted until 1913.

[21] Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 67–68, 70, 202–203.

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> Last November, the American people were given the clearest choice of this century. Your votes were a mandate, which I accepted, to complete the initiatives we began in my first term and to fulfill the promises I made for my second term.[22]

If the spurious nature of Nixon's claim now seems self-evident, the dubious grounds for virtually all such pretensions are perhaps less obvious.[23]

Critique of the Theory

What does a president's claim to a mandate amount to? The meaning of the term itself is not altogether clear.[24] Fortunately, however, in his excellent book *Interpreting Elections*, Stanley Kelley has "piece[d] together a coherent statement of the theory."

> Its first element is the belief that elections carry messages about problems, policies, and programs—messages plain to all and specific enough to be directive. . . . Second, the theory holds that certain of these messages must be treated as authoritative commands . . . either to the victorious candidate or to the candidate and his party. . . . To qualify as mandates, messages about policies and programs must reflect the *stable* views both of individual voters and of the electorate. . . . In the electorate as a whole, the numbers of those for or against a policy or program matter. To suggest that a mandate exists for a particular policy is to suggest that more than a bare majority of those voting are agreed upon it. The common view holds that landslide victories are more likely to involve mandates than are narrow ones. . . . The final element of the theory is a negative imperative: Governments should not undertake major innovations in policy or procedure, except in emergencies, unless the electorate has had an opportunity to consider them in an election and thus to express its views."[25]

To bring out the central problems more clearly, let me extract what might be called the primitive theory of the popular presidential mandate. According to this theory, a presidential election can accomplish four things. First, it confers constitutional and legal authority on the victor. Second, at the same time, it also conveys information. At a minimum it reveals the first preferences for president of a plurality of votes. Third, according to the primitive theory, the election, at least under the conditions Kelley describes, conveys further information: namely that a clear majority of voters prefer the winner because they prefer his policies and wish him

[22] Kelley, *Interpreting Elections*, 99.

[23] For other examples of claims to a presidential mandate resulting from the election, see William Safire, *Safire's Political Dictionary* (New York: Random House, 1978), 398; and Kelley, *Interpreting Elections*, 72–74, 126–129, 168.

[24] See "mandate" in *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1971, compact edition); Safire, *Political Dictionary*, 398; Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, *The American Political Dictionary* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 130; Julius Gould and William L. Kolb, *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 404; Jay M. Shafritz, *The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and Politics* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1988), 340.

[25] Kelley, *Interpreting Elections*, 126–128.

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to pursue his policies. Finally, because the president's policies reflect the wishes of a majority of voters, when conflicts over policy arise between president and Congress, the president's policies ought to prevail.

While we can readily accept the first two propositions, the third, which is pivotal to the theory, might be false. But if the third is false, then so is the fourth. So the question arises: Beyond revealing the first preferences of a plurality of voters, do presidential elections also reveal the additional information that a plurality (or a majority) of voters prefer the policies of the winner and wish the winner to pursue those policies?

In appraising the theory I want to distinguish between two different kinds of criticisms. First, some critics contend that even when the wishes of constituents can be known, they should not be regarded as in any way binding on a legislator. I have in mind, for example, Edmund Burke's famous argument that he would not sacrifice to public opinion his independent judgment of how well a policy would serve his constituents' interests, and the argument suggested by Hanna Pitkin that representatives bound by instructions would be prevented from entering into the compromises that legislation usually requires.[26]

Second, some critics, on the other hand, may hold that when the wishes of constituents on matters of policy can be clearly discerned, they ought to be given great and perhaps even decisive weight. But, these critics contend, constituents' wishes usually cannot be known, at least when the constituency is large and diverse, as in presidential elections. In expressing his doubts on the matter in 1913, A. Lawrence Lowell quoted Sir Henry Maine: "The devotee of democracy is much in the same position as the Greeks with their oracles. All agreed that the voice of an oracle was the voice of god, but everybody allowed that when he spoke he was not as intelligible as might be desired."[27]

It is exclusively the second kind of criticism that I want now to consider. Here again I am indebted to Stanley Kelley for his succinct summary of the main criticisms.

> Critics allege that 1) some particular claim of a mandate is unsupported by adequate evidence; 2) most claims of mandates are unsupported by adequate evidence; 3) most claims of mandates are politically self-serving; or 4) it is not possible in principle to make a valid claim of a mandate, since it is impossible to sort out voters' intentions.[28]

Kelley goes on to say that while the first three criticisms may well be valid, the fourth has been outdated by the sample survey, which "has again given us the ability to discover the grounds of voters' choices." In effect, then, Kelley rejects the primitive theory and advances the possibility of a more sophisticated mandate theory according to which the information about policies is conveyed not by the election outcome but instead by opinion surveys. Thus the two functions are cleanly split:

[26] Cited in ibid., 133.
[27] Cited in ibid., 134.
[28] Ibid., 136.

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presidential elections are for electing a president, opinion surveys provide information about the opinions, attitudes, and judgments that account for the outcome.

However, I would propose a fifth proposition, which I believe is also implicit in Kelley's analysis:

> 5) While it may not be strictly impossible *in principle* to make a reasoned and well-grounded claim to a presidential mandate, to do so *in practice* requires a complex analysis that in the end may not yield much support for presidential claims.

But if we reject the primitive theory of the mandate and adopt the more sophisticated theory, then it follows that prior to the introduction of scientific sample surveys, no president could reasonably have defended his claim to a mandate. To put a precise date on the proposition, let me remind you that the first presidential election in which scientific surveys formed the basis of an extended and systematic analysis was 1940.[29]

I do not mean to say that no election before 1940 now permits us to draw the conclusion that a president's major policies were supported by a substantial majority of the electorate. But I do mean that for most presidential elections before 1940 a valid reconstruction of the policy views of the electorate is impossible or enormously difficult, even with the aid of aggregate data and other indirect indicators of voters' views. When we consider that presidents ordinarily asserted their claims soon after their elections, well before historians and social scientists could have sifted through reams of indirect evidence, then we must conclude that before 1940 no contemporary claim to a presidential mandate could have been supported by the evidence available at the time.

While the absence of surveys undermines presidential claims to a mandate before 1940, the existence of surveys since then would not necessarily have supported such claims. Ignoring all other shortcomings of the early election studies, the analysis of the 1940 election I just mentioned was not published until 1948. While that interval between the election and the analysis may have set a record, the systematic analysis of survey evidence that is necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) to interpret what a presidential election means always comes well after presidents and commentators have already told the world, on wholly inadequate evidence, what the election means.[30] Perhaps the most famous voting study to date, *The American Voter*, which drew primarily on interviews conducted in 1952 and 1956, appeared in 1960.[31] The book by Stanley Kelley that I have drawn on so freely here, which interprets the elections of 1964, 1972, and 1980, appeared in 1983.

A backward glance quickly reveals how empty the claims to a presidential mandate have been in recent elections. Take 1960. If more than a bare majority is essential to a mandate, then surely Kennedy could have received no mandate, since

[29] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

[30] The early election studies are summarized in Bernard R. Berelson and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 331ff.

[31] Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

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he gained less than 50 percent of the total popular vote by the official count—just how much less by the unofficial count varies with the counter. Yet "on the day after election, and every day thereafter," Theodore Sorenson tells us, "he rejected the argument that the country had given him no mandate. Every election has a winner and a loser, he said in effect. There may be difficulties with the Congress, but a margin of only one vote would still be a mandate."[32]

By contrast, 1964 was a landslide election, as was 1972. From his analysis, however, Kelley concludes that "Johnson's and Nixon's specific claims of meaningful mandates do not stand up well when confronted by evidence." To be sure, in both elections some of the major policies of the winners were supported by large majorities among those to whom these issues were salient. Yet "none of these policies was cited by more than 21% of respondents as a reason to like Johnson, Nixon, or their parties."[33]

In 1968, Nixon gained office with only 43 percent of the popular vote. No mandate there. Likewise in 1976, Carter won with a bare 50.1 percent. Once again, no mandate there.

When Reagan won in 1980, thanks to the much higher quality of surveys undertaken by the media, a more sophisticated understanding of what that election meant no longer had to depend on the academic analyses that would only follow some years later. Nonetheless, many commentators, bemused as they so often are by the arithmetical peculiarities of the electoral college, immediately proclaimed both a landslide and a mandate for Reagan's policies. What they often failed to note was that Reagan gained just under 51 percent of the popular vote. Despite the claims of the vice president elect, surely we can find no mandate there. Our doubts are strengthened by the fact that in the elections to the House, Democratic candidates won just over 50 percent of the popular vote and a majority of seats. However, they lost control of the Senate. No Democratic mandate there, either.

These clear and immediate signs that the elections of 1980 failed to confer a mandate on the president or his Democratic opponents were, however, largely ignored. For it was so widely asserted as to be commonplace that Reagan's election reflected a profound shift of opinion away from New Deal programs and toward the new conservatism. However, from this analysis of the survey evidence, Kelley concludes that the commitment of voters to candidates was weak; a substantial proportion of Reagan voters were more interested in voting against Carter than for Reagan; and despite claims by journalists and others, the New Deal coalition did not really collapse. Nor was there any profound shift toward conservatism. "The evidence from press surveys . . . . contradicts the claims that voters shifted toward conservatism and that this ideological shift elected Reagan." In any case, the relation between ideological location and policy preferences was "of a relatively modest magnitude."[34]

[32] Quoted in Safire, *Political Dictionary*, 398.
[33] Kelley, *Interpreting Elections*, 139–140.
[34] Ibid., 170–172, 174–181, 185, 187.

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In winning by a landslide of popular votes in 1984, Reagan achieved one prerequisite to a mandate. Yet in that same election, Democratic candidates for the House won 52 percent of the popular votes. Two years earlier, they had won 55 percent of the votes. On the face of it, surely the 1984 elections gave no mandate to Reagan.

Before the end of 1986, when the Democrats had once again won a majority of popular votes in elections to the House and had also regained a majority of seats in the Senate, it should have been clear and it should be even clearer now that the major social and economic policies for which Reagan and his supporters had claimed a mandate have persistently failed to gain majority support. Indeed, the major domestic policies and programs established during the thirty years preceding Reagan in the White House have not been overturned in the grand revolution of policy that his election was supposed to have ushered in. For eight years, what Reagan and his supporters claimed as a mandate to reverse those policies was regularly rejected by means of the only legitimate and constitutional processes we Americans have for determining what the policies of the United States government should be.

What are we to make of this long history of unsupported claims to a presidential mandate? The myth of the mandate would be less important if it were not one element in the larger process of the pseudodemocratization of the presidency—the creation of a type of chief executive that in my view should have no proper place in a democratic republic.

Yet even if we consider it in isolation from the larger development of the presidency, the myth is harmful to American political life. By portraying the president as the only representative of the whole people and Congress as merely representing narrow, special, and parochial interests, the myth of the mandate elevates the president to an exalted position in our constitutional system at the expense of Congress. The myth of the mandate fosters the belief that the particular interests of the diverse human beings who form the citizen body in a large, complex, and pluralistic country like ours constitute no legitimate element in the general good. The myth confers on the aims of the groups who benefit from presidential policies an aura of national interest and public good to which they are no more entitled than the groups whose interests are reflected in the policies that gain support by congressional majorities. Because the myth is almost always employed to support deceptive, misleading, and manipulative interpretations, it is harmful to the political understanding of citizens.

It is, I imagine, now too deeply rooted in American political life and too useful a part of the political arsenal of presidents to be abandoned. Perhaps the most we can hope for is that commentators on public affairs in the media and in academic pursuits will dismiss claims to a presidential mandate with the scorn they usually deserve.

But if a presidential election does not confer a mandate on the victor, what does a presidential election mean, if anything at all? While a presidential election does not confer a popular mandate on the president—nor, for that matter, on congressional majorities—it confers the legitimate authority, right, and opportunity on

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a president to try to gain the adoption by constitutional means of the policies the president supports. In the same way, elections to Congress confer on a member the authority, right, and opportunity to try to gain the adoption by constitutional means of the policies he or she supports. Each may reasonably contend that a particular policy is in the public good or public interest and, moreover, is supported by a majority of citizens.

I do not say that whatever policy is finally adopted following discussion, debate, and constitutional processes necessarily reflects what a majority of citizens would prefer, or what would be in their interests, or what would be in the public good in any other sense. What I do say is that no elected leader, including the president, is uniquely privileged to say what an election means—nor to claim that the election has conferred on the president a mandate to enact the particular policies the president supports.

The Democratization of the Presidency

It was inevitable that the executive designed by the Framers would be fundamentally altered in response to the powerful influence of democratizing impulses. If the Framers had intended a chief executive whose election and capacity for governing would not require him to compete for popular approval and who therefore would not depend on "the popular arts" of winning public support,[35] they seriously underestimated both the strength of the democratic impulses among their fellow citizens and its effects on the presidency. Nothing reveals this more clearly than the amazing speed with which the Framers' design for the executive was replaced by a presidency dependent on popular election and popular approval.

The consequences of democratization were evident almost at once and gained strength with the passage of time. I have already described one aspect of this process of democratization in some detail: the invention of the theory of the presidential mandate. Jackson's invention was, however, preceded by decades of democratization that gave plausibility to the theory.

By Jackson's time the presidency had long since become an office sought by partisan candidates in popular elections. Though political parties had existed in Britain and Sweden as elite organizations in systems with a severely limited suffrage, under the leadership of Jefferson and Madison the Republican party became an instrument by which popular majorities could be organized, mobilized, and made effective in influencing the conduct of government. Henceforth a president would combine his role as a presumably nonpartisan chief executive with his role as a national leader of a partisan organization with a partisan following.[36]

[35] Ceaser, *Presidential Selection*, 47ff.

[36] As Ceaser remarks, *Presidential Selection*, 88, 90: "The nonpartisan selection system established by the Founders barely survived a decade. By the election of 1796, traces of partisanship were already clearly in evidence, and by 1800 the contest was being fought on strictly partisan lines." Like many other innovations, Jefferson's had unintended consequences. "Jefferson . . . had an abiding distrust of national elections and, except in the case of his own election, never regarded them as the proper

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If the presidential office was to be attained by partisan contestation, then in order to reach that office a serious presidential candidate would ordinarily need to gain the endorsement and support of a political party. Though the story of the evolution of the presidential nominating process has often been told, it so vividly reveals the impact of democratizing impulses that I want to summarize it briefly.

The Nominating Process

The first organized system for nominating candidates for president and vice president was the congressional caucus, which both the Republicans and the Federalists introduced in 1800.[37] Yet given the emerging strength of democratic ideology, a system so obtrusively closed to participation by any but a small group of congressional politicians was clearly vulnerable. Democratic sentiments we would find familiar in our own time were expressed in a resolution passed in the Ohio legislature in 1823:

> The time has now arrived when the machinations of the *few* to dictate to the *many* . . . will be met . . . by a people jealous of their rights. . . . The only unexceptional source from which nominations can proceed is the people themselves. To them belongs the right of choosing; and they alone can with propriety take any previous steps.[38]

By 1824, when the candidate of the congressional caucus of Democratic Republicans trailed a bad fourth in the election behind Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and Henry Clay, who all ran without benefit of a blessing by the caucus, the outrage to democratic sentiments was easily exploited, most notably by Jackson and his supporters. The congressional nominating caucus came to an end.[39]

In an obvious extension of democratic ideas, which by then had thoroughly assimilated the concept of representation, in 1831 and 1832 the nominating convention came into existence. But in due time,

> [j]ust as once the democratic passions of the people were roused against the Congressional caucus, so now they were turned against the convention system. . . . Away therefore with the delegates, who can never be trusted, and back to the people![40]

So in a further obvious extension of democratic ideas to the nominating process, from 1901 onward the direct primary was introduced, initially for state and

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forum for making decisive changes. . . . The paradox of Jefferson's election in 1800 was that while he was chosen for partisan reasons, he did not intend to institute a system of permanent party competition."

[37] Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., *The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789–1801* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957), 163–165.

[38] M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Party System in the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), 12, fn. 1.

[39] Though Jackson gained more votes than Adams, both popular and electoral, he was denied victory in the House of Representatives.

[40] Ostrogorski, *Democracy*, 342.

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congressional nominations, and soon for presidential candidates. The presidential primary system was in turn subjected to the democratizing impulse. "By the election of 1972," Ceaser remarks, "the election process had been transformed into what is essentially a plebiscitary system."[41]

Reducing Intermediate Forces

The democratization of the nominating process is instructive for many reasons — among others because after almost two centuries of trials employing three major forms with many variations, a sensible method of nominating presidential candidates still seems beyond the reach of Americans. The present system has its defenders no doubt, but they seem to be rapidly diminishing.

The democratization of the nominating process is also instructive because it shows how the relations between the public and presidents or presidential candidates have become increasingly direct. Jeffrey Tulis has described the enormous change that has taken place in the way presidents address the public — presidential speech, if you like. The view that prevailed during the early years of the republic, and for much of the nineteenth century, tended to follow "two general prescriptions for presidential speech." First, proposals for laws and policies would be written and directed principally to Congress; although public, they would be fashioned for congressional needs and not necessarily for general public understanding or approval. Second, when presidential speech was directed primarily to the people at large it would address general principals rather than specific issues.

> The inaugural address, for example, developed along lines that emphasized popular instruction in constitutional principle and the articulation of the general tenor and direction of presidential policy, while tending to avoid discussion of the merits of particular policy proposals.[42]

Presidents rarely directly addressed the general public, except possibly on official occasions. From Washington through Jackson, no president gave more than five speeches a year to the general public, a total that was not exceeded by half the presidents from Washington through William McKinley. When they did address the general public the early presidents rarely employed popular rhetoric or discussed their policies.[43] The great exception was Andrew Johnson, who however scarcely served as a model for his successors.[44] Moreover, Gil Troy has recently discovered that until Woodrow Wilson no president had ever "stumped on his own

[41] Ceaser describes three phases in the evolution of the presidential selection process since the introduction of the primaries: 1912–1920, a period of the expansion of the primaries and the "plebiscitary model"; 1920–1960s, which saw the decline of primaries and the resurgence of parties; and the period since 1972. See *Presidential Selection*, 215ff.

[42] Jeffrey K. Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 46–47.

[43] Ibid., 64, table 3.1 and 66, table 3.2.

[44] Ibid., 87ff.

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behalf." Until the 1830s, even presidential candidates did not make stump speeches. "Such behavior," Troy has written, "was thought undignified—and unwise. Presidential candidates, especially after nomination, were supposed to stand, not run, for election."[45]

What we now take as normal presidential behavior is a product of this century. The innovators were Theodore Roosevelt and to an even greater extent Woodrow Wilson.[46] Since their day and particularly in recent decades, the task of shaping presidential speech to influence and manipulate public opinion—if necessary by appealing over the heads of Congress in order to induce the Congress to support the president's policies—has become a central element in the art and science of presidential conduct.

The President and the Constitutional System

Thus the presidency has developed into an office that is the very embodiment of the kind of executive the Framers, so far as we can discern their intentions, strove to avoid.

They did not wish an executive who would be a tribune of the people, a champion of popular majorities; who would gain office by popular election; who as a consequence of his popular election would claim a mandate for his policies; who in order to mobilize popular support for his policies would appeal directly to the people; who would shape the language, style, and delivery of his appeals so as best to create a public opinion favorable to his ambitions; and who whenever it seemed expedient would by-pass the members of the deliberative body in order to mobilize public opinion and thereby induce a reluctant Congress to enact his policies. That is, however, a fair description of the presidency that emerged out of the intersection of the Framers' design with the strongly democratic ideology that came to prevail among politically active Americans.

One response to this kind of presidency is to argue that these developments are, on the whole, good. They are good, it might be said, because democracy is good, more democracy is better than less democracy, and a more democratized presidency is better than a less democratized presidency. In the immortal cliché of the 1970 McGovern-Fraser Commission, "the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy."[47] Yet this response does not seem to quiet the fears of a growing number of critics. In Arthur Schlesinger's now popular term, the presidency was transformed into the imperial presidency.[48] James Ceaser, Theodore Lowi, and others have referred to development of the plebiscitary presidency.[49] Lowi has also dubbed it the personal presidency, remarking that "the new politics of the president-centered

[45] *New York Times*, 17 January 1988.

[46] On Theodore Roosevelt, see Tulis, *Rhetorical Presidency*, 95–116; on Wilson, see ibid., 118–137.

[47] Ceaser, *Presidential Selection*, 275.

[48] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).

[49] Ceaser, *Presidential Selection*, 5; Theodore J. Lowi, *The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 97ff, 134ff.

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Second Republic can best be described as a plebiscitary republic with a personal presidency."[50] Jeffrey Tulis calls the presidency that was seeded by Wilson and cultivated by his successors the rhetorical presidency.[51]

In criticisms of the modern presidency I want to distinguish several different perspectives. From one, what is lamentable is the break with the doctrines, intentions, and designs of the Founders. A rather different perspective, one more pragmatic and functional, emphasizes that the presidency is simply no longer working satisfactorily in its existing constitutional setting. For example, a president claiming a mandate for his policies may be blocked in one or both houses of Congress by a majority of members who in effect also claim a mandate for their policies. The result is not constructive compromise but deadlock or contradictions in policies. Examples are the recent conflicts over the deficit and over American policies in Central America.

From a third perspective, however, the presidency has come to endanger the operation of democratic processes. It is this perspective that I want to emphasize here.

I have alluded to the developments over the past two centuries as the *pseudodemocratization* of the presidency. I have no wish, much less any hope of adding to the other epithets another even more cumbersome and more ugly; but the term does speak directly to my concerns. By pseudodemocratization I mean a change taken with the ostensible and perhaps even actual purpose of enhancing the democratic process that in practice retains the aura of its democratic justification and yet has the effect, intended or unintended, of weakening the democratic process.

In the case of the presidency, I have two adverse consequences in mind. One, the more obvious, is a loss of popular and congressional control, direct and indirect, over the policies and decisions of the president. A president endowed with the mystique of a mandate—which may sometimes be deepened in a democratic country by the majesty and mystery generated by his popularity and his capacity to evoke and reflect popular feelings, yearnings, and hopes—may encounter resistance to a particular policy in Congress, perhaps even in the public. So the president exploits all the resources of his office to overcome that resistance: his rhetorical resources, his unique capacity to influence or even manipulate public opinion, and all the power and authority derived properly or factitiously from the Constitution—including his power as commander-in-chief, his unique authority over foreign affairs, his right or claim to executive privilege and secrecy, his authority and influence over officials in the executive branch, over the objectives they are obliged or induced to seek, and over the moneys and other resources necessary to reach those objectives. Whatever term we may wish to apply to an executive like this, we can hardly call it democratic.

The other consequence, though more elusive and not wholly independent of the first, is equally important. Now on one view—which I would describe as either simplistic or hostile—democracy means rule by public opinion. This view is mis-

[50] Lowi, *Personal President*, xi.
[51] Tulis, *Rhetorical Presidency*.

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taken both historically and theoretically. Democracy cannot be justified, I think, and its advocates have rarely sought to justify it as no more than the triumph of raw will. It can be and is justified because more than any feasible alternative it provides ordinary people with opportunities to discover what public policies and activities are best for themselves and for others, and to insure that collective decisions conform with—or at least do not persistently and fundamentally violate—the policies they believe best for themselves and for others.

I cannot undertake to explicate the complexities in the notion of discovering what is best for themselves and for others, nor do I need to. For it is obvious that discovering what is best for oneself or others requires far more than announcing one's raw will or surface preferences. Imagine this extreme situation. Suppose we were called upon to vote in a national plebiscite on a proposed treaty governing nuclear weapons that had been secretly negotiated between the president and the leader of the Soviet Union. Suppose further that the plebiscite is to be held one day after the agreement between the two leaders, and that we are to vote yes or no. The very perversity of this example serves to emphasize the crucial importance of opportunities for *understanding* as a requirement in the democratic process and illustrates why in the absence of such opportunities we should speak instead of a pseudodemocratic process.

Many writers have stressed the importance of *deliberation*. While some associate it with classical republicanism, deliberation is surely central to the idea of a democratic decision making. What I have referred to elsewhere as enlightened understanding is an essential criterion for the democratic process. Deliberation is one crucial means, though I think not the only means, to enlightened understanding. Others include systematic research and analysis, experimentation, consultation with experts, orderly discussion, casual and disorderly discussion, day-dreaming, and self-inquiry.

The modern presidency all too often impairs not only deliberation but also other means to a more enlightened understanding by citizens and the Congress. Nelson Polsby's conclusions about the presidential selection process should be extended to the presidency as a whole. The increasing directness of relationships between a candidate or president and the public means that the traditional "intermediation processes," to use his term, have become less effective. Face-to-face groups, political parties, and interest groups are less autonomous and now rely heavily on the mass media.[52] For example, some nice experiments have recently shown that in assessing the relative importance of different issues, citizens are strongly influenced by television news.[53] I share Polsby's judgment that not only are deliberative processes weak in the general public's consideration of candidates and presidents, but they are also insufficiently subject to extensive review and appraisal by their peers.[54]

[52] Nelson W. Polsby, *Consequences of Party Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 134, 170–172.

[53] Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[54] Polsby, *Consequences*, 134, 170–172.

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I also share his judgment that "the directness of direct democracy in a very large scale society seems . . . illusory."[55]

Conclusion

How serious a matter is the pseudodemocratization of the presidency? What, if anything, can and should we do about it? To answer those questions responsibly would obviously take us far beyond the slender limits of an article. Among friends and colleagues I think I detect rather sharply differing perspectives. Let me list several.

First, the problem is not serious.

Second, though the problem is serious, the solution is to elect one more great president.

Third, the problem is serious but there isn't much we can do about it.

Fourth, the problem is serious but can be corrected by fairly modest incremental changes, possibly including a constitutional amendment, say one providing for an American equivalent to the question hour in the British or Canadian parliaments.

Last, the problem is so profoundly built into the interaction between the constitutional framework and democratic ideology that it cannot be solved without a fundamental alteration in one or the other. This is the conclusion to which I find myself increasingly drawn.

However, given that conclusion, a solution—assuming one is attainable—could require either that Americans transform their constitutional framework or give up their democratic beliefs. I think some critics may hope that Americans will reject their democratic ideology in favor of what these critics believe to be eighteenth-century republican doctrines that would restore the Constitution to its pristine condition in the form the Framers presumably intended. I think this alternative is not only morally wrong but politically and historically illusory.

A goal more suitable to the democratic beliefs of Americans would be to begin the arduous task of rethinking constitutional needs in order to determine whether they may not design a form of government better adapted to the requirements of democracy and less conducive to pseudodemocratization. Among other rethinking, Americans need to consider how to create better opportunities for deliberation and other means by which citizens might gain a more enlightened understanding of their political goals.

To achieve the daunting goal of rethinking the Constitution will not be easy and no one should believe that, properly done, it can be accomplished quickly. But begun now, it might be achieved before this century is over. It would be an appropriate undertaking to commence now that the bicentennial of the American Constitution is behind us.*

[55] Ibid., 147.

* This article is based on *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, vol. 10, edited by Grethe B. Peterson, University of Utah Press.

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The Reagan Strategy of Containment

FAREED ZAKARIA

Ronald Reagan came into the Oval Office on a platform that rejected the previous three administrations' basic foreign policies. His criticisms of Jimmy Carter were unsurprising. Every president distances himself from his predecessor, especially one from the opposite party. But Reagan condemned just as unequivocally the détente policies that had been fashioned by his fellow Republicans, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. This wholesale rejectionism led to speculation that President Reagan would move outside the evolved framework of postwar American foreign policy and adopt a radically different strategy of containment than had his predecessors. Some suggested that he might abandon containment altogether and move closer to James Burnham's prescription to "rollback" the Soviet Union.[1] Verdicts at the end of the Reagan years were mixed; some commentators felt vindicated in their fears of confrontation, while others saw Reagan's foreign policy as radical only in its rhetoric.[2]

[1] See John Vincour, "Bonn Officials Pleased with U.S. Disavowal of Pipes," *New York Times*, 19 March 1981; Richard Halloran, "U.S. Said to Revise Strategy to Oppose Threats by Soviets," *New York Times*, 18 April 1981; Murrey Marder, "For Reagan, Tough Choices in Revising Policy on Soviets," *Washington Post*, 3 January 1981; also see Bill Moyers, "Documentation: The New Cold War," *International Security* 6 (Fall 1981): 181–201.

[2] Studies that see Reagan's strategy as one of rollback include Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment" in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, Donald Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Resurgent: The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1987), 75–114; a journalist who sees the same tendency and applauds it is Gregory Fossedal, *The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); for the "radical rhetoric" case, see William Schneider, "Rambo and Reality" in Oye et al., *Eagle Resurgent*, 41–75.

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This article will ask how the Reagan administration conceived of and implemented a grand strategy, and judge how different it was from other postwar grand strategies. Looking at its conception of interests, threats, resources, and strategies, I argue that the administration saw itself implementing a version of containment—that is, a policy to combat Soviet expansion not overthrow the Soviet Empire—but one quite different from any previous version of containment.[3] While most strategies make trade-offs between costs and risks, Reagan's strategy embraced both high costs and risks in return for the potential of quick success, some of which it got. But for all its novelty, Reagan's approach toward economic resources was depressingly familiar. He frittered away a unique opportunity to "bring into balance," in Walter Lippmann's famous phrase, "the nation's commitments and the nation's power."[4] Analyzing the Reagan strategy using the two chief theoretical frameworks for postwar American foreign policy—symmetry versus asymmetry, and neorealism—I find both inadequate, because neither responds well to the interactive pressures of strategy. The article concludes that the Reagan strategy of containment was successful in that its chief goal—Soviet foreign policy restraint, not Soviet internal reform—was accomplished. In large part, the change in Soviet behavior must be attributed to Soviet domestic forces, but at the margin that any American foreign policy can affect it, the Reagan strategy of containment deterred potential Soviet belligerence.

Grand Strategy

There is a problem with the notion of the Reagan strategy of containment. Ronald Reagan was not keenly interested in the making of foreign policy as was, for instance, Richard Nixon. Nor did he have a "vicar" of foreign policy like John Foster Dulles or Henry Kissinger spinning out a vision of American foreign policy. The Reagan team is characterized, however, by the presence of several strategic entrepreneurs—officials who competed to get their ideas implemented and to be given broad policy authority on issues and areas. They would include Defense Department officials, Fred Iklé, John Lehman, and on nuclear issues, Paul Nitze and Richard Perle; State Department officials, Chester Crocker on Africa, Elliott Abrams on Central America, and Paul Wolfowitz on Southeast Asia. Add to this list the chief cabinet-level officers, Alexander Haig and later George Shultz at State, William Casey at the CIA, Caspar Weinberger at Defense, and Jeane Kirkpatrick at the UN, and you have the "official mind" of the Reagan administration.

Looking at foreign policy through the lens of national strategy or grand strategy

[3] Containment means different things to different people. Rather than suggest what containment *should* be, this article attempts to ask what it was to the Reagan administration. The classic exposition of this approach is John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[4] Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), 9.

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runs the risk of distorting facts, since government policy is rarely executed consciously and consistently on the basis of some overarching framework. But foreign policy is not made in a vacuum. Statesmen *do* act on the basis of certain general ideas, even if they do not articulate them clearly. They also follow policy legacies and precedents, working within a kind of common law of foreign policy. John Lewis Gaddis refers to the "Moliere Syndrome": as the *Bourgeois Gentilhomme* discovers that all his life he has been speaking prose without realizing it, so American governments have practiced containment without systematically planning to do so.[5]

Apart from its links or breaks with the past, we will also judge the Reagan administration's strategy of containment by the criteria that apply to any grand strategy. Strategy can be defined briefly as the relationship between means and ends. When the goals are the general well-being of the nation and the resources available are those of the entire nation, the strategy is a "grand" one. Ideally, regional and military strategies should derive from this general framework. Often they do not, and grand strategy is used simply to refer to the sum of diverse specific strategies. Containment, however, has truly been America's grand strategy since the late 1940s; almost all foreign and defense policy has been derived from its central equation. Properly conceived, any strategy encompasses first a conception of a nation's interests, then of the threats to those interests, then of resources available, and by relating these, a set of ordered goals and the means to attain them.

Interests

Though the Reagan administration greatly expanded American interests, it began its first term explicitly denying that any interests needed to be expanded. It was unconsciously making a distinction between material and general interests. Material interests could be thought of as a nation's physical security, well-being, and access to markets, goods and investments. General interests are preferences that stem from a nation's beliefs – in the American case, the promotion of democracy, capitalism, stability, and the non-use of nuclear weapons.[6] The Reagan administration denied the need for new *material* interests. No senior administration official suggested new areas of contest, such as Eastern Europe; none proposed new bases in or aid to hitherto unimportant countries. Caspar Weinberger, addressing

[5] John Lewis Gaddis, "Epilogue: The Future of Containment" in Terry Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Concept and Policy*, vol. II (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), 21–22. For another example of an implicit, evolved grand strategy, see Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

[6] I make this distinction not as a new theory of national interest, but rather because it highlights an important fact about the Reagan administration. In reality, of course, a nation conceives of a national interest, which is some inseparable combination of these two analytic constructs.

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himself to the question of what was new about the administration's foreign policy, pointed first to what was not—its list of interests and commitments.[7]

While material interests stayed essentially constant, the administration's conception of general interests changed remarkably. Reagan had come to power criticizing Jimmy Carter for an obsession with human rights.[8] Jeane Kirkpatrick had explained in the article that got her a cabinet-level job that the United States needed to be more tolerant of its authoritarian allies.[9] Haig adopted this approach on *realpolitik* grounds. "International terrorism will take the place of human rights," he declared.[10] Initial policies toward countries like South Korea, the Philippines, South Africa, and Chile were consistent with this rhetoric. "We will not leave you in isolation," Vice-President George Bush promised Ferdinand Marcos in 1981. "It would be turning our backs on history if we did."[11] In its first years the Reagan administration was regularly denounced by human rights groups for turning a blind eye on the death squads and police brutality of allied Third World regimes.[12] By 1983, however, the administration seized the initiative on human rights. In part as a response to international and domestic criticism, the change also coincided with George Shultz's arrival at the State Department and the El Salvadoran elections.

In April 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had explained that the Carter administration would encourage and promote three kinds of human rights, placing government brutality towards individuals and economic deprivations before broad political liberties.[13] Initially the Reagan administration was judged by these standards. Soon, however, the State Department began resetting the human rights agenda. On the one hand, it consciously downplayed abuses of individual rights; and on the other hand, it aggressively championed political rights—democratiza-

[7] Caspar Weinberger, speech on 5 May 1981, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents (AFP: CD) 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1984), 39. Also see George Shultz speech on 3 April 1984, *AFP: CD 1984*, 1-6.

[8] See Ronald Reagan, speech to the Foreign Policy Association, 9 June 1977, in Reagan, *A Time for Choosing: The Speeches of Ronald Reagan: 1961-1982* (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983), 205-20.

[9] Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary*, November 1979 and "U.S. Security and Latin America," *Commentary*, January 1981.

[10] Alexander Haig, *AFP: CD 1981*, 394-395. Also see Haig's confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 January 1981, *AFP: CD 1981*, 2; and Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 90. Also see Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 93. For Reagan's views, see *AFP: CD 1981*, 367.

[11] This was the speech in which Bush made his notorious expression of love for Marcos's democratic temperament; *AFP: CD 1981*, 1049-1051.

[12] See, for example, the appendices in *Practice of Torture by Foreign Governments and U.S. Efforts to Oppose Its Use: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, U.S. Senate, Ninety-eight Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1984); *The Phenomenon of Torture: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations*, House of Representative, Ninety-eighth Congress, 2nd. sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984).

[13] Vance quoted in Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 52.

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tion—all over the world. Shultz explained the reformulation clearly: "Responding to specific juridical abuses and individual cases, as they happen, is important, but they are really the surface of the problem we are dealing with. The essence of the problem is the kind of political structure that makes human rights abuses possible."[14] Within months of Shultz's appointment, the State Department organized a Campaign for Democracy, Project Democracy, and then the National Endowment for Democracy, all of whose aims were to link and strengthen independent political groups—from newspapers to trade unions—in democratizing countries. Even Shultz's rhetoric on human rights differed markedly from his predecessor's.[15]

Not only did this new approach address human rights critics, but more importantly for the administration, it intensified the struggle against communism. (This pressure to democratize was applied far more harshly on pro-Soviet communist countries in what was termed the Reagan Doctrine, which shall be discussed later.) Events in El Salvador cemented this reformulation into a firm policy that was able to gain the indispensable support of the United States Congress. A State Department official recalls:

> To fight Communism in El Salvador required American advisors, trainers and military equipment. Yet Congress had not approved such an intervention since Vietnam. Even arguments on national security grounds had not been enough to sustain anti-Communist policies in most areas of the Third World. But what the Reagan administration learned in the debate over El Salvador was that support for democracy could overcome congressional resistance. It was Reagan's backing of the leftist Christian Democratic party headed by Jose Napoleon Duarte that succeeded in building a bipartisan coalition in favor of training, advising and financing a war against the Communist guerrillas in El Salvador. . . . Thanks to this what began as an isolated strategy gradually came to dominate Reagan's policy towards Latin America.[16]

In its second term the Reagan administration began pressing the ruling regimes in South Korea, the Philippines, Haiti, and to a lesser extent in Panama, Paraguay, and Chile to grant political rights to the opposition parties; and in some cases it helped (however late) in the process of a transition to democratic rule. Once established, Washington supported the democratic regimes, providing aid and helping prevent coups d'etat, even when the leader threatened was as unabashedly anti-American as Peru's Alan Garcia.[17] In the case of Haiti, the State Department

[14] *AFP: CD 1984*, 283. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams, whom some people credit for this reformulation, made these arguments earlier; see *AFP: CD 1982*, 381. On Abrams's role, see "Excerpts from State Department Memo on Human Rights," *New York Times*, 5 November 1981; and Fossedal, *Democratic Imperative*, chap. 4. For a view that credits other officials—Thomas Enders and Constantine C. Menges—see Woodward, *Veil*, 134–135, 137.

[15] Compare Shultz's speech quoted above, "Human Rights and the Moral Dimensions of Foreign Policy," *AFP: CD 1984*, 279–284, to Haig's speech to the Trilateral Commission, "Human Rights and American Interests," *AFP: CD 1981*, 368–380.

[16] The author was deputy for policy in the State department's Bureau for Inter-American Affairs from 1985 to 1988. Robert Kagan, "Losing in Latin America," *Commentary*, November 1988, 48.

[17] Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World* (New York: Freedom House, 1987).

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moved with haste, uncharacteristically indifferent to the instability that might—and did—erupt after the departure of General Jean-Claude Duvalier. Many critics believed that the administration's new human rights approach was a smokescreen for power politics. Others echoed the *realpolitik* arguments that Haig had made in 1981.[18] While much of the rhetoric of democratization was qualified in practice, the fact still remains that the Reagan administration by all accounts conceived of its general interests in a more expansive and universalist manner than any previous administration, with the possible exception of John F. Kennedy's.

Threats

The Reagan administration believed the most important recent change in international relations was the growth of the Soviet threat. On this a usually cacophonic administration spoke in harmony. First, they agreed that America's material interests had not grown, but that the Soviet capacity to challenge them had. In the words of a senior administration official, "It is a given that we have vital interests around the world. . . . The hard fact is that the military power of the Soviet Union is now able to threaten these vital interests as never before."[19] Second, the administration argued that this increased strength was even more significant, because thanks to America's unwillingness to counter it, the Soviet military had achieved a "decided advantage" in "virtually every measure of military power."[20]

Third, this build-up posed not just a military threat, but a more likely political one.[21] This was the rallying point around which the Committee on the Present Danger, whose members included several future Reagan officials, formed. One of the committee's leaders, Paul Nitze, had mounted a campaign against Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty, stressing both its military and political flaws. The strategic balance was important, he explained, because changes in the ratios of nuclear weapons would translate into changes in political influence, particularly during crises. Shultz concurred: "As a crucial determinant of relative strength, the strategic balance is a key indicator of relative influence."[22]

[18] For a skeptical view, see Tamar Jacoby, "The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Summer 1986).

[19] National Security Adviser William Clark, "National Security Strategy," speech at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 21 May 1982. Clark's speech was delivered one day after the administration completed its belated strategic review, National Security Decision Directive No. 32, which is still classified. Also see Richard Halloran, "Reagan as Military Commander," *New York Times Magazine*, 15 January 1984, 25.

[20] Reagan's speech is reported in, *New York Times*, 23 November 1982; also see for Haig, *AFP: CD 1981*, 2–3; for Shultz, *AFP: CD 1983*, 510.

[21] For the extreme view, the fear that the Soviet Union could "Finlandize" the United States, see Norman Podhoretz, *The Present Danger* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), 58–61.

[22] Paul H. Nitze, James Dougherty, and Francis X. Kane, *The Fateful Ends and Shades of SALT II* (New York: Crane Russak, 1979), 77–78; Nitze's classic statement on escalation dominance is, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (January 1976). Shultz to Senate Armed Services Committee, 20 April 1983, *AFP: CD 1983*, 77. For the opposing position advocating

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Fourth, the threat was as much ideological as anything else. The Reagan administration believed that the 1970s had witnessed a reversal for the West and that America, humiliated by Vietnam, OPEC, and Iran, was neither liked nor feared by the nations of the world. "[The] ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world," said Reagan, "Will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideals—a trial of spiritual resolve."[23] Lastly, while it claimed that prudent American planning must be guided by Soviet capabilities, the Reagan administration had no doubts about Soviet intentions. The president was fond of quoting Churchill's line on the Russians: "I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire are the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines."[24] Throughout its first term the administration put out lists of treaties the Soviets had "cheated" on and human rights abuses that they routinely perpetrated. It also claimed that the Soviet military rejected deterrence in favor of a nuclear war-fighting strategy.[25]

By the middle of its second term the administration dramatically reduced its assessment of the Soviet threat. It could have done this for three reasons. First, it concluded on entering office that it had exaggerated Soviet strength. But with the exception of the Scowcroft Commission, there is no evidence that the administration believed, as John F. Kennedy's did, that it had overestimated its opponent's military might. Second, while still a threat, the Soviet Union's relative strength had diminished because of the United States military build-up, economic recovery, and more confidant world posture. This seems to have been the view of many Reagan officials, particularly those from the Republican establishment. This view continued to be widely held in the first year of the Bush administration. Third, Soviet intentions had changed, reducing the Soviet threat. Mikhail Gorbachev's departure from previous Soviet policies and his strikingly conciliatory style convinced most Americans that the Soviet Union was now a much less threatening rival than it had been. Few were converted to this belief earlier or more fully than Ronald Reagan.[26] So we see that in 1980 the administration increased its estimate of the threat, not because the Soviets became any more evil, but rather because their capacity for action had increased. But in Reagan's second term, though these capabilities had not been reduced in any significant way, officials began reducing their assessment of the threat because of a new reading of Soviet intentions. Most commentators had thought that the Reagan administration would be unlikely to display this flexibility.

existential deterrence see, Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).

[23] 8 June 1982 speech in Reagan, *A Time for Choosing*, 336.

[24] Ibid., 327 (8 June 1982) and 310 (9 May 1982).

[25] See, for example, the view of the head of the National Security Council's Soviet desk from 1981–1983, Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, July 1977.

[26] Steven Roberts, "President Assails Foes of New Arms Pact," *New York Times*, 3 December 1987.

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RESOURCES

Since the Reagan administration believed that the Soviet threat was military, political, and ideological, it began its first term claiming that it would use all these resources to combat Soviet influence. As one official noted, "we will expand our capabilities for meeting Soviet challenges. . . . Doing so will require that we take better advantage of our political, economic and other assets—and those of our allies."[27] The most severe resource America lacked, by this reading, was raw military strength. Caspar Weinberger's recurrent criticism of the Carter administration was not that its defense policies were flawed, but rather that it had provided no resources to execute them.[28] The Reagan administration set about changing this situation.

Ronald Reagan promised the American people that he would rearm America, cut taxes, and balance the nation's budget. Over the years it became strikingly clear which of those three pledges he was not serious about. From the beginning Reagan's economic team knew that combining a large increase in defense spending with a large tax cut might well mean persistent federal deficits. One of Reagan's chief economic advisers recalls that when the campaign staff realized in September 1980 that they would have to forecast $50 billion deficits, they decided "that the importance of increasing defense and going ahead with the full tax cut program was more important than balancing the federal budget quickly."[29] Their forecast was prescient, with one qualification: by 1985 the deficits were in the $250 billion range.

Regardless of whether the budget was kept deliberately unbalanced or not, it is clear that even in the face of mounting deficits the president deemed it important to continue the defense build-up.[30] In doing this Reagan and Weinberger seem to have "rewritten the laws of defense budget history." They obtained the greatest peacetime defense increase ever, whether measured in number of years or dollars or programs. In 1979 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had called for 5 percent real growth in military spending for several years; candidate Reagan endorsed the request. President Reagan exceeded it; from 1981 to 1988 the Department of Defense received over two trillion dollars, $200 billion over the JCS request. After 1985 the budget declined 10 percent in real terms, yet the 1988 defense appropriation was higher in real terms than it was in the costliest year of the Vietnam war.[31]

[27] Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, 10 June 1981, *State Department Bulletin*, August 1981, 73–74. Also see William Clark's statement of 20 May 1982 cited in Louis J. Walinsky, "The Case for Economic Denial," *Foreign Affairs* 16 (Winter 1982/83): 272.

[28] Weinberger to Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 February 1983, *AFP: CD 1983*, 35; *Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 1987* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1987), 37.

[29] Martin Anderson, *Revolution* (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 129. They were able to balance the budget on paper using newly released rosy economic forecasts from the Senate Budget Committee.

[30] David Stockman makes the cynical case in David Stockman, *The Triumph of Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986); Anderson, *Revolution* and Martin Feldstein, "Janeway Lecture," Princeton, University, 1985, suggest that Reagan was optimistic.

[31] Lawrence Korb, "Spending Without Strategy," *International Security* 12 (Summer 1987): 166;

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While President Reagan could congratulate himself for having kept this campaign promise, nagging questions remain as to whether the money appropriated was spent wisely and efficiently. Caspar Weinberger intentionally downplayed strategies and doctrines, making appropriations the only goal of his department.[32] Congress, ill-equipped to create strategy itself, compounded the emphasis on programs. The lack of overall planning at the Pentagon allowed an ambitious service chief like John Lehman, secretary of the navy, to step into the vacuum and create a Maritime Strategy. This was true to a lesser extent in the other services, causing Senator Sam Nunn to observe that in place of an overall military strategy there was "a Navy strategy, an Army strategy, an Air Force strategy, a marine strategy."[33] Finally, the Pentagon refused to plan for the inevitable downturn in the budgetary cycle and instead stretched out ongoing programs. The result is that the Defense Department has to cut back on spare parts, ammunition, and training for the weapons systems already acquired.[34] Ironically, Caspar Weinberger had come into office criticizing the Carter Defense Department for its neglect of readiness and long-term planning.[35]

As controversial as Reagan's defense build-up was, his use of other resources—particularly rhetoric—also annoyed the foreign policy establishment. In his first term Ronald Reagan made several speeches that were more confrontational in tone and substance than those of any president since John F. Kennedy. The administration also attempted a broad-based public diplomacy campaign defending the West and denouncing the Soviets. It expanded the United States Information Agency and Voice of America, and constantly spoke of information as a foreign policy resource and public diplomacy as a fact of life.[36]

Criticism of Reagan's rhetoric grew milder over time. This was in part because it became clear that his words would not be matched by deeds, but also because the ideological warfare was popular with the American public. Reagan's attitude was seen at home as a belated response to years of Soviet propaganda and a forceful assertion of America's role in the world. It did, however, create some problems, both short-term and long-term. From the start it alarmed many to whom the words

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Lawrence Korb and Stephen Daggett, "The Defense Budget and Strategic Planning" in Joseph Kruzel, ed., *American Defense Annual: 1988* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), 44–45.

[32] Weinberger rejected planning on the basis of two-and-a-half or one-and-a-half war strategies or any abstract concepts; see Weinberger speech of 5 May 1981, *AFP: CD 1981*, 40–41; *Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 1983*, 11-19. For a detailed critique of the one-and-a-half war strategy, see Francis J. West, Jr., "Conventional Forces in NATO and Beyond" in W. Scott Thompson, ed., *National Security in the 1980s* (San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), 324–328. In 1981 West became assistant secretary for defense for international security affairs.

[33] Cited in Korb, "Spending Without Strategy," 169.

[34] For an analysis that emphasizes the resulting increase in costs, rather than the loss of readiness, see Gordan Adams and Stephen Alexis Cain, "Defense Dilemmas in the 1990s," *International Security* 13 (Spring 1989): 5–15.

[35] Weinberger to Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 February 1983, *AFP: CD 1983*, 35.

[36] Funding for the United States Information Agency was raised to $92 million in 1982; Charles Z. Wick, a Reagan confidante, was placed at its helm. See Shultz to Rand Corporation, *AFP: CD 1984*, 454. An entire chapter is devoted to this subject in Fossedal, *Democratic Imperative*, 88–114.

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were not addressed. Europeans were disturbed, many because they disagreed with Reagan's politics, but many others because they detected in his populist tone a unilateralism and nativism that was as anti-European as anti-Soviet. "The real potency of American isolation lies at the heart of Mr. Reagan's Defense Department. . . ." wrote the editor of *The Economist* in 1982. But even in Europe, the criticism abated in time.[37] The Reagan administration for its part softened its rhetoric and scaled back its public diplomacy. And it did so for a good political reason—the talk had become ineffective. "Increases in power produced by rhetoric can be quick and cheap," explains Samuel Huntington. "[T]hey are so likely to be fragile and transitory."[38]

With diplomacy, the traditional resource of foreign policy, the Reagan administration had a mixed record. While diplomacy is often said to be a mixture of threats and promises, in practice nations use many more carrots than they do sticks. The Reagan administration shifted this balance, confident that disincentives would work better than incentives. "[We do not] believe," explained a State Department official, "that the prospect of cooperative activities will necessarily induce the Soviet Union to moderate its policies."[39] This threatening approach seems to have worked with American adversaries. The intermediate nuclear force (INF) treaty and Soviet restraint in general seem to have been achieved in part because the United States made clear that Soviet aggression would bring quick and strong responses. The administration claims that its bellicose threats of economic and political sanctions during that Polish crisis of November 1981 may have forestalled a Soviet invasion of Poland. The Reagan administration was similarly confrontational with hostile Third World nations. Threats were backed with force, which was used only when it was sure to be effective. (Lebanon in 1984 is the exception, and troops were removed from there relatively quickly.) Again many of the administration's goals were achieved; Grenada is now a pro-U.S. democracy, Libyan terrorism subsided, and Cuba and Nicaragua scaled back both the rhetoric and substance of their support for insurgencies abroad.[40] But the Reagan administration also used this coercive diplomacy with allies, with whom threats are less credible. For example, the administration's effort to bully its European allies into canceling the Euro-Siberian pipeline deal backfired; and in general, attempts to tighten tech-

[37] Andrew Knight, "Ronald Reagan's Watershed Year?" *Foreign Affairs: America and the World* 61 (1982): 525–6; Michael Howard, "A European Perspective on the Reagan Years," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World* 66 (1987/88): 479.

[38] Samuel P. Huntington, "Coping with the Lippmann Gap," "*Foreign Affairs: America and the World* 66 (1987/88): 458.

[39] Lawrence Eagleburger, 10 June 1981, *Department of State Bulletin*, August 1981, 74; see also George Shultz testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *AFP: CD 1983*, 510–511.

[40] Tim Zimmerman, "The American Bombing of Libya: A Success for Coercive Diplomacy?" *Survival* 19 (May/June 1987): 195–214. Some argue that sanctions against Nicaragua could have been even more effective had they been applied earlier and more thoroughly; see Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, "Nicaragua Sanctions: Too Little, Too Late," *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 May 1985; and Fossedal, *Democratic Imperative*, 131–132.

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nology transfers were fraught with difficulties.[41] And when threats fail, as Thomas Schelling has pointed out, they are expensive.

Strategies

Having discussed the Reagan administration's conception of interests, threats, and resources, we can now ask how it put them all together, created goals, related means to these ends, and implemented this strategy. There are two theoretical approaches often used to analyze postwar American foreign policy: John Lewis Gaddis's framework of symmetry and asymmetry, and policy analysis deriving from neorealist theory. Gaddis has suggested that strategies of containment alternate between "symmetrical" ones, which counter adversaries at the same place, time, and in the same manner as enemy thrusts (Korea, Vietnam) and "asymmetrical" ones, which choose preferred places, times, and manners to respond (Flexible Response, Nixon Doctrine.) Symmetrical ones, he adds, are usually "cost-maximizing" and "risk-minimizing." To use his examples, the Korean War was symmetrical in that it countered an enemy offensive in the same place, time, and manner as that offensive. The cost of such a strategy is high, but there is a low risk of "losing" the area, or letting the offensive go unresponded to. Asymmetrical ones, on the other hand, are "cost-minimizing" and "risk-maximizing." Flexible response promised to counter Soviet moves at a time, place, and with means of U.S. choice. The costs of asymmetry are lower, because its response will emphasize the U.S. comparative advantage; but there is a risk that any given Soviet move will go unchallenged because at the time no such advantageous response is available. Samuel Huntington points out that these alternations coincide with swings in the defense budgetary cycles, with symmetrical containment on the upswing and asymmetrical on the downswing.[42] Since the most striking feature of U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s has been its large military build-up, the Reagan administration's strategy of containment can at first glance be labeled symmetrical. Indeed Gaddis has made this case recently.[43]

The administration, however, did not believe it was practicing symmetrical containment. "Implementation of our overarching strategy . . . requires an array of strategies that capitalize on our advantages and exploit our adversaries' weaknesses.

[41] See, Richard N. Perle "The Strategic Implications of West-East Technology Transfer" in *The Conduct of East-West Relations in the 1980s: Part II*, Adelphi Paper No. 190 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1984), 20–28; also see Carl Gershman, "Selling Them Rope," *Commentary*, April 1979, 35–45. For an historical analysis of economic containment, see Angela E. Stent, "Economic Containment in Deibel and Gaddis," *Containment,* vol I, 161–189.

[42] Gaddis, *Strategies*, 352–353; Samuel Huntington, "The Defense Policy of the Reagan Administration: 1981–1982" in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., *The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 82–116.

[43] John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment and the Logic of Strategy," *The National Interest* 10 (Winter 1987/8): 27–38. Also see Samuel Huntington, "U.S. Defense Strategy: The Strategic Innovation of the Reagan Years" in Joseph Kruzel ed., *American Defense Annual: 1987–1988* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), 23–43.

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. . . It is essential that we rebuild our forces in ways that emphasize our specific comparative advantage," explained Caspar Weinberger. William Clark made the same point when explaining why the United States needed a mix between continental and peripheral strategies: "We can't [engage the Soviet Union successfully on all fronts]; simply can't."[44] Reagan himself often emphasized the need for a struggle in all forms, because he believed that while the Soviet Union has an advantage in the military sphere, the United States was better off exploiting its economic, political, and ideological strengths.

Military Strategy

In the military sphere itself, Weinberger insisted that "it is not our intention to match the Soviets tank for tank or aircraft for aircraft. . . . We recognize that other factors besides quantitative comparison affect the military balance."[45] From the first years of the administration, the United States began moving toward strategies that exploited Soviet weakness. The United States Army and SHAPE in Europe developed (independent of one another) the Air-Land Battle doctrine and the Follow-on-Forces Attack (FOFA), both of which attempted to give the United States the flexibility to quickly gain the initiative and pursue any war with the Warsaw Pact forces in areas, circumstances, and at a pace favorable to NATO. Samuel Huntington proposed encompassing these doctrines, which were essentially tactical, under a broader strategic concept—"conventional retaliation." This advocated, in the event of any Warsaw Pact attack, a strong offensive strike against the Soviet Union's weakest link—its political and military alliance with Eastern Europe.[46]

The Navy's Maritime Strategy was as clearly asymmetrical. Rather than simply defend against Soviet attacks, the doctrine required that the United States escalate the conflict into areas of Soviet weakness. Whichever component of this concept one emphasizes—offensive sea control, horizontal escalation, counterforce coercion—it bears the clear marks of asymmetrical strategy. Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. explained:

> [If] the Soviet Union starts a war in a chosen theater, such as Central Europe, they cannot expect it will be limited only to the theater of their greatest strength. . . . [the Maritime

[44] Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Spring 1984): 675–698; Clark, "National Security Strategy."

[45] Weinberger to Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 February 1983, *AFP: CD 1983*, 34.

[46] Huntington, "U.S. Defense Strategy," 32–35; Samuel Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," *International Security* 8 (Winter 1983–84). On FOFA and Air-Land Battle, see Boyd D. Sutton, John R. Landry, Malcom B. Armstrong, Howell M. Estes III, and Wesley Clark, "New Directions in Conventional Defense," *Survival* 26 (March/April 1984). Also see John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security* 7 (Summer 1982); Mearsheimer, "Numbers, Strategy and the European Balance," *International Security* 12 (Spring 1988); and Eliot Cohen, "Towards Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance," *International Security* 13 (Summer 1988).

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> Strategy] enables free-world forces to be applied where Soviet forces are weakest and their vulnerabilities greatest, as in their Pacific territories and client states.[47]

Gaddis, in labeling the Reagan administration's policies symmetrical, is forced to assert that while the Maritime Strategy would be an example of asymmetrical thinking, it is most likely a declaratory and not an actual strategy. He provides no evidence for this claim, and none of the articles or memoirs written by the strategy's authors, even after they left government, suggest this possibility.[48] If in fact the strategy were simply declaratory, it was an unusually well-kept secret in a rather leaky administration, even from critics within the Pentagon who were so exercised precisely because they believed it was not just declaratory.

Strategic Modernization and SDI

From the administration's point of view, however, none of these solutions addressed its central defense problem—the vulnerability of U.S. land-based nuclear missiles. Strategic modernization of that portion of the triad was deemed essential to close the window of vulnerability that has opened up in the Soviet Union's favor. Yet the modernization program got off to a shaky start. Congressional support for the MX missile has always been weak, and the nuclear freeze movement pressured the administration to achieve strategic stability through arms control. The Scowcroft Commission, while supporting the MX, undermined its rationale by downplaying the "window of vulnerability."[49] The missile it proposed, the Midgetman, would be survivable and would not invite a first strike. But while the strategic modernization program was being debated, another more ambitious project would soon occupy the center stage of strategic issues. Strobe Talbott and Michael Mandelbaum noticed, "When the President unveiled SDI in March 1983, it seemed unlikely to replace the strategic modernization program as the administration's driving preoccupation. Yet by the second term that's precisely what happened."[50] It happened because the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) temporarily solved the strategic modernization problem.

SDI did not begin with Ronald Reagan's March 1983 speech, and it did not begin as a replacement for deterrence. *Strategic Survey 1980–81* reported that "strong pressures have already developed in the U.S. for the amendment or even the abrogation of the [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty."[51] These pressures came from people who advocated limited missile defenses, not Reagan's vision of a population shield.

[47] John F. Lehman, Jr., *Command of the Seas* (New York: Scribners, 1988), 126.

[48] Gaddis, "Containment and Strategy," 35. On the Maritime Strategy, see James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 112 (January 1986): 7–15; also see Lehman, *Command*, 115–150; for a critique, see John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986).

[49] "Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces" (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 11 April 1983).

[50] Strobe Talbott and Michael Mandelbaum, *Reagan and Gorbachev* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 106.

[51] IISS, *Strategic Survey 1980–1981* (London: IISS, 1981), 16.

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While the debate over SDI was seriously altered by Reagan's genuine belief in a defense program that would render nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete," strong elements within the administration continually promoted "point-defense" as a way of strengthening land-based missile survivability. By 1984 the Scowcroft Commission emphasized that one did not have to choose between the two: "it is impossible to distinguish between defensive systems designed to enhance survivability of offensive systems and those designed to put a shield over wide areas of the United States. . . ."[52] In the second term, SDI was being spoken of by several administration officials as part of the strategic modernization program.[53]

Consider the Nitze view of deterrence: the overall strategic balance is important because it translates into political influence. The administration openly acknowledged that it would alter the strategic balance in its favor before negotiating arms-control agreements, because that change would intimidate the Russians into making concessions. In fact that is what seems to have happened. The Soviet Union feared that SDI would give the United States a survivable offensive capability and did not want to enter into a high-technology arms race (that it would lose) in response. This perception of a potential advantage for the United States explains in part Moscow's readiness to negotiate, and its unusually accommodating positions on a series of arms-control issues. Whether by design or not, SDI gave the United States the political leverage it had sought through strategic modernization without having made significant progress on the MX or Midgetman. Since SDI existed only in theory, it could alter only the psychological balance of power. The actual military threat arising from the U.S. ICBM vulnerability, which the Reagan administration warned about in dire terms, never manifested itself. Building MX and Midgetman would have been a symmetrical, missile-for-missile approach that attempted to match the Soviet Union in a game it had experience in—churning out vast quantities of ICBMs. SDI, on the other hand, responded to the Soviet challenge in terms favorable to the United States and unfavorable to the Soviets, moving the arms race into the high-technology arena and stretching the time-frame into a long-term one where the United States is stronger.[54]

[52] "Final Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," 21 March 1984 in *AFP: CD 1984*, 48. Weinberger makes a similar point on 1 May 1984, ibid., 54.

[53] Robert McFarlane speech, 7 March 1985, *AFP: CD 1985*, 49; also see "White House Statement on Strategic Modernization," 3 June 1986, *AFP: CD 1986*, 48–50. Reagan and to a lesser extent Weinberger persisted in speaking in terms of a population shield, but did so most fervently only when speaking to a conservative group; see, for example, Reagan's radio talk (which is tailored for its Reaganite audience) on 12 July 1986 in ibid., 50–51. Nitze's view of the entire struggle is thoroughly presented in Strobe Talbott, *Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1988), 185–385.

[54] Off the record remarks by one senior Soviet official suggest that SDI made the proposals of the hard-line elements in the Kremlin seems less and less tenable in the long run and helped consolidate the power of Mikhail Gorbachev's faction.

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Symmetry and Asymmetry: Costs and Risks

In several other areas symmetrical approaches were consciously rejected. At the start of the administration, officials promised that "linkage would be the operative principle," reviving Kissinger's idea of linking economic benefits to the Soviets with their external and internal policies.[55] But Shultz did not practice this policy, explaining why in 1984: "Linkage . . . has limitations; if applied rigidly it could yield the initiative to the Soviets, letting them set the pace and character of the relationship. . . . Sudden shifts in policy stemming from emotional and perfectly understandable reactions to Soviet behavior are not the way to pursue our interests." While this characterization was not how linkage was conceived, Shultz makes a persuasive case that in practice it is too reactive and inflexible.[56] This is the classic criticism of symmetrical containment.

Symmetrical strategies such as the Carter Doctrine are costly and low-risk: there is a much smaller danger that the Persian Gulf will be attacked if the United States makes a formal commitment to counter such a move militarily. Asymmetrical programs like the Nixon Doctrine are cheap but high-risk: shifting the policeman role to regional powers reduces economic and political costs to the United States; but it also reduces the surety of a response to any given offensive. Reagan's military strategy is unprecedented in the postwar era in that it was high-cost and high-risk.[57] It was, in Gaddis's terms, part symmetrical and part asymmetrical.

On the expense of Reagan's strategy there is little disagreement, Indeed, by the end of the second term much of the friendly criticism of his policies came from people who thought that the administration had devoted too much time and money on the asymmetrical aspect of its strategy (bold offensive initiatives) at the cost of symmetry (the basic need to counter the Soviet threat when and where it manifests itself). Critics of the Maritime Strategy charged that in the event of a big European war, the navy would spend too many of its resources on its forward strategy and be unable to help through convoying in the main NATO response, which would be a land-based defense against the Soviet attack.[58] Similarly Lawrence Korb has recently criticized SDI as a wasteful way to address the problem of U.S. ICBM inferiority, which cuts into the MX and Midgetman missile programs that would counter the Soviet threat more cheaply, missile-for-missile.[59]

[55] Eagleburger's testimony in *State Department Bulletin*, August 1981, 74; Haig, *Caveat*, 220.

[56] Shultz's address to Rand Corporation, 18 October 1984, *AFP: CD 1984*, 453. Linkage as conceived by Kissinger was asymmetrical—events in one area extend to another. But in implementation, more because of Congress than Kissinger, it degenerated into a fixed quid pro quo system where the penalties and rewards were outlined beforehand. This forced American strategy to be reactive and mechanistic. On this, see Gaddis, *Strategies*, 310–313.

[57] I use "risky" infrequently because of its pejorative connotations. It should be remembered that all strategies involve risks. High-risk ones accentuate that aspect to gain certain benefits, which often include low costs and the prospect of a quick victory.

[58] John J. Weltmann, "The Short, Unhappy Life of the Maritime Strategy," *The National Interest*, Spring 1989, 80–86.

[59] Korb and Daggett, "The Defense Budget," 46–48. This was always Nitze's view. He believed that

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Why were Reagan's policies, in contrast to most high cost strategies, also high risk? To answer that question, we must understand what Gaddis lumps under the term risk. Symmetrical strategies are low risk in the sense that there is a very low probability of a bad outcome. But if the strategy fails, the resulting outcome is a *very bad* one—usually a war involving American troops. Asymmetrical containment, on the other hand, is high risk for two reasons: the risk of exposed interests and the risk of aggressive means. George Kennan's or Dwight Eisenhower's or Richard Nixon's strategy was high risk, because by promising to defend only selected interests, others lay exposed and endangered; their loss could prove humiliating, even damaging. The limited interests that were preserved, however, would be defended in a more daring and aggressive way with policies like Massive Retaliation. Reagan's strategy adopted the asymmetrical—that is, aggressive—method of defending interests, finding preferred means, places, and times to respond; but it did not reduce any of its interests. The risk lay not in unguaranteed interests—for there were none—but in the provocative means by which all interests would be defended. To use a World War II analogy, the strategy adopted General George Patton's plan for quick, deep strikes into the heart of Germany in addition to, not instead of, General Dwight Eisenhower's broad-based attrition approach. This combination of universal interests and activist policies led to criticism that the Reagan administration was pursuing a revolutionary foreign policy. Most strongly attacked for these reasons were the programs popularly known as the Reagan Doctrine.

Reagan Doctrine: Containment or Rollback?

While the Reagan Doctrine was labeled as such by commentator Charles Krauthammer, it neatly encompassed the administration's various efforts to support insurgent groups that were fighting communist governments.[60] Critics saw these initiatives as highly provocative and argued that the Reagan administration had rejected certain rules of discretion and stability that the United States had observed for years. One scholar judged the Reagan Doctrine to be "the most concrete difference between [this administration's] foreign policy and the foreign policy of its predecessors."[61] These charges implied, some explicitly stated, that the Reagan administration had gone beyond containment, attempting to rollback the Soviet Union.

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the Soviets feared that SDI may permanently solve the strategic modernization issue in America's favor, but that in reality SDI was too costly and impractical. Something that your opponent thinks is valuable but that you know is worthless is the perfect bargaining chip.

[60] For one of the first arguments, see Charles Krauthammer, "Isolationism, Left and Right," *New Republic*, 4 March 1985; and, "The Poverty of Realism," *New Republic*, 17 February 1986. Robert W. Tucker and Krauthammer engaged in an extended debate on this topic in *The National Interest* 1 (Fall 1985), 2 (Winter 1986), 3 (Spring 1986), and 4 (Summer 1986). For an excellent critique, see Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The Guns of July," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Spring 1986): 203–220.

[61] Kenneth A. Oye, "Constrained Confidence and the Evolution of Reagan Foreign Policy," in Oye, et al., *Eagle Resurgent*, 25.

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The Reagan administration accepted that it differed from previous administrations but only in its interpretation of containment. The first phase of containment, officials argued, assumed that the Soviet Union was interested solely in its periphery, but by the 1970s both Soviet might and ambitions had grown enormously. "Where it was once our goal to contain the Soviet presence within the limits of its immediate post-war reach," explained Shultz, "now our goal must be to advance our own objectives, where possible foreclosing and when necessary actively countering Soviet challenges whenever they threaten our interests. Unlike containment our policy begins with the clear realization that the Soviet Union is and will remain a global superpower"[62] By "containment" Shultz here means George Kennan's vision of dealing with Soviet expansionism only in Europe. Kennan did not realize that containment would become the guiding force of foreign policy worldwide; but it had to, because it addressed the central feature of the international system—bipolarity. The U.S. strategy toward its rival superpower and the other pole of the world was bound to turn from a regional or European strategy into a more expansive global one—a grand strategy. George Kennan's "Long Telegram" of 1946 was overshadowed in influence by NSC-68, the more globalist State Department analysis of 1950, in part because the latter recognized this reality.

"How do we achieve [containment] in today's conditions?" asked Reagan in 1986. His answer shows the new Soviet challenge that the administration believed it was confronting. "First, the Brezhnev Doctrine that Soviet gains are irreversible is an arrogant pretension we must face up to."[63] The Reagan Doctrine was conceived not as a revolutionary policy of rollback, but rather as a version of containment that would correct the imbalance in the status quo caused by the Soviet Union's revolutionary policies of the 1970s, when it expanded "far beyond the natural limits of its own apparent interests and influence."[64] The rhetoric of the Reagan Doctrine was universal and invited criticism from both the Left and Right. In Congressman Stephen Solarz's words, "the ideological imperative . . . that creates a moral obligation . . . for our country to provide assistance to anti-communist liberation movements wherever they may be around the world . . . [is] a manifest absurdity."[65] But in practice the administration chose only those Third World countries where Soviet influence was recent and the regime could be destabilized for relatively low costs. And even when these conditions were satisfied, nothing was done if other major interests or concerns would have to be sacrificed, as in the cases of Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cambodia and for five years, Angola.[66] Kraut-

[62] Shultz to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15 June 1983, *AFP: CD 1983*, 510. (Emphasis added.)

[63] Reagan to U.S. Congress 14 March 1986, *AFP: CD 1986*; also see Shultz's testimony of 15 June 1983, *AFP: CD 1983*, 510.

[64] Haig, *Caveat*, 26.

[65] Stephen Solarz in American Enterprise Institute (AEI), *The Reagan Doctrine and Beyond* (Washington, D.C.: AEI, 1987), 7.

[66] When the House of Representatives voted a symbolic $5 million military aid package to the Cambodian rebels over Shultz's objections, he immediately announced that the administration would take advantage of the legislation's option to make the aid humanitarian. See Rosenfeld, "Guns of July," 613.

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hammer outlined how he saw the doctrine: "The elements are simple: anti-communist revolution as a tactic. Containment as the strategy. And freedom as the rationale." Guerrillas, he added, were "astonishingly cheap."[67]

Henry Kissinger worried that the administration was focusing unduly on the communist nature of its enemies rather than their pro-Soviet foreign policy. It is true that Reagan's rhetoric was in tension with his strategic logic. Helping freedom fighters triumph over tyranny is not the same as bleeding the Soviet Empire by funding insurgencies. Leaving aside the moral questions this raises, the policy's incoherent logic manifests itself in an inability to set clear goals, as the administration's dealings with Nicaragua demonstrate. Throughout its tenure the Reagan administration spoke in two distinct voices about the Sandinista government. At times it wanted to turn Nicaragua into a democracy; at other times it was disturbed chiefly by Managua's foreign policy. It is no wonder that the administration did not achieve its goal in Nicaragua, since it did not have one. When Washington would clamor about democracy and a free press, the Sandinistas would temporarily reopen the opposition daily, *La Prensa*, release political prisoners, and revive fears about the contras' undemocratic past. When the State Department pointed to Soviet arms shipments, the Nicaraguan government would argue that it was defending itself against the contras, the American mining of its harbors, and a potential U.S. invasion. By constantly shifting the terms of the debate, Washington was never able to muster enough support on any one goal in its policy toward Nicaragua.

With the exception of Nicaragua and Panama however, the administration's policies in the Third World accomplished their chief objectives—reducing Soviet influence and promoting democracy. The administration balanced the often conflicting demands of these two goals with a concern for stability. It positively affected, if at times only at the margins, the outcome in Afghanistan, Angola, El Salvador, the Philippines, and South Korea. Administration officials point to the fact that there has been a strong movement towards democracy and no successful coup against a democratic regime in Latin America during the 1980s.[68] This may not be enough for those who believe that America can and should remake the world, but compared with its predecessors the Reagan administration's policy of pushing communist and noncommunist countries in the Third World towards democracy had four advantages. First, it combatted Soviet influence in the Third World. Second, it helped create stable friendly governments without condemning America to a reputation as a supporter of right-wing tyrants (Nixon Doctrine) or an imperial power attempting nation-building (Vietnam). Third, its ideological component had the vital advantage of being saleable to the American Congress and public. Fourth, it was relatively cheap.

[67] Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," 16, 21.

[68] Kagan, "Losing," 46–49; Elliott Abrams, "Inside the Reaganista Revolution," *Policy Review* 50 (Fall 1989): 208. Elected civilians replaced military governments in Honduras (1982), Bolivia (1982), Argentina (1983), El Salvador (1984), Panama (1984), Uruguay (1985), Brazil (1985), and Guatemala (1985); see Raymond Gastil, *Freedom in the World* (New York: Freedom House, 1987, 1988, 1989).

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Neorealism and the Threat

As is often true but rarely acknowledged in debates on strategy, the crucial issue does come down to whether or not the threat was real: did the Soviet Union need to be countered in 1980? Several commentators, using prescriptions derived from neorealist theory, contend that the Reagan build-up was the result of confused and unnecessary concerns:[69] confused, because the administration both feared the Soviet threat and was confident that Soviet communism was bankrupt. While they may have made some contradictory public statements on this issue, Reagan, Haig, Shultz, and other officials repeatedly explained why they held both views. One reporter summarized the administration's position in 1981, well before it was apparent that the Soviet Union wanted to reform itself: "[The Secretary of State has] said, as has the President that the Communist system faces a lot of difficulties over the next ten years, but at the moment they are militarily very powerful."[70] Because Russia was in economic and political trouble, the administration argued, it might act militarily out of desperation. It was important to keep American defenses strong and thus rule out the often-exercised diversion of the Russian ruling elite—external expansion. " . . . I don't wish to sound overly optimistic [about Soviet decline]," Reagan said in his speech to the British parliament in 1982. "It has happened in the past [that] a small ruling elite either mistakenly attempts to ease domestic unrest through greater repression and foreign adventure, or it chooses a wiser course."[71] A senior Reagan aide claims that the administration consciously attempted to put pressure on the *nomenklatura* to follow the "wiser course"—internal reform.[72]

The administration's fears were unnecessary, these critics claim, because, first, while the Reagan administration feared that Soviet strength would lead countries to bandwagon with the stronger nation, in fact neorealism has demonstrated that nations tend to balance against a stronger power; second, the Soviet Union was much weaker than the Reagan administration thought. The arguments are mutually exclusive. If the Soviet Union was in fact weaker than the United States, then by neorealist logic neutral nations would ally with it, and that would be a genuine cause for concern in Washington. If the United States were weakening, then regardless of the alliance pattern, it had genuine cause for concern. Balancing theory, in predicting that nations will ally against a rising power, surely rests on the assumption that the stronger power's principal rival is asserting itself as a viable alternative. Nations did not balance against the Roman Empire because there did

[69] See, for example, Oye, "Constrained Confidence"; Posen and Van Evera, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy"; and, Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 14 (Summer 1989). (Each one does not all make all the following points.)

[70] Karen House and Tom Bray posed this as a question when interviewing Secretary of State Alexander Haig, *The Wall Street Journal,* 9 July 1981.

[71] *AFP: CD 1982*, 19. For similar analyses by Haig see *AFP: CD 1981*, 55–57, 569, 587, 588; for Shultz's view see, *AFP: CD 1982*, 12–14.

[72] Richard Pipes, "Gorbachev's Russia: Breakdown or Crackdown," *Commentary*, March 1990, 16.

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not seem to be another credible great power in the system with whom they could ally. Otherwise, the logical prescription of balancing theory would be that nations deliberately weaken themselves to attract allies.

Steven Walt appears to solve this problem by substituting "threat" for "power" in balancing theory.[73] Thus the prescription is to be less threatening without diminishing one's power and thus attract allies. While this is a more sophisticated version of balancing theory, some questions remain. There are few ways to be less threatening without reducing one's power. A short-term solution is conciliatory rhetoric, but that would be as "fragile and transitory" as Reagan's bellicose rhetoric was in increasing American power. There is also a fine line between being less threatening and seeming weak and hence not a credible great power to ally with. Gorbachev initially seemed to walk this line with dexterity, reducing the Soviet threat but not its power and thus attracting friends. But Soviet power in Eastern Europe was made up in large part of the Soviet threat to intervene. Once that threat was taken away, Soviet power collapsed and Eastern European nations started moving away from the Soviet Union, balancing against a declining, less threatening, power. Walt writes in a 1989 article that while balancing theory is correct, its most obvious prescription for America—the United States should pull out of Europe because the Europeans would ally even more strongly with a less fearsome America—should be ignored. Balancing would occur eventually, he asserts, but it would take a shape, form, and timing that the United States may not like or be able to influence. This must be regarded as a general qualification to balancing theory.[74] The statesman, unlike the academic, cannot wait for international relations theory to work itself out. He must have a policy that addresses the perceived power distribution in the world.

Conclusions

Theory aside, the question remains: was the Soviet Union restrained because or in spite of the Reagan administration's strategy? The nature of this question points to the high standard by which the Reagan administration is being judged. In the postwar period most administrations have sought to be evaluated favorably by distancing themselves from the acknowledged disasters of their terms—usually the "loss" of a major ally or a war. (Eisenhower's is the only exception.) In this case no major setback occurred and by traditional indices—arms control agreements, anticommunist forces gaining strength—foreign policy "successes" were achieved. As American public opinion sees it, Ronald Reagan came into a world

[73] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[74] Walt, "Finite Containment," 37–40. Consider an extreme example. Recently released documents show that in the late 1940s and 1950s, American diplomats were fully aware that geopolitically China should want to ally itself against the Soviet Union. They even devised a wedge strategy to help this occur. Yet for at least fifteen years they had to confront the inexorable reality of China's unflinching support for every Soviet move and posture in the world arena. See John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 147–195.

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marked by Russian expansion and Third World turmoil. Today the Soviet Union has withdrawn from most areas of world conflict, a reduction of nuclear weapons has begun, and there are no interstate wars in force around the globe. The Reagan administration claims credit for this. It would seem easy to get, but for several reasons, many remain unwilling to grant that the Reagan strategy of containment worked.

The most important reason for this reluctance is that the changed global atmosphere must unquestionably be attributed largely to the turn of events inside the Soviet Union. Reagan's critics point to the Soviet domestic condition and believe that the Kremlin finally had no inclination or ability to pursue aggressive foreign policies and that the Reagan administration's programs simply coincided with this fundamental change in Soviet behavior. Apart from this reason, critics balk at commending Reagan's policies because the president's obvious lack of strategic thought makes it difficult to believe that any "Reagan strategy" could exist. Also, the bureaucratic infighting and high turnover—Reagan had as many national security advisers as the previous five presidents put together—made coordinated diplomacy difficult; and the amateurism of the National Security Council staff, demonstrated in the Iran-contra affair, casts further doubt on the existence of a wise foreign policy-making apparatus.

This may suggest, as it has to many in the past, that Ronald Reagan is simply a lucky man. While some of the administration's success could be attributed to chance, Reagan's polices *were* effective. Clearly Soviet internal reform occurred largely because of the dynamics of Soviet domestic politics. The unbearable economic situation and coercive state control in Russia led to the creation of a reformist faction that waited for the Brezhnev elite's grip on power to loosen before asserting control. And this domestic dynamic was a major reason for the change in Soviet foreign policy. Reagan's policies could only have had an effect on the margin—having a greater effect on Soviet foreign policy than on internal reform. But all American foreign policy has limited influence; it is still appropriate to ask whether it succeeds or fails on that margin. The argument that the Kremlin finally found the economic crisis unbearable cannot explain everything. The Soviet economy had been moribund for at least fifteen years. If the situation was unbearable from 1980 to 1985, it was also unbearable from 1975 to 1980, and yet Soviet foreign policy was unusually expansive in that period. Arguments that assert that there was an inevitable trigger—known only in retrospect—that caused an event are always suspect.

As a strategist, Reagan's staunch adherence to certain principles provided him with steady goals and his advisers—many of whom were intellectuals[75]—conceived

[75] If Ph.D.'s are any measure, Reagan's foreign policy intellectuals included Secretary of State George Shultz; Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam; Deputy Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé; UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick; Deputy Director of the CIA Robert Gates; Assistant Secretaries of State Paul Wolfowitz, Chester Crocker, and Alan Keyes; Director of the National Security Agency William Odom; National Security Council aides, Richard Pipes, Steven Sestanovich, Dennis Ross, Carnes Lord, and several others. A similar list for the Carter or Bush administration would be much shorter.

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of innovative means to these ends. Despite the muddling and infighting, the ideological tenor of the administration gave its policies a certain consistency. The policies were risky, but sacrificed safety in the real hope of quick success. Perhaps they succeeded only because they were tried against a weary, overextended Russian empire; but the policies were conceived precisely because that empire overextended itself. In a sense the Reagan Doctrine did to the Russians what Vietnam did to the Americans; just as America's opposition to communism everywhere was pared down by the 1970s, so Brezhnev's embracing guarantee to all communist regimes was tested and exposed to be untenable beyond the natural Soviet sphere of influence—Eastern Europe—for which it had been promulgated in the first place. And finally, Reagan's willingness to accept Gorbachev's sincerity earlier than most American politicians signaled to the Soviets that their changed attitude would be met by a friendly American response.

The parts of the Reagan strategy that worked best—the Reagan Doctrine, the threat of SDI, forward strategies, the rhetoric—were relatively inexpensive. The vast military build-up was helpful in conveying an image of American bipartisan strength and resolve, but Eastern Europe, for instance, seems to have been emboldened far more by Reagan's rhetoric than his navy. It is difficult to separate the various effects, but it is certainly conceivable that the Reagan strategy of containment would have worked just as well with substantially smaller military increases. The build-up was also fiscally irresponsible; it exacerbated America's perennial defense deficit between what it wants and what it pays for. Other presidents have left similar legacies, but no one since Franklin Roosevelt has had as much political capital with which he could close this shortfall.

Interaction

When devising elegant definitions of strategy on paper, it is often forgotten that strategy is above all interactive. Asymmetry cannot be preferred to symmetry in the abstract, nor can a nation's foreign policy be simply to wait for balancing to occur, because in practice strategies must respond to events. What would George Kennan—the apostle of limited, asymmetrical containment—do if North Korea invaded South Korea? He would and did support symmetrical containment—the Korean War. Soviet adventurism in the 1970s, particularly since it seemed to take advantage of America's Vietnam syndrome, was bound to provoke an American response. And the speed and forcefulness of Reagan's response may have helped make the Soviet Union realize its blunder and begin correcting it.

In 1980 Robert Axelrod ran two tournaments for computer programs to determine what pattern of behavior one should use to elicit cooperation from an adversary. He was surprised to find that the strategy that won both tournaments was the shortest and simplest—a program called Tit For Tat—which consistently beat out highly sophisticated and nuanced alternative strategies. Analyzing its success, he suggested some rules to induce cooperation from a rival.[76] First, be nice; don't

[76] Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 109–123. There

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be the first to stop cooperating. If you "defect," that is, stop cooperating, your adversary is likely to retaliate, setting off an uncontrollable spiral. Second, always reciprocate both defection and cooperation. If your adversary defects, you should do likewise. But if he then cooperates, forgive him immediately and cooperate in turn. Third, don't be too clever. Highly complex strategies are incomprehensible, and if you appear unresponsive your adversary has no incentive to cooperate with you. Tit for Tat's great success is its clarity; it is eminently comprehensible to the adversary. The Reagan strategy of containment followed strikingly similar lines. In response to what it saw as American cooperation during détente, Soviet expansionism in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Afghanistan was viewed as rank defection. The Reagan strategy was to retaliate against this defection with the utmost clarity. When by 1986 the Soviet Union began cooperating, the administration held few grudges and quickly reciprocated that cooperation. The straightforwardness of this strategy—which some saw as crudeness—may go a long way in explaining the now blossoming partnership between the Soviet Union and the United States.

is a first rule: don't be envious of others' success. Tit for Tat won in the long run, not by destroying the other player, but by allowing both parties to live. In the U.S.-Soviet context this rule has been accepted by both superpowers, perhaps because of nuclear weapons.

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The "New" New Deal: FDR and American Liberalism, 1937–1945

JOHN W. JEFFRIES

The administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt did not run out of ideas after 1937, nor did "Dr. New Deal" retire during World War II. The conventional portrait of the late 1930s and the war years as a period without significant innovation in domestic policy needs reworking. During Roosevelt's second term, American liberals urged additional social reform, supported a reorganized executive branch with enhanced national planning and administrative capability, and turned to the "new economics" of compensatory fiscal policy. By 1939, one prominent journalist discerned an emerging "new New Deal," and some historians have begun to write of a "Third New Deal" taking shape by the end of the decade. For liberal policy formulation, if not for its implementation, the late 1930s were considerably more important than commonly recognized.[1]

[1] On a "new New Deal," see Kenneth C. Crawford, "From Pump-Priming to Pumping," *Nation*, 27 May 1939, 607. On a "Third New Deal," see Otis L. Graham, Jr., "New Deal" in Otis L. Graham, Jr. and Meghan Robinson Wander, eds., *Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1985), 286; Barry D. Karl, *The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 155–81; Stephen W. Baskerville, "Cutting Loose from Prejudice: Economists and the Great Depression" in Stephen W. Baskerville and Ralph Willett, eds., *Nothing Else to Fear: New Perspectives on America in the Thirties* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1985), 278–79. On a "third stage" of the New Deal, see David L. Porter, *Congress and the Waning of the New Deal* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1980). See also Dean L. May, *From New Deal to New Economics: The American Liberal Response to the Recession of 1937* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1981); Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States" in Peter B. Evans, et al., eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp.

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So, too, was the era of World War II. Roosevelt's colorful suggestion at his late-December 1943 press conference that "old Dr. New Deal" and his internal medicine had given way to "Dr. Win-the-War" has distorted understanding of wartime liberalism and has obscured the president's espousal of new departures in domestic policy. In fact, liberals continued to develop the agenda and policy proposals of a new New Deal during the war years, and Roosevelt began to champion them. At that same late-1943 press conference, Roosevelt spoke purposely of the coming need for a "new program" to "plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in more security, in more employment, in more recreation, in more education, in more health, in better housing for all of our citizens." Advocating "a second [economic] bill of rights" and "an American standard of living higher than ever before known," the president began to flesh out the new program in his January 1944 State of the Union message.[2] Later that year, in Chicago at the end of the 1944 campaign, Roosevelt called again for a new "Economic Bill of Rights" and envisioned as well a postwar full-employment economy with a stunning sixty million jobs and the trappings of economic abundance. A "complete statement of the New Deal of 1944" in the words of presidential adviser and speechwriter Samuel I. Rosenman, Roosevelt's Chicago speech reflected the formulation of a new liberal program during his second and third terms.[3] Prefiguring "vital-center" Fair-Deal liberalism and helping set the liberal agenda of the next quarter-century, the new program of Keynesian prescriptions for an expanding mixed economy of abundance with full employment, rising living standards, and economic security constituted a significant landmark in the evolution of liberal priorities and policies.

Roosevelt's National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) was central to both the emergent Third New Deal of the late 1930s and to the development of the new program during the war years. Created in 1939, the NRPB was the fourth version of what had previously been named the National Planning Board (1933–1934), the National Resources Board (1934–1935), and the National Resources Committee (1935–1939).[4] Its two most important reports, transmitted in tandem to the Con-

132–49; Richard Polenberg, *Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government: The Controversy over Executive Reorganization, 1936–1939* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[2] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (hereafter *PPA: FDR*), vol. 12: 1943, 569–75; *PPA: FDR*, vol. 13: 1944–45, 41–2; Samuel I. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 414–16.

[3] *PPA: FDR*, vol. 13: 1944–45, 369–78; Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 492–98. On wartime developments in liberal policy proposals, see also Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, "Redefining the New Deal: World War II and the Development of Social Provision in the United States" in Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 81–122; and Margaret Weir, "The Federal Government and Unemployment: The Frustration of Policy Innovation from the New Deal to the Great Society," in ibid., esp. 149–68.

[4] On the history of the NRPB and New Deal planning, see Philip W. Warken, *A History of the National Resources Planning Board, 1933–1943* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979); Marion Clawson, *New Deal Planning: The National Resources Planning Board* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

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gress by Roosevelt on 10 March 1943, constitute a particularly illuminating focus for following the substance and process of liberal policy innovation after the mid-1930s. One of those reports, *Security, Work, and Relief Policies*, exhaustively scrutinized American public assistance requirements and programs. Emphasizing "serious maladjustments" in the nation's economy, the report concluded that "the need for public aid will be both large and persistent for some time to come." It urged comprehensive government programs to assure "access to minimum security for all our people." The companion but quite different document, *National Resources Development, Report for 1943, Part I. Post-War Plan and Program*, provided the NRPB's recommendations for postwar reconversion and prosperity. Prescribing a much-enlarged government responsibility for economic development and stability and proposing a "new [economic] bill of rights," *Post-War Plan and Program* advocated above all full employment in a "dynamic expanding economy" with "increasingly higher standards of living." The United States, declared this far more expansive and sanguine report, stood "on the threshold of an economy of abundance."[5]

Though quickly buried by a conservative Congress, largely ignored by a prospering, preoccupied wartime public, and often conflated and confused then and since, the two reports are significant ones. Different from one another in origins, analyses, and prescriptions, they reflected the changing course of American liberalism from the emphasis on structural reform and economic security during the First and Second New Deals to the focus on liberal Keynesianism and abundance of the new New Deal. Their history also illustrates the importance of salient events, public opinion, political currents, and elected officials in setting the public agenda and of intellectuals, bureaucrats, staffers, interest groups, and program advocates in initiating and shaping public policies. And their fate together with that of the NRPB itself, terminated in 1943 by Congress, illuminates the powerful constraints on liberal policy implementation imposed during the war by prosperity, national priorities, and the generally conservative drift of politics, as well as by the American political system and its antistatist traditions.

The 1937–1938 Recession and the New Deal

The two NRPB reports and the evolution of liberal policy that they revealed had their roots in the circumstances and ideas of the late 1930s. The recession of 1937–1938 was in a number of ways fundamental to the subsequent course of New Deal liberalism. Striking with sudden severity in the late summer of 1937 and

Press, 1981); Otis L. Graham, Jr., *Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 1–90; Patrick George Brady, "Toward Security: Postwar Economic and Social Planning in the Executive Office, 1939–1946" (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1975), esp. 30–169.

[5] U.S. National Resources Planning Board, *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1942), 545; U.S. National Resources Planning Board, *Report for 1943, Part I: Post-War Plan and Program* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1943), 3–4.

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sending economic indexes plunging even more sharply than in the autumn of 1929, the recession precipitated a lengthy policy reevaluation within the administration. In the well-known central debate pitting spenders headed by Federal Reserve Chairman Marriner S. Eccles against the budget balancers led by Treasury Secretary Henry T. Morgenthau, Jr., the spenders, who maintained that stringent fiscal and monetary policy had triggered the recession, carried the day. In mid-April 1938 Roosevelt announced a large spend-lend program emphasizing work relief and public works.[6]

But the Eccles-Morgenthau contest suggests a deceptively simple story of the impact of the recession on New Deal policy. If Eccles was a forerunner of the younger compensatory spenders who would embrace the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, the older liberal approach was represented not by Morgenthau and the budget balancers but rather by those who argued for major structural reform. Structural reformers blamed economic concentration and inflexible, administered prices for maldistributed income, inadequate purchasing power, and the resultant gap between the nation's production and consumption capacities that prevented achieving a high-consumption economy of abundance. Some, like Rexford G. Tugwell, advocated planning and controls, while others looked to antitrust policy to unleash the economy's potential. Though their prescriptions were rooted in Progressive-era institutional economics, structural reformers had great strength in the early and middle 1930s. In addition to Tugwell, they had a powerful voice in Gardiner C. Means and his contemporary studies of economic concentration and administered prices and another in the the *New Republic*, which called for major, indeed radical structural reform with federal economic planning and controls to achieve "secure abundance."[7] Within the administration, an important outpost of institutional economic analysis and structural prescriptions was the National Resources Committee, where Gardiner Means directed its final major economic study, published after years of work in June 1939.[8] Structural reformers used their influence during the 1937–1938 recession to press for new antitrust measures, and in late April Roosevelt asked Congress to conduct a major study

[6] Kenneth D. Roose, *The Economics of Recession and Revival: An Interpretation of 1937–38* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954); May, *New Economics*, esp. 96–139; John Morton Blum, *From the Morgenthau Diaries, I. Years of Crisis, 1928–1938* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 380–451.

[7] Theodore Rosenof, *Patterns of Political Economy in America: The Failure to Develop a Democratic Left Synthesis, 1933–1950* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983), 3–130; Bernard Sternsher, *Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964); Stuart Kidd, "Collectivist Intellectuals and the Ideal of National Planning; 1929–1933" in Baskerville and Willett, eds., *Nothing Else to Fear*, 15–35; Herbert Stein, *The Fiscal Revolution in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 117; May, *New Economics*, 159–60; John Kenneth Galbraith, *A Life in Our Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 69; William E. Stoneman, *A History of the Economic Analysis of the Great Depression in America* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), 4–9, 36–44, 61; *New Republic*, 23 September 1936, 207–8.

[8] Allan G. Gruchy, "Economics of the National Resources Committee," *American Economic Review* 29 (March 1939): 60–73; Warken, *NRPB*, 90–96; Clawson, *New Deal Planning*, 148–52, 155–56, 332–33, 346.

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of monopoly. In June, Congress established the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC), which began hearings into the structure of the American economy in the fall of 1938.[9]

The TNEC and new antitrust initiatives, however, proved a misleading turn in liberal policy. Partly that was because after 1939 defense mobilization undermined antitrust efforts, restored prosperity, and corroborated Keynesian analysis. But to an important degree, the monopoly study was from the outset an escape mechanism, a way to avoid or at least postpone a divisive decision among the many policy proposals at hand in the late 1930s. Though the TNEC published numerous useful studies, its final report in 1941 was limited in its recommendations, anticlimactic, and generally ignored. In any event, compensatory spending was perhaps the predictable outcome of the policy debates of the late 1930s. Structural reformers and spenders both sought a full-production, full-employment, high-consumption economy, but structural reform divided between antitrust and planning and encountered formidable political, ideological, juridical, economic, and technical obstacles. By contrast, spending provided a common denominator among most liberals, did not foreclose other approaches, was politically more feasible, required neither intrusive planning nor coercive controls, and, as economic indexes rose again, seemed plainly to work.[10] It was thus Roosevelt's mid-April 1938 spending decision, not his late-April call for a new monopoly study, that presaged the direction of the administration and the course of liberalism.

At the heart of the new departures in liberal domestic policy in the late 1930s were the increasing acceptance and the significant development of the ideas of John Maynard Keynes. Involving much more than just the growing and pre-Keynesian recognition of the importance of government spending during hard times, Keynesian analysis came to shape social reform as well as economic policy. Down to the spring of 1938, Keynes and his writings had in fact only marginally influenced New Deal policy making, including the April 1938 spending decision itself.[11] But Keynesian economics constituted an analytical framework that fit the lessons of Roosevelt's first two terms: unbalanced budgets and some recovery; restrictive fiscal policy and sharp recession; renewed spending and a resurgent economy. It also provided a structure of ideas that proved fundamental to the further development of liberal policy. Again the 1937–1938 recession was crucial. Not only did it substantiate the Keynesian emphasis on fiscal policy, but it was also for American Keynesians an "intellectually traumatic episode" that produced a seminal rethinking of Keynesian doctrine. Starkly revealing the failure of pump-priming—private spending had not sustained the economy when government spending declined—

[9] David Lynch, *The Concentration of Economic Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), 1–34; Ellis W. Hawley, *The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 383–455.

[10] Hawley, *Problem of Monopoly*, 404–90; Lynch, *Concentration of Economic Power*; Rosenof, *Patterns of Political Economy*, 104–06, 110–11; Stein, *Fiscal Revolution*, 100–09.

[11] May, *New Economics*, 53–66; Stein, *Fiscal Revolution*, 109–18, 131–33, 165–67; Alan Sweezy, "The Keynesians and Government Policy, 1933–1939," *American Economic Review* 62 (May 1972): 116–20.

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the recession brought important Keynesian economists and then many other liberals to the conclusion that full-employment prosperity required not recurrent pump-priming but rather continuing compensatory public spending.[12]

The Impact of Alvin H. Hansen

The economist Alvin H. Hansen was the pivotal figure in the reorientation of liberal economic analysis. After moving from the University of Minnesota to Harvard in 1937, he earned the title of the "American Keynes" for his role in disseminating Keynesian ideas in both academic and governmental circles.[13] Hansen's signal theoretical contribution was his concept of "secular stagnation." The economic history of the previous quarter-century, Hansen said in his influential December 1938 presidential address to the American Economic Association, demonstrated that the economy was "passing . . . over a divide which separates the great era of growth and expansion of the nineteenth century" from a profoundly different era. The rate of population growth, the existence of new territories and resources, and the impact of technological change that had previously supported private investment and economic growth no longer obtained. In the changed circumstances of a "mature economy" without adequate outlets for private investment, an era of "secular stagnation" had set in. Hansen refrained in his 1938 address from calling for permanent public spending to compensate for insufficient private investment, but he soon became a vigorous proponent of planned, ongoing compensatory fiscal policy.[14]

Though controversial, Hansen's secular stagnation analysis quickly informed the thinking of many younger economists. At Harvard, where Keynes had already evoked great excitement among graduate students and junior faculty, Hansen used his famous fiscal policy seminar to focus discussion on Keynesian ideas and his own extension of them. From Harvard, largely through Hansen and his students, Keynesian economics spread to policy makers in Washington by the end of the decade, and Hansen himself began to serve in a number of significant official capacities. His initial impact on liberal policy makers, however, came especially through a strikingly influential book, *An Economic Program for American Democracy*, published later in 1938 by a number of Harvard and Tufts economists with connections to Hansen's fiscal policy seminar. A clear explication of secular

[12] Walter S. Salant, "Alvin Hansen and the Fiscal Policy Seminar," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 90 (February 1976): 15; Sweezy, "Keynesians and Government Policy," 120–22; Rosenof, *Patterns of Political Economy*, 35–46; Stein, *Fiscal Revolution*, 114–15, 131–68.

[13] On Hansen, See Robert Lekachman, *The Age of Keynes* (New York: Random House, 1966), 126–37; William Breit and Roger L. Ransom, *The Academic Scribblers: American Economists in Collision* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 85–110; Collection of articles on Hansen in *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 90 (February 1976): 1–37.

[14] Alvin H. Hansen, "Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth," *American Economic Review* 29 (March 1939): 1–15. For Hansen's analysis in the late 1930s and early 1940s, see his two landmark books, *Full Recovery or Stagnation?* (New York: Norton, 1938) and *Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles* (New York: Norton, 1941).

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stagnation theory and a forceful call for deficit spending, redistributive taxation, and major reform to ensure full-employment prosperity and full economic security, *An Economic Program* was for several weeks on Washington's best seller list. It became, in Elliott Roosevelt's words, a "bible of the New Dealers."[15]

By the spring of 1938, as Kenneth C. Crawford explained in the *Nation*, Keynesian ideas as mediated and modified by Hansen had come to reflect the conclusions of "most liberals, in and out of the Administration." A "new New Deal" had begun to take shape. University economists, executive branch officials and bureaucrats, and liberal intellectuals and journalists were especially important to the growing influence of Keynesian analysis and prescriptions. In Washington, Lauchlin B. Currie, a key assistant to Marriner Eccles at the Federal Reserve Board and after 1939 one of FDR's six assistants in the new Executive Office of the President, played a leading role in spreading Keynesian ideas, affording Hansen a public hearing, and placing Keynesians in significant federal positions. At the same time, the National Resources Committee, no longer dominated in its economic analysis by the institutionalist economists and structural reformers, organized an important advisory group of Keynesians who, like the authors of *An Economic Program for American Democracy*, called for progressive taxation, permanent compensatory fiscal policy, and heavy spending on social welfare and public works in order to achieve recovery and reform. By mid-1939 the dominant position of the Keynesians on the planning board was clear, and Hansen became one of its chief consultants. Outside the administration and the academy, the new influence of Keynesianism upon liberals was perhaps most strikingly registered in the pages of the *New Republic*. After advocating thoroughgoing structural reform for most of the decade, the journal now began to serve as an influential purveyor of Keynesian ideas and policy recommendations. Though structural reform retained some support, Lauchlin Currie was correct when he told Roosevelt early in 1940 that Keynesian analysis had "become generally the New Deal economists' diagnosis of and prescription for our economic problem."[16]

[15] John Kenneth Galbraith, "How Keynes Came to America" in Galbraith, *A Contemporary Guide to Economics, Peace and Laughter* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 43–53; Galbraith, *A Life in Our Times*, 67–69, 90–91, 93–95; Salant, "Fiscal Policy Seminar," 15–16; Richard V. Gilbert, et al., *An Economic Program for American Democracy* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1938); May, *New Economics*, 146–50; Stein, *Fiscal Revolution*, 487. The book also advocated antimonopoly policy, but as for Hansen and other Keynesians that was clearly secondary.

[16] Crawford, "From Pump-Priming to Pumping," 606–07; Lauchlin B. Currie, "Discussion," *American Economic Review* 62 (May 1972): 140–41; Byrd L. Jones, "Lauchlin Currie and the Causes of the 1937 Recession," *History of Political Economy* 12 (Fall 1980): 303–15; Richard N. Chapman, *Contours of Public Policy, 1939–1945* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1981), 9–34; Lynch, *Concentration of Economic Power*, 256–58, 314–16; U.S. National Resources Planning Board, *The Structure of the American Economy, Part II: Toward Full Use of Resources* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1940); U.S. National Resources Planning Board, *The Economic Effects of the Federal Public Works Expenditures, 1933–1938* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1940), Currie to FDR, 18 March 1940, Official File 264, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (hereafter FDRL). For the *New Republic*, see, 2 February 1938, 377–93; 8 February 1939, 7–8; 24 May 1939, 68–71; 7 June 1939, 122–25; 23 August 1939, 64–66; 5 July 1939, 236–37; 2 August 1939, 349–50; 25 October 1939, 329; 22 January 1940, 104–05; 19 February 1940, 231–32.

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For all its new importance, however, compensatory fiscal policy did not in the late 1930s eclipse social welfare on the liberal agenda. With unemployment and privation still obvious major problems, especially after the 1937–1938 recession, public assistance remained high among the priorities of the Roosevelt administration, Keynesians included, and dominated the efforts of social reformers. Just as *An Economic Program for American Democracy* spoke for liberal Keynesians, so a 1939 book by Assistant Works Progress Administration (WPA) Commissioner Corrington Gill, *Wasted Manpower: The Challenge of Unemployment*, represented views of social welfare reformers. Yet the two books had much in common, including a grounding in Hansen's notion of secular stagnation. Gill maintained that "prolonged mass unemployment" with an "irreducible minimum" of at least 10 percent of the work force was the nation's foremost problem. The result of a "new order" of "economic stagnation," mass unemployment was "chronic" rather than short-term or even cyclical and thus required a much-expanded permanent program of social security, public works, and relief.[17]

Taken together, *An Economic Program for American Democracy* and *Wasted Manpower* nicely mirrored central developments in liberal reform ideas during Roosevelt's second term. Reflecting in particular the crucial importance of the 1937–1938 recession and of Hansen's mediation of Keynes, both books called for compensatory fiscal policy and also for major security and relief programs. But for the Keynesian economists who wrote *An Economic Program*—as for Hansen, Currie, and those associated with the planning board—secular stagnation did not necessarily mean a chronically slack or depressed economy; it implied rather the primary need for planned, permanent, compensatory fiscal policy to underwrite expansion, full employment, and rising living standards and thus enable the economy to achieve its full potential. Social welfare reformers like Gill, on the other hand, evidently found in Hansen's definition of secular stagnation—"sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on themselves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment"[18]—a description of the depression decade and the 1937–1938 recession that fit their sense of chronic mass unemployment and thus pointed to the more central role of welfare measures and work relief. For them fiscal policy, though an important tool, would neither cure economic problems nor obviate the fundamental need for expanded security, work, and relief programs.[19] In the perceptions and policy prescriptions of *Wasted Manpower* and *An Economic Program* can be discerned the overlapping yet different views and emphases later manifested in the two major NRPB reports released in 1943, *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* and *Post-War Plan and Program*.

As liberals began to develop a significant new agenda during Roosevelt's second

[17] Corrington Gill, *Wasted Manpower: The Challenge of Unemployment* (New York: Norton, 1939).

[18] Hansen, "Economic Progress," 4.

[19] For analyses similar to Gill's, see Arthur E. Burns and Edward A. Williams, *Federal Work, Security, and Relief Programs* (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1941); and Donald S. Howard, *The WPA and Federal Relief Policy* (New York: Russell Sage, 1943).

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term, they encountered formidable constraints to implementing it. Congress was firmly in the hands of a conservative coalition after the 1938 election – ironically not least because of the very 1937–1938 recession that had helped shape the new departures in liberal economic and welfare proposals. In 1939 Congress defeated the Works Financing Bill, a major compensatory lend-spend measure drafted by liberal Keynesians; it slashed the administration's work-relief bill; and it finally enacted only a weakened version of Roosevelt's executive reorganization bill.[20] By 1939, moreover, the approaching war compounded the problems of domestic liberal reform. As it opposed new liberal measures and pruned old ones, Congress argued that such programs conflicted with necessary defense spending. For his part, the president gave more attention to defense and foreign policy, less to domestic reform. And by 1940 the war and the American defense program began to trigger the remarkable wartime economic recovery that – further irony – made implementation of the new New Deal less necessary and thus less likely at the same time that it corroborated Keynesian analysis.

In addition to such obstacles, the liberal Keynesians also had to rely on a president who seems never to have been wholly persuaded of their economic analysis or prescriptions. Despite his spending decision of 1938, the educational efforts of Currie and other administration Keynesians, the increasingly Keynesian cast of many of his messages, and his consistent advocacy of preparing a "shelf" of public works projects to combat postwar joblessness, Roosevelt evidently never really understood Keynesian economics, downed his instinctive disapproval of unbalanced budgets, or went much beyond a conventional understanding going back to the 1920s of public works as a countercyclical balance wheel and source of jobs. After the NRPB's demise in 1943, the president told Budget Director Harold D. Smith that among the agency's problems had been its "grandiose schemes," particularly in the "realm of economics . . . which nobody understood, perhaps not even the Board." As late as January 1945 FDR betrayed to Smith "some of the fears of the average citizen" with respect to the federal debt.[21] Still, if he was more a reluctant practitioner of Keynesian economics than a true believer, Roosevelt generally shared the aims of the liberal Keynesians and sometimes championed

[20] Chapman, *Contours of Public Policy*, 34–59; James T. Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 288–324; Porter, *Waning of the New Deal*, 61–88. Social security coverage was modified and expanded with little debate in 1939, but that occurred because conservatives and Republicans for their own reasons supported reform and because Congress saw in expanded benefits popular and politically profitable legislation. See Arthur J. Altmeyer, *The Formative Years of Social Security* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 74–117; Edward D. Berkowitz, "The First Social Security Crisis," *Prologue* 15 (Fall 1983): 133–49.

[21] Chapman, *Contours of Public Policy*, 20–21; James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1956), 328–36; Robert M. Collins, *The Business Response to Keynes, 1929–1964* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 6, 196–98; John W. Jeffries, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 'America of Tomorrow'" in David M. Kennedy and Michael E. Parrish, *Power and Responsibility: Case Studies in American Leadership* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 33–35, 54–55; May, *New Deal to New Economics*, 67–73; Harold D. Smith, Conferences with the President, 31 August 1943 and 1 January 1945, Smith Papers, FDRL.

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their policies. Supporting and at times encouraging NRPB policy development during the war and espousing its goals during the politics of 1944, the president played a significant role in moving the new New Deal onto the public agenda.

The NRPB and the new New Deal

As it succeeded the National Resources Committee in the summer of 1939, the National Resources Planning Board soon became central to the evolving liberal program. Holding that the relief problem was "no longer an emergency sickness" but a "chronic" condition, the NRPB put long-term relief policy atop its agenda. Next came "long-range policies and action programs for the full use of resources," including especially full employment. The NRPB also considered but decided against then recommending to the president, "an expansion of the 'Bill of Rights' suited to life in a modern democracy" and including the rights to work, security, shelter, health, and education. By early autumn 1939, then, the NRPB had identified as its chief priorities relief and full employment, the focuses respectively of *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* and of *Post-War Plan and Program*; had begun to develop the new economic bill of rights; and had at FDR's direction become the administration's chief postwar planning and coordination agency.[22]

The NRPB's Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies quickly got underway and by December 1940 had prepared a preliminary version of its final report. Concluding that "increasing employment created by expenditures for national defense and by general economic recovery will not 'solve' the problem of relief" because millions of unemployed and unemployable Americans would remain jobless, the Relief Committee advocated a much-expanded program of social insurance, work relief, and public welfare. The committee, which included Corrington Gill and other social welfare experts who accepted a stagnationist analysis of chronic economic problems and relief needs, thus held the pessimistic economic views common among social reformers in the late 1930s.[23]

By late 1940, however, the NRPB itself had a different outlook from its Relief Committee—one reflecting the war's galvanizing impact on the economy and on liberal visions; the more optimistic, expansionary side of Keynesian analysis; and the much higher valuation the New Deal had always given jobs over relief, including work relief.[24] Forwarding the preliminary relief report to the president, board chairman Frederic Delano generally endorsed the Relief Committee's recommendations for ensuring minimum security, but he added that "to raise the standard of living for the whole American people" would require the "full productive use

[22] Delano to Roosevelt, 25 August 1939, with appendixes, National Archives Record Group (hereafter NARG), Washington D.C., 187, 103.71, Box 218, Meeting 2, Appendix P; NARG 187, 103.71, Box 219, Meeting 6, minutes and Appendix G; Clawson, *New Deal Planning*, 10–11, 176–86; Warken, *NRPB*, 182–250.

[23] NARG 187, 103.71, Box 224, Meeting 28, Appendix D-2; Warken, *NRPB*, 229.

[24] On the last point, see William W. Bremer, "Along the 'American Way': The New Deal's Work Relief Programs for the Unemployed," *Journal of American History* 62 (December 1975): 636–52.

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of our human and physical resources."[25] The general national anxiety about renewed depression after defense spending subsided informed the NRPB's economic planning, to be sure; but while its Relief Committee predicted substantial continuing unemployment and prescribed expanded welfare measures, the board itself was developing far-reaching Keynesian ideas about achieving full-employment prosperity and an adequate minimum standard of living and then maintaining them after the war. And where the Relief Committee reflected the sensibilities and outlooks of social workers and welfare reformers, the NRPB with its infusion of economists was becoming in the words of one newcomer "more like a University department than a government agency. . . . They talk the Keynesian language, which is a jargon built on a number of key words such as national income and full employment."[26]

In August 1941, the NRPB issued *After Defense—What?*, which briefly set out in that Keynesian vocabulary the fundamental viewpoint and program that subsequent NRPB reports and liberal proposals would elaborate. Specifying full employment as the nation's major postwar priority, the pamphlet attributed to Alvin Hansen said that "the full employment and prosperity which is [sic] coming with the defense effort proves that we can have a full employment system . . . if we are determined to have it so, because we do have the necessary manpower, resources, productive plant, and organizing ability." To sustain a postwar full-employment economy with national income of at least $100 billion annually, the United States must balance its "national production-consumption budget at a high level with full employment, not at a low level with mass unemployment." Programs for "upbuilding America" and ensuring security and a "better life for all" would provide important outlets for government spending. Though government must take "a leading part" and must ensure appropriate fiscal policy, the NRPB report also called for cooperation between the public and private sectors and maximum use of decentralization and "our system of modified free enterprise" to promote postwar prosperity and stability. And in what was a version of the new economic bill of rights discussed since August 1939, communicated several times to the president, and already influencing his rhetoric, the report recommended as well ensuring everyone the "promise of American life in food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, work, rest, home life, opportunity to advance, adventure, and the basic freedoms."[27]

[25] Delano to Roosevelt, 3 December 1940, NARG 187, 103.71, Box 224, Meeting 28, Appendix D-1.

[26] Various materials in NARG 187, 103.71, for 1940 and 1941; Leon Epstein to Edwin Witte, 10 September 1941, as quoted in David Hugh Shepard, "Reconversion 1939–1946: Images, Plans, Realities" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1981), 78.

[27] U.S. National Resources Planning Board, *After Defense—What?* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1941); James Tobin, "Hansen and Public Policy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 90 (February 1976): 34; NARG 187, 103.71, Box 222, Meeting 21, App. E; Delano to Roosevelt, 14 March 1941, Official File 1092, FDRL; Charles W. Eliot to Roosevelt, undated [May 1941], President's Personal File 1820, FDRL; John D. Millett, *The Process and Organization of Government Planning* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), 63, 118–20; James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 33–34.

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Though based in some measure on the planning board's pre-Keynesian structural studies going back to the mid-1930s and on American notions of abundance going back much further still, the NRPB's expansive outlook reflected especially the impact of defense prosperity and of Alvin Hansen's wartime conviction that government fiscal policy could sustain full-employment prosperity after the war. Hansen's concept of secular stagnation and economic maturity did not mean for him and others of the "stagnationist" school that the American economy must inevitably be slack or depressed or that technological progress and new private innovation and investment would cease. Hansen did believe that private investment and the "automatic functioning" of the economy would not always be sufficient to ensure the full use of the nation's productive resources; but he maintained that government fiscal policy could enable the American economy to reach its full productive potential and underwrite high-consumption, full-employment prosperity. The great wartime economic expansion, moreover, demonstrated all the more the "fabulous productive capacity" of the American economy, and Hansen quickly saw that wartime technological advances would further enhance productivity and growth. Finding confirmation in the early stages of World War II of his sense that "wars are a tremendous stimulant to technological progress," Hansen wrote in October 1942 that "there is good reason to believe that we shall experience a technological revolution so far-reaching as to provide the basis for a substantial private investment boom." To ensure that the postwar boom he anticipated was not followed by depression, Hansen urged that the government implement new tax policies as well as new spending programs for public development and social services. He was confident that the proper fiscal policies could sustain unprecedently high levels of demand, production, employment, and consumption in the postwar period.[28]

Hansen's views emerged with particular force and clarity in *After the War—Full Employment*, a much-publicized report written by him, approved by FDR, and published by the NRPB in January 1942. Broadly consistent with *An Economic Program for American Democracy*, *After the War—Full Employment* reflected the economic performance and political lessons of 1939–1941 and the growing confidence of liberal Keynesians about managing the postwar economy. In the report, Hansen called not only for planning, redistributive taxation, and compensatory public spending, but also for government-business cooperation in a mixed economy to "vitalize and invigorate private enterprise," ensure the continued postwar mobilization of the nation's full productive capacity and its sixty

[28] For Hansen's views, see Hansen, "We Can Pay the War Bill," *Atlantic*, October 1942, 58–66; and Hansen, "The Postwar Economy" in Seymour E. Harris, ed., *Postwar Economic Problems* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1943), 9–26. See also Paul Samuelson, "Hansen as a Creative Economist," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 90 (February 1976): 30; and Alan Sweezy, "Secular Stagnation?" in Harris, ed., *Postwar Economic Problems*, 67–82. On American ideas about abundance, see Daniel M. Fox, *The Discovery of Abundance: Simon M. Patten and the Transformation of Social Theory* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967); David M. Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

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million workers, and maintain an expanding high consumption economy of opportunity, rising living standards, and economic security. "We shall have, when the war is over," Hansen wrote, "the technical equipment, the trained and efficient labor, and the natural resources required to produce a substantially higher real income for civilian needs than any ever achieved before in our history." What was required was the intelligence and will to enact public policy to assure the purchasing power and investment necessary for high-consumption, full-employment prosperity. Hansen thus was optimistic about postwar economic prospects if the proper fiscal policies were implemented, and his ideas were at the heart of liberal and administration thinking about the postwar economy. As Richard Lee Strout wrote in the *New Republic* in late 1941, Hansen's "views are among the most influential that have hit Washington in a long time," and his "economic and fiscal thinking . . . permeates the New Deal." Explaining the influence on American liberals of the "post-war blueprint" of "Keynes in London and Hansen in Washington," Strout outlined Hansen's "revolutionary vision of a brave new America after the war. An America in which factories work overtime on peace goods and there are jobs for all."[29]

By early 1942 the period of NRPB policy innovation had largely ended. Subsequent wartime liberal proposals, including *Post-War Plan and Program*, generally were restatements, refinements, or extensions of the ideas and visions evident before Pearl Harbor in the NRPB's internal studies and published reports. Nicely summarized in the NRPB's January *Report for 1942*, the new liberal program developed after the mid-1930s was founded on Keynesian analysis and prescriptions and the experience of defense prosperity. It looked to expansion and "the distribution of abundance" rather than stagnation and scarcity and included the recommendations of *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* as but a secondary part of the larger program for full employment, high national income, and rising consumption levels and living standards. Emphasizing full-employment opportunity as well as security, it envisioned a postwar mixed economy where public policy both stimulated and cooperated with the private sector to sustain prosperity and stability. The *Report for 1942* also contained the first explicit reference to the new economic bill of rights.[30]

[29] U.S. National Resources Planning Board, *After the War—Full Employment* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1942); Richard Lee Strout, "Hansen of Harvard," *New Republic*, 29 December 1941, 888–90. From the salience of Keynesianism and full employment among wartime liberals, see also Byrd L. Jones, "The Role of Keynesians in Wartime Policy and Postwar Planning, 1940–1946," *American Economic Review* 62 (May 1972): 125–33; Alonzo L. Hamby, "Sixty Million Jobs and the People's Revolution: The Liberals, The New Deal, and World War II," *The Historian* 30 (August 1968): 578–98; Lekachman, *Age of Keynes*, 144–75; Rosenof, *Patterns of Political Economy*, 164–209. During the war, full employment became not just a liberal but a national goal, though the proper fiscal policy to achieve it provoked debate; and some important businessmen accepted a limited version of Keynesian analysis and policy. See Stein, *Fiscal Revolution*, 169–96; Collins, *Business Response to Keynes*, 1–112; Kim McQuaid, *Big Business and Presidential Power: From FDR to Reagan* (New York: William Morrow, 1982), 62–121.

[30] U.S. National Resources Planning Board, *National Resources Development: Report for 1942* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1942).

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Politics, Public Opinion, and the NRPB Reports

For all the confidence and enthusiasm of its proponents, the new New Deal encountered formidable obstacles. After Pearl Harbor the war commanded the nation's attention, propelled the United States into an era of full-blown prosperity, and thus continued to alter the context and substance of American politics in ways that militated against liberal programs and enhanced the growing strength of the conservative coalition in the Congress. Beginning especially with the publication of *After Defense—What?* and *After the War—Full Employment*—despite the reports' pointed references to private enterprise—there came scathing criticism from the foes of national planning, deficit spending, executive power, an expanded regulatory-welfare state, and a large government role in the postwar economy. And after Pearl Harbor the NRPB could find less support from the president, who made what he called the "Survival War" his consuming first priority. Though permitting the NRPB to proceed quietly with its postwar studies and defending it from congressional conservatives, Roosevelt was not willing to involve himself in postwar planning or publicize it and risk diverting public attention from the war. Nor in 1942 did he release *Security, Work, and Relief Policies.*[31]

Politics—in particular the sharp GOP gains in the 1942 congressional elections and the prospect of the 1944 presidential contest—helped move the NRPB proposals onto the public agenda. Seeking to implement their postwar policies and to prevent Republicans from preempting the key issues of postwar employment and economic security, liberals in and out of the administration urged Roosevelt to turn his attention toward the homefront. With others, the NRPB drew the president's attention to the English Beveridge Report, which after its December 1942 release received an apparently favorable response to its proposals for cradle-to-grave security, and recommended that he send the comparable *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* report to Congress as soon as possible.[32] Evidently responsive, FDR told Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) head David E. Lilienthal that in his January 1943 State of the Union address "I'm really going to *tell* this next Congress" and "lay out a program that will give them and the country something to chew on," one that would be "a kind of American Beveridge Plan."[33]

In the end, the president acted more cautiously. He knew the incoming Con-

[31] Chapman, *Contours of Public Policy*, 249–52; Clawson, *New Deal Planning*, 181–83, 211; Karl, *Uneasy State*, 214–19; Donald T. Critchlow, *The Brookings Institution, 1916–1952: Expertise and the Public Interest in a Democratic Society* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985), 135–42; Jeffries, "Roosevelt and the 'America of Tomorrow,'" 35–37.

[32] Various correspondence in President's Personal File 1820, Boxes 8, 25, FDRL; Official File 899, FDRL; Oscar Cox Papers, Box 100, FDRL; and Harry L. Hopkins Papers, Boxes 137, 328, 329, FDRL; Jonathan Daniels, *White House Witness, 1942–1945* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), 87–88, 103; Delano to Roosevelt, 2 December 1942, 3 December 1942, 17 December 1942, NARG 187, 103.71, Box 232, Meeting 62, Appendixes 0-1 and I; *Nation*, 12 December 1942, 636–37, and 19 December 1942, 669–70; *New Republic*, 14 December 1942, 784–86, and 21 December 1942, 810–11.

[33] David E. Lilienthal, *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. I: The TVA Years, 1939–1945* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 571–72.

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gress would be dominated by a coalition of Republicans and anti-New Deal Democrats stronger and more fiercely conservative and anti-administration than its predecessors. Always attentive to public opinion, moreover, Roosevelt after the 1942 elections engaged Princeton's Hadley Cantril to survey opinion on significant issues. Asked for his advice on the 1943 State of the Union message, Cantril urged a "conciliatory" speech and recommended further "that (at this time) any reference to the question of security shall take the form of assurance that after the war normal jobs will be available through enormous production—rather than the promise of an amplified social security (Beveridge) plan at the government's expense." In his speech, the president did declare that Americans wanted both "full employment" and "assurance against the evils of all major economic hazards . . . that will extend from the cradle to the grave." He suggested that "it is wholly possible" that those aims "will loom very large as a task of America during the coming two years." Such passages, however, were only a small part of an address that focused on the war and even won praise for its conciliatory character.[34]

Early in 1943, administration liberals renewed their pressure on Roosevelt to assume leadership on postwar policy, to begin preparing for the politics of 1944, and on both accounts to send the NRPB recommendations to the Congress. The NRPB importuned the president to meet with them (for the first time in months, though there had been frequent correspondence) and to release *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* and *Post-War Plan and Program*. Conscious of the importance of public opinion for acceptance of its program and concerned since early 1941 about FDR's lack of public advocacy, the NRPB scrutinized public opinion surveys and in 1942 conducted its own study of the "Climate of Post-War Public Opinion." The board concluded that a public campaign of education and persuasion appealing to practical self-interest was required to achieve its ends; and its series of pamphlets in 1941 and 1942 sought to foster a receptive climate for its proposals. But while the board rightly perceived the importance of public opinion and the national mood for implementing its program, the reports served more to focus opposition than to build support. The whole enterprise suggested the problems of a planning board trying to operate as a propaganda agency and of the experts and appointed officials who develop policy proposals entering the politicized public arena of policy making. Writing Roosevelt in December 1942 that polls showed public approval of postwar planning and interest in the Beveridge Report, NRPB chairman Delano betrayed the board's characteristic lack of political savvy by suggesting that sending the very conservative new Congress the two very liberal reports might help the agency in what promised to be an unusually difficult annual battle for funding.[35]

[34] Richard W. Steele, "The Pulse of the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Gauging of American Public Opinion," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9 (October 1974): 195–216; Jeffries, "Roosevelt and the 'America of Tomorrow,'" 39–41; Hadley Cantril, *The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), 40–98; Cantril and Gerard B. Lambert to David K. Niles, 21 December 1942, Cox Papers, Box 100, FDRL; *PPA: FDR*, vol. 12: 1943, 21–34.

[35] Various material in Cox Papers, Box 100, FDRL; and in NARG 187, 103.71; Millett, *Government*

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On March 10—with virtually no advance notice to Congress, the press, or even the NRPB—Roosevelt suddenly submitted both *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* and *Post-War Plan and Program* to Congress. Roosevelt's motivation in so abruptly releasing the two reports remains unclear—all the more because he then did nothing to promote them. In some measure, at least, the president evidently wanted to lay groundwork for postwar policy and for the 1944 election.[36] But whatever the reasons for Roosevelt's action, the two reports constituted a landmark in the liberal domestic policy agenda, a culmination of New Deal and NRPB policy development since the late 1930s, and a reflection of the changing priorities and new program of liberals in those years. The *New Republic* called them a "Charter for America."[37]

In its more than six hundred pages, *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* recommended a comprehensive array of long-term government social insurance, work relief, general relief, and social services to combat chronic unemployment and economic insecurity. The continuing need for large-scale public aid arose partly, said the report, because many people would be unemployable or temporarily unemployed even in a full-employment economy; but it arose chiefly from basic "defects" and "serious maladjustments" in the American economy. The need for public assistance, once considered temporary or emergency, had become permanent, "a sad commentary upon our inability to organize our economic life so as to ensure full employment at a level of wages" adequate for a high standard of living and economic security. That chastened view of the American economy was a product both of the economic history and extraordinary relief needs of the 1930s and of the Relief Committee's general acceptance after lengthy discussion of Hansen's late 1930s account of secular stagnation in a mature economy. Though acknowledging that "the experience of the years since 1933, and especially of the defense period, suggests the effectiveness of a spending policy in increasing national income, production, and employment," the report nonetheless remained skeptical—and not altogether clear or consistent—about "a permanent policy of deficit spending" and the ability of federal policy to ensure full-employment prosperity. Like Corrington Gill's *Wasted Manpower* and the assumptions of other social welfare reformers of the 1930s, *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* inclined toward the pessimistic implications of secular stagnation analysis.[38]

Post-War Plan and Program, a much smaller but much more far-reaching report, came to quite different conclusions. Also grounded in Hansen's ideas going back to the 1930s and publicized then in *An Economic Program for American*

Planning, 118–22, 137–52; Delano to Roosevelt, 10 February 1943, 11 February 1943, 5 March 1943, Official File 1092, Box 9, FDRL.

[36] Keith W. Olson, "The American Beveridge Plan," *Mid-America* 65 (April-July 1983): 90–96; Warken, *NRPB*, 224–26; Clawson, *New Deal Planning*, 137–42; I.F. Stone, "Planning and Politics," *Nation*, 20 March 1943, 405–07; *New Republic*, 19 April 1943, 525.

[37] *New Republic*, 19 April 1943, 523–42.

[38] NRPB, *Security, Work, and Relief Policies*, esp. 14–15, 130–33, 322–29, 445–48, 487–88, 494, 502–03, 545–49.

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Democracy, but drawing particularly on *After the War—Full Employment* and other of Hansen's and the NRPB's early 1940s studies, *Post-War Plan and Program* took a far more expansive and confident view of the nation's economic prospects. It called for fiscal policies to ensure a "dynamic expanding" full-employment economy with "increasingly higher standards of living," for a "new [economic] bill of rights," and for a cooperative mixed economy with an enlarged federal role in economic and social affairs and a reinvigorated private sector. As had been the case since 1940, recommendations for comprehensive social services and social security programs were important but secondary and supplementary parts of the board's program. "It should be," said *Post-War Plan and Program*, "the declared policy of the United States Government" to "promote and maintain a high level of national production and consumption"; to "underwrite full employment for the employables"; to "guarantee a job for every man released from the armed forces and the war industries at the close of the war, with fair pay and working conditions"; and to "guarantee and, when necessary, underwrite . . . equal access to security, equal access to education . . . , equal access to health and nutrition . . . , and wholesome housing conditions for all." Recent "amazing advances" in technology and organizational ability together with the economy's underlying productive capacity and the new understanding of the power of fiscal and monetary policy put the nation "on the threshold of an economy of abundance." With "the will to act" and with "adequate post-war policy and planning," the NRPB asserted, "this generation has it within its power not only to produce in plenty but to distribute that plenty" and enter a new era of full employment and shared prosperity "far beyond anything yet attained."[39]

Despite their scope and significance, the reports provoked only a limited reaction. Criticism outweighed praise, but inattention exceeded both. Within a week, *Newsweek* observed, "discussion of the reports had practically ceased." It seemed likely they "would gather dust in Congressional committee rooms for months and even years. . . ." Within two weeks only one-third of the public could remember hearing about them. The reports were plainly "a dud" so far as their immediate legislative prospects were concerned."[40]

The fate of *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* is easier to explain than that of *Post-War Plan and Program*. A product of the circumstances and concerns of the late 1930s, it missed both the conditions and the mood of a prosperous nation in the middle of the war. It was, as I.F. Stone observed in the *Nation*, "only a comprehensive social workers' approach to our economy"; and clearly it did register the late-1930s' mentality of social welfare reformers and their worried conviction that defense spending and economic improvement would not eliminate the

[39] NRPB, *Post-War Plan and Program*, esp. 2–17.

[40] *New York Times*, 11 March 1943 and 12 March 1943; *Newsweek*, 22 March 1943, 27–36; Jerome S. Bruner, *Mandate From The People* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), 159; Warken, *NRPB*, 226–37; Olson, "American Beveridge Plan," 92–94; NARG 187, 103.71, Box 234, Meeting 66, Appendixes.

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need for a major, permanent expansion of public assistance and security programs.[41] But what wartime Americans most wanted after the war, as Hadley Cantril had suggested to the White House, was not more social security but rather enough jobs.[42] That same priority, reflected in *Post-War Plan and Program*, also influenced the changing focus of liberal policy proposals from providing security toward underwriting full employment. Harry Hopkins illustrated that changing emphasis and also the related growing influence of Keynesian economists at the expense of social welfare reformers. As WPA head in 1937, Hopkins had advocated expanded long-term relief programs to alleviate chronic unemployment and economic need. By the late 1930s, however, Hopkins had become an important proponent of compensatory spending. In April 1943, Hopkins told two White House advisers that "I don't think much of the 'Beveridge scheme' for America. I think what we have to provide is real security in terms of full employment." The two leading liberal journals, the *New Republic* and the *Nation*, likewise held that expanded security programs were necessarily secondary to the larger aim of postwar full employment.[43] And of course, conservatives and businessmen as well as liberals and workers also emphasized private-sector jobs for the postwar period.

Even so, *Post-War Plan and Program* fared no better than *Security, Work, and Relief Policies*. In part that was because *Post-War Plan and Program* involved much more than full employment. The economic bill of rights, the grand plans for mixed public-private corporations and for a greatly enlarged government role in such areas as industrial, housing, energy, urban, and regional development,—indeed, the very liberal Keynesian basis of full-employment prescriptions—all drew the ire of congressional antiplanning, antistatist, antispending conservatives. The lack of forceful White House advocacy or promotion also provides part of the explanation, but on balance probably a small part. Beyond and partly back of congressional opposition and presidential passivity was the state of public opinion and the consequent failure of even the report's full-employment emphasis to enlist active public support or to engage public interest. Despite persisting fears of a postwar economic slump and continuing public approval of government planning to ensure postwar employment, unemployment seemed a distant problem; and there was a heady midwar sense among homefront Americans and GIs alike that *they* would have jobs once the war was over. With the war, not unemployment, the salient issue of early 1943, the prevailing national mood was thus more an obstacle than a stimulus for the new New Deal.[44]

[41] Stone, "Planning and Politics," 406, Edwin E. Witte, "American Post-War Social Security Proposals," *American Economic Review* 33 (December 1943): 825, 829.

[42] Bruner, *Mandate From The People*, 153–78; Cantril and Lambert to Niles, 21 December 1942.

[43] Harry L. Hopkins, "The Future of Relief," *New Republic*, 10 February 1937, 7–10; May, *New Deal to New Economics*; Jones, "Currie," 313; Hopkins to Isador Lubin and Oscar Cox, 22 April 1943, Hopkins Papers, Box 328, "Post-war Planning 1943," FDRL; *New Republic*, 21 December 1942, 810–11, 19 April 1943, 523–42; *Nation*, 20 March 1943, 401–402.

[44] Bruner, *Mandate From the People*, 163–64, 171–73; Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., *The American Soldier, Vol. II* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949), 598, 608–09; Office of Public Opinion

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The conservative opposition and public indifference that shelved the NRPB reports in the spring of 1943 also doomed the board itself. Reflecting not just the intensely conservative temper of the 78th Congress but also the long-standing institutional, ideological, and partisan opposition to the NRPB and liberal planning, the House had in February moved to cut off the board's funding. The March release of the two reports further antagonized congressional conservatives in both houses and fueled their resolve to kill the NRPB. In June Congress ordered that the NRPB be liquidated by September, that its records be delivered to the National Archives, and that its functions not be transferred to another agency or its funding supplemented by any other moneys.[45] Seldom has an agency been killed with such finality and relish.

Roosevelt Champions the New Program

The NRPB's agenda nonetheless lived on, for it found important proponents after the board's demise. The Budget Bureau replaced the NRPB as the administration's chief economic planning agency, and its Keynesian-dominated Fiscal Division focused on postwar policy for an expanding full-employment economy. Congressional and administration liberals used the NRPB reports in developing social security, public assistance, and demobilization measures; by late 1944 they had initiated full-employment legislation as well. Though substantially unachieved during the war, the broad aims and specific measures of the NRPB's postwar program were thus kept alive on Capitol Hill by bureaucrats and staffers, experts and interest group, and elected officials.[46]

But liberals understood that presidential leadership was crucial to moving the new New Deal onto the national agenda. Like others troubled by the president's seeming withdrawal from domestic issues and worried about the 1944 election, Chester Bowles, the aggressive head of the Office of Price Administration, met with the president in mid-December 1943 and urged him to espouse "the new liberal program." A few days later Bowles sent along a speech outline emphasizing especially a "*Second* Bill of Rights to establish a new basis for security and prosperity for all of us." The White House had earlier been made aware of autumn opinion

Research, "Public Opinion and the NRPB Report for 1943," Cox Papers, Box 100, FDRL; OWI Special Intelligence Report, 6 March 1943, Official File 4351, Box 5, FDRL; NARG 187, 103.71, Box 234, Meeting 66, Appendixes.

[45] Clawson, *New Deal Planning*, 11–13, 214–41; Chapman, *Contours of Public Policy*, 244–49; 256–60; Warken, *NRPB*, 237–45; Barry D. Karl, *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 278–82; *New York Times*, 28 May and 19 June 1943.

[46] Brady, "Toward Security," 170–221; Witte, "Post-War Social Security Proposals," 832–37; J. Joseph Huthmacher, *Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 292–94; Altmeyer, *Formative Years*, 118–51; Amenta and Skocpol, "Redefining the New Deal," esp. 86–94; Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1972), 73–98, 184–237; John Morton Blum, *V Was For Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 221–332.

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surveys indicating that the public was chiefly concerned about domestic economic issues. Roosevelt then spoke of the "new program" for "an expanded economy" and its benefits at his "Dr. Win-the-War" press conference; his early-January State of the Union address, closely paralleling Bowles's outline and based as well on the NRPB reports, called for "a second Bill of Rights."[47]

The president did not sound those themes again until the 1944 campaign. Focusing his declining energies on the war, Roosevelt throughout much of 1944 gave liberals additional cause for concern about postwar domestic policy and the approaching presidential election. Springtime polls indicated that domestic issues, jobs in particular, dominated public concerns and that Republicans apparently had an edge on postwar domestic issues. Worried about the working-class vote, Bowles and others continued to press the president in 1944, especially for a commitment to the "liberal, full-employment program." After Thomas E. Dewey embraced full employment as "a first objective of national policy" in accepting the GOP nomination for president, Alvin Hansen proposed an administration "White Paper on Employment Policy." Budget Director Harold Smith and Federal Reserve Chairman Marriner Eccles agreed that such a document would be useful for the campaign, and with Roosevelt's approval Keynesians from throughout the administration quietly worked on the project during the late summer and fall. For political reasons stressing private enterprise as well as government spending, the white paper recommended policy to achieve a full-employment, high-production, and high-consumption economy with business expansion, rising living standards, and guaranteed minimum standards of health, education, and security. The document was sent to the White House in October, as were numerous speech drafts on full-employment policy and postwar plenty. The new New Deal developed by the NRPB and liberal Keynesians was at the center of Democratic national politics in 1944.[48]

It was also central to FDR's final major campaign address at Chicago in late October. Though he rejected as too specific and controversial proposed passages spelling out full-employment policy, Roosevelt clearly committed himself to the fundamental aims of the liberal Keynesian program. The result of wartime prosperity, liberal policy innovation and program advocacy, and the president's own mix of large vision and close political calculation, the Chicago speech nicely revealed the distance Roosevelt's program had come during the war. In concluding

[47] Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941–1969* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 117–23; Cantril, *Human Dimension*, 95–98; Bowles to Samuel I. Rosenman, 23 December 1943, Rosenman Papers, Box 1, FDRL; Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 414–416, 425–26.

[48] Jeffries, "Roosevelt and the 'America of Tomorrow,'" 49–51; Bowles, *Promises*, 118–20; Alvin Hansen to Gerhard Colm, 11 July 1944, and other correspondence and material in "The Employment Act Symposium: Postwar Employment – 1944" folder, Gerhard Colm Papers, microfilm, FDRL; Conferences with the President, 31 August 1944, Smith Papers, FDRL; Burns, *Soldier of Freedom*, 524–25; Polenberg, *War and Society*, 189–90, 203; Harold D. Smith to Samuel I. Rosenman, 26 October 1944, White House Memoranda 1944, Smith Papers, FDRL; Bowles to Rosenman, 2 October 1944, and other material in Rosenman Papers, Box 19, FDRL.

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his 1940 campaign, Roosevelt had emphasized social justice and economic security in "his picture of the America of the future." Warning voters then against "extravagant promises of fabulous wealth," he had characterized such visions as "a mirage of an island of dreams." Four years later, Roosevelt envisioned a much different "America of tomorrow." Now gibing at those who had always dismissed his administration's ideals as "the dreams of starry-eyed New Dealers," he expansively talked of "this land of unlimited opportunity" and of the American habit of "accomplishing the impossible." He looked ahead to government and private enterprise together producing a full-employment economy of sixty million jobs, with new homes, automobiles, airplanes, and other fruits of an expanding high-consumption economy of abundance. He called for a new economic bill of rights to ensure everyone the good life of security, prosperity, and happiness.[49]

But policy innovation and presidential advocacy did not bring the quick enactment of the new New Deal. Implementation depended more on economic conditions and the collision of interest groups and political forces in Washington than on the presidential rhetoric or the climate of opinion that put the new program on the national agenda. The story of full-employment policy, the very heart of the new program and of the NRPB's unfinished business, illustrated the difficulties liberals continued to experience in turning policy innovation into implementation. Full employment seemed a clear national consensus and leading political priority after the politics of 1944. But the full-employment bill introduced by liberals in 1945 encountered essentially the same political, ideological, institutional, and interest group constraints, apparent public indifference, and desultory presidential leadership that had thwarted NRPB and liberal policy proposals during the war. The bill also encountered the remarkable postwar prosperity that undermined stagnationist analysis and militated against enacting liberal Keynesian policy. The eventual Employment Act of 1946 called for "maximum" rather then "full" employment, lacked explicit Keynesian prescriptions for compensatory fiscal policy, guaranteed no "right to work," and was ultimately more a symbolic consensus statement of general government responsibility for a stable free-enterprise economy than a binding commitment to federal policy to ensure full employment. It set the course of postwar full-employment politics and policy.[50]

Despite such frustrations, the new New Deal remained basic to the liberal agenda for a quarter century. Its history provides a good example of what Nelson Polsby has termed "incubated" policy innovation – heavily-researched, highly-politicized, and much-controverted proposals developed and revised by staff and academic specialists and kept on the public agenda by politicians needing issues and pro-

[49] *PPA: FDR*, vol. 9, 1940, 544–53 and vol. 13, 1944–45, 369–78; Stephen Kemp Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), 43; Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 247–53, 492–98.

[50] The indispensable account of the Employment Act remains Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law*. See also Shepard, "Reconversion," 192–249. For longer perspectives, see Margaret Weir, "Full Employment as a Political Issue in the United States," *Social Research* 54 (Summer 1987): 377–402; Collins, *Business Response to Keynes*; Stein, *Fiscal Revolution*.

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grams during the long period between initiation and enactment.[51] With the signal exception of civil rights, the new program set out a framework and agenda for liberal reform that extended beyond Roosevelt's presidency to the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society. It prefigured Truman's "vital center" domestic program for an expanding full-employment economy with adequate provisions for economic security. Like the NRPB postwar program, vital-center liberalism stressed fiscal policy rather than structural reform, full-employment abundance rather than scarcity, growth rather than stagnation, opportunity as well as security, and government-business cooperation in a mixed economy. And like the wartime liberal program espoused for reasons of politics as well as principle, the Fair Deal too was stymied by congressional opposition, prosperity, and war.[52] Still, much of the NRPB postwar program – from expanded social security and public assistance to economic growth, regional development, and full employment, and from education, housing, and medical care to energy, the environment, and urban development – remained on the liberal agenda not only during the Truman presidency but into the Eisenhower years and beyond. It lay behind New Frontier-Great Society legislation and a renewed interest in national planning when in the 1960s political currents, public perceptions, and policy proposals together opened a "policy window" for implementing liberal measures.[53] Important for what it reveals about the course of liberalism during Franklin D. Roosevelt's second and third terms, the new New Deal has a large importance, too, for understanding the direction of liberalism in the postwar era.

[51] Nelson W. Polsby, *Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), esp. 152–59, 161–64, 100–28. See also John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown 1984), esp. 65–68, 160–62, 122–51.

[52] Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Vital Center, the Fair Deal, and the Quest for a Liberal Political Economy," *American Historical Review* 77 (June 1972): 653–78. See also Mary Hedge Hinchey, "The Frustration of the New Deal Revival, 1944–46" (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 1965); and Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), esp. 3–51, 277–310. The NRPB program did touch on agriculture and rural policy, but it had no equivalent of the Fair Deal's Brannan Plan.

[53] On postwar liberal policy, see, Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*; Kent M. Beck, "What Was Liberalism in the 1950s?" *Political Science Quarterly* 102 (Summer 1987): 233–58; James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968); Graham, *Toward A Planned Society*. On policy windows, see Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, esp. 173–204.

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President Carter and the Press: Perspectives from White House Communications Advisers

MARK J. ROZELL

In 1976 Jimmy Carter seemed to many voters to be the right man at the right time. To an electorate made cynical by the experiences of Vietnam and Watergate, his "outsider" candidacy promised to make government trustworthy again. A recent comprehensive study of Carter's press relations reveals that many journalists also saw in Carter the possibility for a new era in American politics.[1] In the immediate post-Vietnam, post-Watergate years, journalists had framed a new vision of the executive branch. They expected the chief executive and his staff to be above all wrongdoing and to overcome political stalemate through cooperation with Congress.

During the early stages of the presidential term—the so-called honeymoon period—Jimmy Carter received favorable press reviews.[2] Political journalists, columnists, and editorialists largely praised Carter's political symbolism—his efforts to de-pomp the presidency by staging an unpretentious inaugural, delivering fireside chats, and participating in town hall meetings, to identify just a few such symbols. David Broder of the *Washington Post* even referred to the president as "Carter the communicator" and praised Carter's command of political symbols.[3]

[1] Mark J. Rozell, *The Press and the Carter Presidency* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989).
[2] Ibid., 35–41.
[3] David Broder, "Mr. Carter When He's Out Front," *Washington Post*, 23 March 1977.

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The most vocal early press criticism of Carter came from James Reston and the *New York Times* editorial writers. They feared that such a charismatic chief executive as Jimmy Carter would use his mastery of communications to manipulate the press and public, and thereby destroy the delicate balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches.[4]

The favorable press reviews of Carter's communications skills and leadership did not last. There are several explanations for the press's eventually negative perception of Carter. First, controversies surrounding Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Bert Lance, the Justice Department, and Billy Carter fueled press suspicions that Carter's administration was not above legal and ethical impropriety.

Second, journalists were most unimpressed with Carter's handling of Congress. They assumed that a Democratic president with large party majorities in Congress would aspire to be an activist, legislative-interventionist president. Carter's failure to conform to this expectation opened him up to severe press criticism.[5]

Third, the political context in which Carter served contributed to his negative press portrait. His administration dealt with a number of controversial and politically difficult issues – from energy shortages at home to Soviet adventurism and the taking of American diplomats hostage abroad.

Finally, the Carter presidency did not successfully manage its media image. For most Americans, political journalists are the most frequently consulted teachers of national politics and of the presidency. Much of what the public knows about the presidency is influenced by national political journalists. The president's public standing, therefore, is significantly influenced by how well the White House succeeds in convincing the press to adopt the president's symbols and leadership definition.[6]

This article focuses primarily on the latter explanation for Carter's negative press image. Through the use of transcribed interviews with Carter White House communications advisers, I shall demonstrate that Carter's negative press image derived in part from his refusal to focus White House efforts on developing a favorable press portrait. Carter chose instead to focus on other presidential duties such as policy analysis and problem solving. Yet the failure to cultivate and nurture a White House press image made difficult the achievement of many goals that Carter valued highly.

Carter White House staff members selected for investigation here include those individuals concerned with the president's speechmaking and media image: the speechwriters, members of the press secretary's office, and some members of the White House inner circle. To identify the perspectives and perceptions of these staff members I consulted selected transcripts of the Carter Oral History project.

[4] See James Reston, "The Birth of a Salesman," *New York Times*, 20 March 1977; "The Chat By the Fire," *New York Times*, 4 February 1977.

[5] Rozell, *Press and Carter Presidency*, 46–56, 61–65, 88–92, 101–106, 171–176, 188–192.

[6] See Robert A. Strong, "Recapturing Leadership: The Carter Administration and the Crisis of Confidence," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 16 (Fall 1986): 636–650.

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These transcripts are based upon a number of interviews with Carter White House staff by panels of scholars.[7] I quote those passages from the selected transcripts that focus on explanations for Carter's press image problem. These quotations are divided into three thematic categories: symbolism and rhetoric, policy agenda, and policy development.

Symbolism and Rhetoric

According to Carter's communications advisers, the president neglected the need to enhance the White House's press image after the honeymoon period. These advisers asserted that it was their job to make the president look good to the press and public, and that their best efforts were insufficient to achieve that goal. Carter's communications advisers offered the following explanations for their difficulties: the president was inattentive to the press's portrayals of his presidency and did not make enough of an effort to create a favorable image; the president resisted slogans and simplifying characterizations, making the job of explaining a Carter program or philosophy to the press and public very difficult; and the president was inattentive to, if not suspicious of, the presidential speechmaking process. Let's review each of these explanations.

A number of Carter's communications advisers expressed frustration with the president for not working hard enough at fostering a favorable press image. According to a member of the press secretary's office, Carter ignored the potential effects of the day-to-day portrayals of his presidency by the press:

> President Carter didn't spend a lot of time thinking about the press . . . which is good and bad. I think a president can certainly be too caught up in reading every story and watching the wires and fretting over the networks every night to the point that it's very counterproductive. . . . From my standpoint, I wished at times that he was more interested in it and delighted in the game-playing aspects of it . . . that he took an interest in how you go about working this thing out from a press strategy more than he actually did.[8]

For a number of Carter speechwriters the most important game-playing aspect of creating a press portrait of the president was getting favorable reactions to presidential speeches from newspaper columnists and editors. Former Carter speechwriter James Fallows explained that there is an important filtering-down effect of editorial and columnist-inspired opinion. These opinion elites, he argued, play a significant role in the development of public perspectives on the presidency. The president and his senior staff, Fallows contended, did not understand this process:

[7] Scholars who participated in the Carter Oral History project included, among others, Charles O. Jones, Erwin Hargrove, Richard Neustadt, Robert A. Strong, Kenneth W. Thompson, James S. Young, and Donald F. Kettl. The persons interviewed are not identified because the rules governing the use of the Carter Oral History transcripts require anonymous quotation.

[8] White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., Project on the Carter Presidency (Hereafter cited as CPP), vol. 10, 78.

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> One point which we [the speechwriters] tried again and again to make to Carter's old guard of warriors was that a lot of time you do not care in giving a speech whether you're boring the audience or not, because what you really care about is having a written documentation which when inspected by the editors of the *New York Times* and the columnists and by people outside the two thousand who are going to actually hear it, it will strike them as an impressive piece of reasoning and will for the next six months have a sort of ripple effect. That was never company line under Carter. But I think for any president, if he can do that well, that becomes a tremendous power.[9]

Fallows added that Carter was not inclined to worry about journalistic opinion of presidential speeches:

> I think to a larger degree in this administration than most, it would not occur to Carter very often to ask "Well what's the [newspaper] lead going to be about this?" That's not the way his mind works.
>
> I think Carter did not believe enough in, or feel accustomed to the idea of, different groups leading the opinion of people. He just didn't want to have these speeches that would bore the listeners but which would bring editorialists to an enthusiastic frenzy. So that didn't happen much.[10]

An exchange among several Carter speechwriters in their discussions on the function of opinion development reveals their agreement with Fallows that Carter failed to sufficiently cultivate public opinion leaders in the press:

> Why didn't we ever give a *New York Times* ed board kind of speech? Why didn't we ever think we were looking at Meg Greenfield . . . and George Will and what would we say to them, and how would Carter explain himself?[11]
>
> By having contempt for those establishment media people, we set a time bomb each time we ignored them. I would even hear it said, "I don't care what so and so thinks."[12]
>
> They are a special constituency that need to be taken care of. When they have a complaint or their squeaky wheel starts up you've got to do something about it or otherwise they'll come back at you.[13]

Carter's speechwriters believed that the low priority Carter gave to cultivating opinion leaders helps explain the difficulty these White House aides had portraying the Carter administration in a way that was clear and unambiguous. The speechwriters observed that Carter resisted attempts to summarize his administration's programs in a simplifying slogan that would identify for the public the focus of his presidency. They explained that Carter's resistance to characterization made the administration appear to lack priorities. One speechwriter observed: "Carter

[9] James Fallows, "Rhetoric and Presidential Leadership," Miller Center Research Project, University of Virginia, 1 March 1979, 6.

[10] Ibid., 34–35.

[11] CPP, vol. 8, 37.

[12] CPP, vol. 8, 38.

[13] CPP, vol. 8, 39.

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never sent out directives, 'let's stick to these themes the next two weeks. . . .' [We] never got any communication from Carter in terms of philosophy."[14]

The major explanation for this problem was that Carter's eclectic, nonideological philosophy was not conducive to simplification through the use of a slogan, a theme, or some other explanatory device. A speechwriter explained that Carter "simply resisted the idea of labeling himself in any way, shape or form. . . . There was something in his view of reality, of life, that led him to think that he could reconcile opposites."[15] Another speechwriter echoed this same sentiment:

> He could give a speech about civil service reform point by point. But what he could not do was show where civil service reform fit into his conception of government reform . . . and that was hard because there wasn't a Carter philosophy that you could always say this fits in here and this is part of my whole approach to government. And I think that was the problem he had, that he could not think deductively. . . .
>
> If you said, "How does your civil service reform relate to government reform?" . . . he could tell you all the tradeoffs . . . but he wouldn't do it if you said "give me a speech or tell me what Jimmy Carter's all about." . . . I think it was resistance on his part.[16]

In discussions with a panel of scholars, James Fallows declared of Carter: "Things which seemed contradictory to other people all fit within the comfortable embrace of his ideas."[17] An example of Carter's apparent tendency to view opposites as reconcilable was a foreign policy speech at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. According to Fallows, this speech was composed of two different policy memos, one from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the other from National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, which Carter stapled together and simply read verbatim.

> And to Carter there was no contradiction. He supported both their points of view because he could see the merit to each of them and was not drawn towards their points of contradiction. He agreed that it was important to pursue arms agreements with [the Soviets]. He agreed they should be rebuffed where they were making trouble.
>
> . . . In most other [policy] areas, he will decide each issue by itself and not go out of his way to have the grand scheme.[18]

Finally, a member of the White House senior staff offered a somewhat different perspective from the above quotations. This staff member attributed the failure to create a Carter image during the term to the people who successfully presented a favorable Carter image during the 1976 campaign:

[14] CPP, vol. 8, 130.
[15] CPP, vol. 8, 84–85.
[16] CPP, vol. 8, 112.
[17] Fallows, "Rhetoric and Presidential Leadership," 24.
[18] Ibid., 25.

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> Television is an enormous obstacle to a president projecting an image, an impression of addressing a problem in a sustained way. And we failed. We failed. One of the ironies is that we understood so well how to use the media to get there and we failed miserably in articulating in a sustained way what Jimmy Carter was about and how he wanted to deal with these issues.[19]

White House speechwriters attributed Carter's inability to communicate clearly to the president's lack of attention to the speechwriting process. During their discussions with panels of scholars, Carter's speechwriters emphasized their frustrations with having minimal contact with the president. In their views, Carter placed little importance on speechmaking. One speechwriter explained that Carter "was a man who had virtually reached the presidency without somebody writing his words for him and he regarded the whole process of a cooked up impression prepared ahead of time with suspicion."[20] A second speechwriter was puzzled by Carter's refusal to place greater priority on public speaking:

> I think that never in his life did he decide that speaking was important in itself. . . . I've seen a lot of speeches in the East Room of the White House where he gave horrendous speeches to people that came to see him. They were audiences he should have turned on, supporters. . . . He didn't try. I don't know why he didn't think it was important to turn those people on. . . . I think it's a question of priorities and his priorities were not to give a great statement most of the time.[21]

Carter's speechwriters complained that they lacked status in the White House and assessed that this lack reflected the president's priorities. One speechwriter recalled:

> The general experience that Carter had was not such as to make him trust [speechwriters]. The Carter White House speechwriting department was one of the smallest in recent administrations. . . . We had no researchers and just a couple of secretaries.
>
> . . . The President never worked in any consistent way or directly with the people who wrote his speeches. He always worked through somebody else. So there was this constant and futile search for an intermediary between Carter and his speechwriters who would magically produce the desired results.
>
> . . . There was surprisingly little personal contact between us and the man we were writing for. . . . Our work was often guesswork. We would have to imagine what the President would want to say in a given situation.[22]

Three other Carter speechwriters added the following observations to lend credibility to the assertion that Carter placed little emphasis on speechmaking:

> The "official speechwriter meets President to do work on this speech" kind of meetings could be counted on the fingers of your hand during the whole administration for us. . . . there was no formal regular way that any of the speechwriters ever talked to the

[19] CPP, vol. 7, 26.
[20] CPP, vol. 8, 11.
[21] CPP, vol. 8, 1-2.
[22] CPP, vol. 8, 1-2.

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president about speeches except in unusual circumstances. . . . Neither was there an informal kind of arrangement where we all talked with the President about speeches as a group on any regular basis or even on any individual basis.[23]

One of the overall problems is that the writing of a speech is such an important nexus in any administration. That's where so many fights and policy fights come together, and the role of being in charge of that was a very enviable position because of the sort of policy power it provided and also the access it provided. None of us were ever in a position to seize that access. There was always somebody who had access to Carter about speeches. But it was never the person who actually wrote the speech, or almost never.[24]

He never came back to us and said, "why don't you do another like that? I like that speech. . . ." There was no feedback on that stuff. . . . If you have to explain why you have to see the President then there's no way you can. Al McDonald would say, "Well what exactly did you have in mind for an agenda?" If you have to go through that crap to ask to talk to the guy you're writing for, you're in trouble. . . . We had to justify meeting with the President, which we really never justified.[25]

Carter's speechwriters also explained that the president was inattentive to the necessity of working on political rhetoric simply because he disliked the presidential role of mass audience persuasion. The speechwriters offered clear distinctions between the president's speeches to large public audiences and his speeches to smaller, more familiar groups. The important difference between the two kinds of speeches was that large public addresses required intense preparation and some stage-acting ability on the part of the speechmaker. Addresses to smaller, more familiar groups required little preparation and a genuine sense of empathy with the audience.

To the speechwriters this distinction was crucial to understanding Carter as a speechmaker. Unlike Ronald Reagan, they noted, Carter could not stand before a large public audience with whom he shared no personal experiences and simply create, as actors do, a believable sense of empathy with members of the audience. Once in front of smaller groups with whom he shared genuine emotions, no need existed for the speechwriters to create a formal text for the president. Carter's finest speeches, they explained, were ones in which he related on a personal level to individual members of his audience. A speechwriter provided the following example:

Sometimes, most often in front of a black audience, in a highly emotional situation, he could really step right up, just be himself and hit it out. There was nothing of the actor in that man. . . . The times he could plug a speech into his own personality, it worked.

. . . When he was talking to those black audiences, he had real, genuine emotion. Their condition was something he knew, he experienced. An actor will learn how to either re-create that emotion in new situations if he's a good actor, or if he's a bad actor he will learn to fake it. If he's great, he'll probably combine both. Carter could neither re-create

[23] CPP, vol. 8, 8.
[24] CPP, vol. 8, 11.
[25] CPP, vol. 8, 26.

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> nor fake those emotions. When they were not a real part of his experience he would not try to make emotions up or learn how to make them up.[26]

White House staff members attributed part of the administration's public communications problem to Carter's propensity to be the bearer of bad news. His tendency to identify bad news without offering any immediate cure became a political liability for the president. A speechwriter observed that part of Carter's "problem was that he took responsibility once he became President so that people associated what was wrong and what was bothering them about him."[27] And a senior staff member added:

> Every time we would make a speech on inflation or energy, and the more we talked about it without being able ever to bring the little carrot of good news, people would more and more find Carter responsible for those things. We were more closely identified with the bad news the more we made speeches.[28]

To conclude, many of Carter's communications advisers perceived that the president contributed in significant ways to his own problems in generating a favorable journalistic portrait. They found the president inattentive to the game-playing aspects of stroking the egos of editorial writers and columnists. He also appeared to refuse to orient his speeches to the opinion leaders in the press whose reporting and commentaries greatly influenced mass perceptions of the administration. Carter's speechwriters also portrayed the president as inattentive to the formal speechmaking process. They explained that the president placed little emphasis on mass audience persuasion, did not work closely with the speechwriting staff, and did not heed how his frequent negative messages undermined public support for the administration.

Policy Agenda

Some Carter staff members perceived the policy agenda of the administration as an important political liability. This agenda, they asserted, explains much of the negative press portrait of the president's leadership abilities. Three explanations for the difficulties the president experienced enacting his policies and for the subsequent negative press reviews were provided by Carter staff members studied here. First, the agenda was composed of issues that were "political losers"—from civil service reform, the Panama Canal treaties, to the controversial energy program. Second, Carter's agenda was not a traditional Democratic party agenda and therefore caused a great deal of intraparty criticism of the administration's priorities. Third, several Carter officials pointed out that the first year agenda was too ambitious and had created the impression that Carter lacked legislative acumen. Let's first take up the issue of the politically difficult Carter agenda.

[26] CPP, vol. 8, 14, 24.
[27] CPP, vol. 8, 138.
[28] CPP, vol. 21, 32.

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A number of Carter White House officials asserted that the president defined his policy agenda according to his perception of the country's needs. Carter immediately cast aside questions of whether or not particular agenda items were politically possible, these officials reported. Some staff members commented that Carter pushed "second term issues"—ones on which a president can afford to focus when he does not have to be concerned about the electoral implications of unpopular programs. Three White House staff members commented:

> If you back down the list of things, whether it's energy or civil service reform or nuclear proliferation or SALT or even the Mideast, the Camp David business, the Panama Canal, all of them were political liabilities for him in more than just the sense of, well, you have a certain amount of capital to expend and you ration it, you expend it.[29]

> I asked [another White House staff member] last night if he could recall a specific bill, program or policy that we had advocated that was popular and helped us politically. We couldn't think of a single thing. Everything was politically a loser.[30]

> [So] many of the things that he tried to do and did both were really things that were behind the times. I mean they were things that should have been done twenty years ago, or ten years ago, or five years ago and the reasons they weren't done . . . were exactly the reasons we had such a hard time doing them. Good reasons. It was the political difficulty.[31]

White House insiders also attributed the difficulties Carter experienced with his party and the press to Carter's "new kind of Democratic program." That is, the president's domestic policy agenda departed in significant respects from the traditional Democratic party agenda. A member of the press secretary's office offered the following observations:

> The programs the Carter Presidency was putting forward were certainly a new kind of Democratic program. It was more business management techniques—taking the available funds and targeting the citizen, not taking all the dollars there are in the world and throwing them at the problem. It caused the President, of course, to be disowned by his own party. You know, there's a Democrat sitting in the White House but he's not putting out Democratic bills and the coalition was falling apart. I think it demonstrated that the country certainly was in the mood to go in that direction.
>
> . . . it seemed to me what he did is he looked at any problem presented to him and tried to figure out what was the right solution. Well, the right solution is not always the liberal one and it is not always the conservative one. But the average, everyday politician behaves in that way because he has a constituency that he must respond to. So Ronald Reagan could no more take Teddy Kennedy's health care bill and support it if he thought it was the best idea in the world. But Jimmy Carter might.[32]

One senior staff member cited an administration study partially linking Carter's

[29] CPP, vol. 10, 114.
[30] CPP, vol. 7, 77.
[31] CPP, vol. 10, 114.
[32] CPP, vol. 10, 93, 113.

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new Democratic programs to the negative references to the administration in the press by Democratic members of Congress.

> Carter came to Washington not particularly as the favorite of the Democratic establishment or the people in Congress. . . . We took a survey of news in the second year of the administration . . . and found that 85% of the negative statements in the *Washington Post* about Carter were from members of his own party. It was really kind of ironic that Howard Baker was our best public supporter in the Congress from the day we came to Washington.[33]

Finally, several staff members asserted that Carter's agenda was overly ambitious. Some staff members observed that it suffered from a commitment to too many controversial goals. Yet some of these staff members added that controversial issues simply could not be ignored for reasons of political expediency. A senior White House adviser pointed out:

> We clearly did have a problem in that the President wanted to do so much so fast. There were so many things he wanted to confront—and did—[civil] service reform, the Panama canal treaties, the 1977 economic stimulus program. . . . We had too many things on our agenda for our own good. We needed to be a little more "laid back." We would have been more effective in the long run had we done so.[34]

And a senior White House staff member concluded:

> We were dealing with a collection of issues . . . that no one had dealt with because they were so politically controversial. Every one of them were [politically] losers.[35]

A member of the press secretary's office added, however, that a limited policy agenda may only have resulted in limited achievements. In this individual's assessment, a president cannot ignore problems and focus only on a few priority agenda items:

> There were things that he felt very correctly needed to be done . . . If you don't ask a lot, if you don't demand a lot, if you don't push for a lot, then you end up with next to nothing.
>
> . . . there is a limit to the extent that I think a conscientious chief executive can say, "well, we're just going or I as President am just going to worry about these two or three things." The other things bubble on, they get gangrene, they start to smell, and by and by maybe they kill you if you don't pay some attention to them.[36]

A senior White House adviser asserted that the president's legislative achievements were significant yet not recognized sufficiently by the press. This adviser believed that the press, which so often criticized Carter for overloading the agenda, focused too heavily on the policy process and not enough on results. Carter, therefore, received poor journalistic reviews for the same reason that his administra-

[33] CPP, vol. 21, 12–13.
[34] CPP, vol. 3, 100.
[35] CPP, vol. 7, 15.
[36] CPP, vol. 10, 112, 23.

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tion achieved so many of its major legislative programs, that is, because the president defied the expectation that an administration begin its term with limited, clearly defined objectives:

> Then we can see things happening such as having legislative successes that looked like failures. We had as good a legislative record as anybody. As far as in the percentages. But what you would see happening was that the process in getting something passed was so bloody that the press would focus so much on the process and not enough on what actually happened. Every president from Eisenhower or Truman would sweep the Panama Canal problem under the rug. Carter got the damned thing passed . . . Civil service reform. For better or worse we had the first energy program.[37]

A number of Carter staff, therefore, recognized the importance of the policy agenda as a source of journalistic criticism of the administration. Several staff members asserted that the president set himself up for press criticism by focusing on controversial items. Most of these staff members agreed with Carter's agenda and praised the president for taking on controversial issues ignored by previous administrations. Yet these staff recognized that the administration's agenda was a political liability and wondered whether the president should have adopted a less ambitious agenda. To the more politically-minded White House staff members Carter's propensity nearly to ignore the electoral implications of his agenda was a frequent source of frustration.

Policy Development

A great deal of press criticism of the Carter administration focused on White House efforts at policy development. Journalists criticized the administration for speaking with too many apparently conflicting voices, especially in the foreign policy realm, and for lacking a sense of policy priorities. Journalists criticized Carter for allegedly failing to engage in the kinds of wheeling, dealing, and horse trading with members of Congress expected of all presidents.

Carter White House officials made similar observations. The important difference is one of degree. Journalists placed great emphasis throughout Carter's term on the apparently conflicting voices and lack of policy priorities; Carter staff acknowledged these criticisms as legitimate for the early stages of the administration but added that major and unrecognized improvements were made. Both journalists and White House staff made a great deal of Carter's apparent refusal to participate in the coalition-building rituals of political Washington; yet a number of Carter staff emphasized the importance of political changes brought about by institutional reforms in the immediate post-Watergate years.

James Fallows asserted that too many administration officials had a role in influencing the development of Carter's speeches. The former speechwriter believed that Carter should have made one individual responsible for ensuring that the presi-

[37] CPP, vol. 21, 12.

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dent's speeches were clear and coherent. In a sense, the president appeared to speak with many conflicting voices in his policy speeches. Fallows claimed:

> I think it's inevitable in the absence of one condition which is the President giving clear support to a coherent result. I mean if he is not weighing that way then all of this squabbling will produce a confused and badly drafted document. And so that can be changed if you have somebody like [Theodore] Sorensen, or [William] Safire, or whomever, who has the backing of the President to knock all the other people out at the end and just write a coherent document. . . . I did not have the standing with Carter to do that so these things inevitably became incoherent.[38]

A senior White House adviser recalled that he often complained to Carter that "the cabinet people are just talking too much and with so many different voices."[39] A member of the press secretary's office acknowledged that the independence that Carter allowed his Cabinet members and the publicized Vance-Brzezinski debates fostered the impression of an administration speaking with conflicting voices:

> . . . you can have in the White House a fellow who has a very strong view on balancing the budget which is not the same view as that of the Secretary of the Treasury. And if you have them both, one guy on *Meet the Press* and another on the *Today Show* the next morning, you are going to have stories about policy incoherence. Quite the same situation applies when the views are different . . . between the National Security Adviser and the State Department.[40]

This apparent policy incoherence also led to the perception that the administration lacked clear policy priorities. White House staff acknowledged that this perception became a problem; yet these officials noted that Carter had his own reasons for taking on a number of controversial agenda items. A senior White House adviser argued:

> In some areas the President was overexposed, jumping out and making a statement on every issue, which I thought was just awful. It showed he had no priorities. The importance was to focus our efforts on the economy. . . . To always have a semblance of disarray by always having the President out front on every issue was unhelpful.[41]

The president, this adviser reported, responded defensively to pleas to focus on pre-defined priority agenda items. The president apparently believed that such an approach was unrealistic:

> We'd say, "Mr. President, you're spending too much time on foreign policy when the country's priorities are inflation and energy." He'd look at you and say, "OK, well tell me, do you want me to forget about the Middle East?" Sometimes he'd get defensive about it. "You want to say that the Middle East has nothing to do with energy? If you knew what you were talking about maybe you'd know these things are interrelated." But what we meant was that there was just too much.[42]

[38] Fallows, "Rhetoric and Presidential Leadership," 40.
[39] CPP, vol. 21, 8.
[40] CPP, vol. 10, 55.
[41] CPP, vol. 21, 14.
[42] CPP, vol. 21, 10–11.

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A number of quotations by White House communications advisers reflected journalists' criticism of Carter for failing to engage in traditional legislative leadership tactics.[43] One such adviser commented:

> You'd always want to see him kind of reach out and grab [members of Congress] and say, "OK George" and throw his arm around him and slap them on the back and say, "come on, let's go up and have some pop" or something. That was not Carter's style. It's the style which Washington is used to and Carter suffered from it. . . . How do you change the personality of the man? You really can't.[44]

Several White House staff asserted that reforms of Congress in the 1970s created a new environment for presidential leadership. This perspective was reflected in the comment of a senior White House adviser that "even Lyndon Johnson would have had a difficult time in 1976, because Lyndon Johnson wouldn't have had to cajole and twist [only] fifteen or twenty arms." This staff member lamented:

> Twenty years ago if a President wanted to pass a bill to the Congress he'd get Speaker Sam Rayburn and Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and George Meany and maybe someone from the business community. They could sit down in the Oval Office and write a tax bill and leave with a high degree of confidence that it would pass pretty much in the form they'd agreed on. Our experience was that you could have the President and the Speaker and the committee chairs putting on a full court press on a piece of legislation on the Hill, and you could get defeated in subcommittee by a group of people whose names were barely recognizable to you.[45]

A member of the press secretary's office offered a similar assessment:

> It is no longer possible to assemble a small group of congressional leaders in the family dining room at the White House or wherever and have a couple of drinks with them and reach some meeting of the minds and then be certain that the wheels will turn and that the thing will be produced at the other end of the legislative process.[46]

The perspectives of several White House staff members on Carter's approach to developing support for public policies share a good deal with the press portrayals of the Carter presidency. In retrospect these staff offered a fair degree of self-criticism of their efforts at building congressional and public support for their agenda. They acknowledged that the perception of policy incoherence became an important liability to the president and hampered the development of congressional and public support for administration programs. The apparent lack of policy priorities was another source of criticism by journalists and White House communications advisers. Yet Carter's advisers pointed out that improvements in White House communications efforts were unrecognized by the press. For example, Gerald Rafshoon instituted a procedure to coordinate White House communications on policy issues in order to enhance the consistency of official policy statements. James Fallows recalled:

[43] See CPP, vol. 7, 67; vol. 5, 60; and vol. 10, 28.
[44] CPP, vol. 5, 60.
[45] CPP, vol. 7, 10.
[46] CPP, vol. 10, 90.

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> One of the first things that occurred after Rafshoon arrived was that Carter decided to veto the defense bill and Rafshoon saw to it that all of us wrote up little talking points about why this was a good thing and that those were distributed to the people who had to make speeches. Now this seems like a fairly basic thing but it just was not done before; having somebody responsible for coordinating the communications.[47]

White House staff also noted that it is important to keep in mind how institutional reforms in the post-Watergate years made presidential leadership of Congress difficult. While White House staff accepted the journalistic bases for criticizing the administration's efforts to develop public and congressional support for programs, these staff pointed out that the difficulty of the leadership context in the late-1970s should be acknowledged. Journalists, Carter's staff concluded, failed to acknowledge important contextual limitations on Carter's leadership, such as congressional antipathy toward the White House in the immediate post-reform, post-Watergate years.

Conclusion

This review of the perspectives of Carter White House communications aides reveals the bases for Carter's negative press image. Let's briefly review the major themes in the assessments of Carter's communications specialists.

Regarding *symbolism and rhetoric*, a number of White House communications specialists offered criticisms of Carter that reflected major press assessments. The speechwriters emphasized that the president attached little importance to speechmaking and consequently failed to provide quotable commentary and good news stories.

White House communications advisers explained that Carter's selection of *agenda* items also became a political liability. These aides observed that the president's agenda-setting approach was apolitical by nature and that Carter knowingly took on many controversial second-term issues rather than focus on achievable agenda items. As a speechwriter explained: "he was unusual in that there were things to him that were much more important than getting reelected." Staff members quoted here believed that Carter should have opened his term with a less ambitious agenda. They acknowledged the press's criticism of Carter for not beginning his term with "achievable" objectives and establishing a reputation for strong leadership.

White House staff were most critical of the administration's efforts at *policy development*. Communications specialists in the White House criticized Carter for not emphasizing the importance of such rituals of political Washington as compromising and horse trading. These staff aides agreed with journalists' assessments that the White House's tactical political errors harmed a number of Carter's legislative proposals and created a general White House reputation for political amateurism.

[47] Fallows, "Rhetoric and Presidential Leadership," 18–19.

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President Carter's communications advisers provided important insights into the Carter administration's press image problem. They adopted some of the explanations for Carter's negative press image frequently given by the president's defenders—that Carter dealt with unpopular issues, that the leadership context was a liability, and that the president was above narrow, political considerations. Yet the White House communications advisers also expressed frustration with Carter for not being sufficiently concerned with his press image. Carter, it appears, resisted advice from staff members who sought to change him in ways that would suit the press's image of presidential leadership. Given a variety of demanding presidential duties, Carter chose to emphasize problem solving and decision making, while downplaying speechwriting and image creating.

It is not surprising that Carter's communications advisers were unhappy with the president's chosen priorities. It was their duty to make him look good in their areas of responsibility—image and speechmaking. They understandably wanted the president to emphasize what they considered important.

Two important conclusions can be drawn. First, the demands of the presidency are such that no chief executive can carry out all of his duties equally well. Carter chose to emphasize a mixture of duties that suited his own skills, style, and personality. He may have managed competently the details of governing and had a firm grasp of public policy issues and problems, but he did not excel in the areas of managing the press and imagemaking. President Ronald Reagan's legacy likely will differ from Carter's in that respect. Reagan may have excelled where Carter fared poorly (image and press relations), but he also may have failed where Carter performed competently (understanding the details of governing and public policies). In contrast to the Reagan administration, the Carter administration demonstrated that presidents who choose not to run a public-relations-oriented White House can expect to receive poor journalistic reviews.

Second, Carter should have done more than he did to manage his press image. Carter's apparent inattention to press portrayals became an important leadership liability. As media analysts Michael Grossman and Martha Kumar explain: "Carter's reputation as shaped and hardened by the media, contributed to his difficulty in getting control of his office."[48] They add that negative news stories tend to "accelerate the decline of a man who is perceived to be not up to the job."[49] For Carter, "[u]nfavorable stories produced a momentum for continuing unfavorable stories."[50] Carter's negative press image influenced broader public perceptions of his presidency. Carter lacked the leverage that President Reagan would later have, albeit temporarily, to successfully pressure Congress through public appeals to support administration initiatives. Carter's refusal to emphasize image-making and speech-

[48] Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, "The Refracting Lens" in Doris A. Graber, ed., *Media Power in Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 198.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

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making throughout most of the presidential term ultimately had a negative bearing on his ability to achieve policy goals and to be reelected.*

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Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect

DAVID P. FORSYTHE

As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote, "The United States was founded on the proclamation of 'unalienable' rights, and human rights ever since have had a peculiar resonance in the American tradition."[1] But the American fondness for human rights rhetoric has presented two fundamental problems in foreign policy. As first a reluctant great power and then a more willing superpower, the United States has faced the traditional conflict between commitment to human values and exercise of power for other interests. Equally importantly in an interdependent and nonhegemonic world, the United States has painfully discovered that the American and international versions of human rights are not the same.

This article traces the workings of these twin dialectics (rights rhetoric and national interests, and rights rhetoric and community standards) from 1945 to the present in order to suggest that the United States, despite its dominant power, has not been the major shaper of community standards or international regimes on human rights; the United States in its bilateral diplomacy is still struggling to locate precisely human rights on its foreign policy agenda; the Congress, while it still does not codetermine human rights in foreign policy, is ignored and by-passed only at peril for an administration. Ultimately this article suggests that some painful political socialization is in store for the United States when it deals with human

[1] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Human Rights and the American Tradition," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (America and the World, 1978): 503–526.

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rights in foreign policy, especially since human rights in its many and complex forms is here to stay on both the U.S. and global agendas.

Multilateral Diplomacy

While the United States pictures itself as the leader of the free world and a city on a hill to be emulated by others,[2] U.S. multilateral diplomacy has been far from the forefront of efforts to create international regimes on human rights. Indeed, if one views U.S. policy on this subject in terms of four periods, three of them have been characterized by various forms of foot-dragging on human rights in multilateral diplomacy.[3]

Limited Support (1945–1952)

It is true that the United States was sympathetic to some mention of human rights in the UN Charter. But this first era of U.S. foreign policy on human rights should be labeled one of limited support only. The United States was determined to keep charter language limited to vague generalities, resisting most of the efforts of smaller states and private groups that were in favor of more specific and demanding obligations.[4] The United States in professing support for international standards of human rights did not go far enough in that support to guarantee decisive action.

The same orientation held for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While Eleanor Roosevelt and her State Department advisers supported strongly the declaration, they were at great pains to emphasize its nonbinding and aspirational character.[5] The declaration is almost certainly more important politically and legally than foreseen in 1948, and those like the United States, which sought to move beyond charter provisions in some way, should be given credit for achievements over time. But that does not change the historical fact that in the 1940s and early 1950s the United States was opposed to precise and binding obligations in the issue area of human rights. Fear of international scrutiny of American domestic civil rights practices in the South and elsewhere loomed large in U.S. calculations.

[2] See esp. Tammi R. Davis and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "City Upon A Hill," *Foreign Policy* 66 (Spring 1987): 20–38.

[3] A fuller argument can be found in David P. Forsythe, "The United States, the United Nations, and Human Rights" in Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, eds., *The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 261–289.

[4] A. Glenn Mower, Jr., *The United States, The United Nations, and Human Rights* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), 5; Paul Gorden Lauren, "First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and Diplomacy of Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter," *Human Rights Quarterly* 5 (Winter 1983): 1–26; John P. Humphrey, *Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational, 1984).

[5] Ibid.; also see M. Glen Johnson, "The Contributions of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the Development of International Protection of Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 9 (February 1987): 19–48.

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The United States was not silent on human rights issues at the UN, but there is ample evidence that its support for a core international regime and for other rights regimes was definitely limited. The United States endorsed the self-denying ordinance of the UN Human Rights Commission that ruled out specific review of states' human rights policies; and ironically the United States successfully sought the demise of the UN agency on freedom of information because of budgetary concerns. It did not even support the effort to create an international regime for refugees until later, after the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had demonstrated its utility in the East-West struggle in the aftermath of the 1956 events in Hungary.[6]

Neglect (1953–1974)

The limited American support for internationally recognized human rights turned to outright neglect given Brickerism at home and Dullesism in foreign policy by 1953. Brickerism—a movement named after an Ohio senator that sought to limit presidential authority under treaties—caused the Eisenhower administration to eschew leadership on and participation in the development of formal human rights regimes.[7] Whatever the merits of arguments for and against adherence to human rights treaties, Brickerism plus the debate on the Genocide Treaty left a lasting impression in the American polity that human rights treaties were so controversial that they were better left alone.[8] Thus the Genocide Treaty—a moral reaction to the outrages of the fascists in the 1930s and 1940s—languished in the Senate until 1986; the UN Covenants on Civil-Political and Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights were not even submitted to the Senate until 1977, where they have languished since. Most other human rights treaties suffered the same neglect, since the United States has become a party to only a half-dozen human rights treaties over the years, none of major importance save the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 pertaining to victims of armed conflict.

Dullesism, the moralistic preoccupation with Soviet-led communism—named after Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles—solidified the notion that by contesting the USSR one was contributing to human rights. While true enough when speaking of U.S. support for constitutional democracy in Western Europe, containment of the Soviet bear did not lead always or even frequently to democratic governments in places like South Korea and Iran, not to mention Nicaragua and Guatemala. When applied strictly to multilateral diplomacy, Dullesism meant that forums like the UN were seen almost exclusively as places

[6] David P. Forsythe, "The Political Economy of UN Refugee Programs," in Forsythe, ed., *The United Nations in the World Political Economy* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 131–144.

[7] One of the best treatments remains Vernon Van Dyke, *Human Rights, the United States, and World Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[8] Natalie Kaufman Hevener and David Whiteman, "Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment," *Human Rights Quarterly* 10 (August 1988): 309–339.

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to score debating points against communist adversaries – for example, on the subject of forced labor in the Soviet Union.

Thus, starting with the Eisenhower administration, which was under intense pressure by Brickerite forces in Congress, one saw the demise of international human rights as a separate issue on the national foreign policy agenda. Human rights was collapsed into strategic policy, which worked well in U.S. foreign policy toward Western Europe. But substituting moralistic anticommunism for attention to internationally recognized human rights did not work in many parts of the Third World. Eventually this shift in rhetoric and action underwent traumatic reevaluation in the wake of the fiasco of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

The Kennedy and Johnson administrations spoke of the need to promote democracy, especially in the Western Hemisphere. The Alliance for Progress, technically not under the Organization of American States (OAS) but billed as the hemisphere's answer to poverty and repression, continued the pattern of giving priority to anticommunism, with only tertiary attention to human rights.[9] Yet this approach, fashioned by U.S. liberal state-capitalism, floundered on the illiberal state-capitalism that dominated Latin America at the time.[10]

In larger perspective, the Kennedy administration was too short-lived to have much of an impact, and the Johnson Administration was consumed by the Vietnam war, which estranged the United States from the UN, where U.S. policies were under attack not only from the majority of states but also from Secretary-General U-Thant. When other nations took the lead to improve the functioning of the UN Human Rights Commission or to get UN action on private petitions about human rights violations, the United States was supportive. But the United States did not play a leadership role in the 1960s on multilateral human rights.[11]

The Nixon-Kissinger team downgraded human rights as a separate issue and multilateral diplomacy still further. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in particular has left a written record arguing against the intrusion of human rights into the calculus of geostrategy,[12] even though he tried to reformulate his views later in the face of considerable criticism.[13] The record shows, however, that when Kis-

[9] An excellent analysis of the weak U.S. emphasis on democratic values as part of containment in the Third World is provided by Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[10] See esp. Richard Fagen, "The Carter Administration and Latin America: Business as Usual?" *Foreign Affairs* 57 (America and the World, 1978): 652–669, for the concept of illiberal state capitalism in Latin America. His argument is that whereas the United States has intervened in markets to enhance human dignity, many Latin states have intervened to solidify inequity and deprive large numbers of economic benefits.

[11] For an overview of change in human rights developments at the UN and an analysis of the several reasons for that change, see David P. Forsythe, "The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945–1985," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Summer 1985): 249–270; compare with Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights at the UN, 1955–85: The Question of Bias," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (September 1988): 275–305.

[12] In Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (New York: Norton, 1969), he argued that the traditional approach to foreign policy resisted concepts of power, equilibrium, and stability in favor of debilitating moral and legal principles. Human rights fit under these latter principles.

[13] Henry Kissinger, "Continuity and Change in American Foreign Policy" in Abdul A. Said, ed., *Human Rights and World Order* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1978), 154–67.

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singer went through the motions of speaking to an OAS gathering on human rights, he later informed the target country (Chile) that the speech was for U.S. domestic consumption only.[14] The origins of that part of the 1975 Helsinki Accord dealing with human rights—so-called Basket Three—lay not with Kissinger and the United States but with the West European democracies.

Given such views by top U.S. officials and given their private reprimands of State Department officials who broached the subject of human rights violations with foreign officials, it was not by accident that in 1969 Daniel Patrick Moynihan was made ambassador to the UN, which he then characterized as a dangerous place where totalitarian regimes sought to use the language of human rights to delegitimize the West.[15] He and others like Democratic Senator Henry Jackson were clear in their views that the human rights issue should be used at the UN and elsewhere as a weapon in the East-West struggle.

As often noted, the twin impacts of Watergate and Vietnam brought the Nixon-Kissinger team into disrepute, as much for their substantive policies as for their duplicity. The trauma of Vietnam brought home to the American polity the disturbing truth that resisting communism was not always the same as protecting human rights. The tragic war helped produce a decoupling of human rights and security policy in U.S. foreign policy. The collapse of global containment of communism as the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy had important implications for human rights.

Renewed Interest (1974–1980)

The trauma of Vietnam, when added to Watergate, caused the Congress to assert itself on foreign policy. The result was a renewed interest in internationally recognized human rights as a relatively separate issue. When Congressman Donald M. Fraser, chairman of the obscure Subcommittee of International Organizations and Movements, began his systematic hearings in 1973 on human rights, which were to have major impact on the agenda of U.S. foreign policy, he and his principal assistant, John Salzburg, gave a clear international framework to the concept. Human rights were to be defined by the International Bill of Rights (the Charter provisions, the Universal Declaration, and the two UN Covenants). They argued that both an international definition and multilateral diplomacy were important for an effective U.S. policy on the question.[16]

[14] David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and World Politics* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), chap. 3.

[15] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978). Moynihan is not totally wrong; but there is considerably more to UN human rights activity than a Soviet effort to delegitimize "bourgeois" regimes.

[16] According to a letter from John Salzburg to me, the emphasis on *international* human rights stemmed from the mandate of the subcommittee that Donald Fraser chaired, from the chairman's "strong belief" in the UN and international law, and from the assistant's background in UN human rights affairs. See Donald M. Fraser, "Freedom and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 26 (Spring 1977): 152; Congressional Research Service, "Human Rights in the International Community and in U.S.

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In the next stage of congressional action, legislation was approved on the subject of human rights, much of it referring to "internationally recognized human rights." Three general statutes linked human rights to U.S. security assistance, economic assistance, and voting in the international financial institutions. All three acts from the 1970s contained the stipulation that U.S. foreign policy was to be affected by a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" in recipient states. This language was incorporated into other legislative acts as well. By the late 1970s one could see that the Congress had reacted to a perceived amoral or immoral U.S. foreign policy by legislating human rights into foreign policy via general, country-specific, and function-specific statutes.[17] Even though the United States was not a party to most human rights treaties, UN developments on human rights affected Congress as it tried to compel the executive to consider human rights apart from a basically unilateral approach to anticommunism.

Kissinger resisted these congressional pressures to the end of his tenure under President Gerald Ford.[18] The Carter administration, however, did move somewhat in the direction desired by Congress. It gave human rights great rhetorical prominence as a separate issue and supported some multilateral diplomacy on the subject: for example, the administration's opposition to the Byrd Amendment permitting trade with Rhodesia and the concomitant support for UN mandatory sanctions on the Ian Smith government; its vote in the Security Council for a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa; acceptance in principle of socioeconomic human rights; utilization of the OAS to help rid Nicaragua of Anastasio Somoza; and submission to the Senate of four signed human rights treaties (the two UN Covenants, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Convention on Racial Discrimination).[19]

This executive attention to human rights apart from what Carter termed an American "inordinate" fear of communism, whether stemming from congressional pressures, personal commitment, or campaign rhetoric, was most assuredly not a simple

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Foreign Policy, 1945–76," report prepared for the Subcommittee on International Organizations, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 24 July 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1977); and "Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership," report of Subcommittee on International Organizations, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 27 March 1974 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974).

[17] A more complete account can be found in David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1988), which relies extensively on congressional hearings and reports by private human rights groups. See also the list of U.S. legislation on human rights contained in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Human Rights Documents: Compilation of Documents Pertaining to Human Rights* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983).

[18] For example, U.S. law required the State Department to submit reports on human rights conditions in countries receiving U.S. security assistance. Kissinger refused to release these reports to the Congress until just before leaving office, when he released several short and superficial ones.

[19] For one overview see A. Glen Mower, Jr., *Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: The Carter and Reagan Experiences* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987).

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adoption of multilateral standards.[20] It was not as if the Carter administration learned or internalized international standards and then applied them across the board in its foreign policy. It had to be pushed by Congress into economic pressure on Uganda because of human rights violations. Carter allowed executive lawyers to gut his support for the two UN Covenants with extensive reservations and understandings.[21] He resisted congressional efforts to introduce consideration of internationally recognized human rights into the workings of international financial institutions such as the World Bank. Thus much U.S. foreign policy was not at all or only begrudgingly affected by multilateral standards on human rights.

Yet on balance the Carter administration built on the foundations set by Congress and showed, however erratically, renewed attention to internationally recognized human rights. This was less a global crusade based on the International Bill of Rights and more an unsystematic series of piecemeal efforts to help individuals when U.S. strategic and economic interests were not perceived as overwhelming.[22]

Exceptionalism Triumphant (1981–1988)

The Reagan administration's policies on human rights were initially almost a caricature of American exceptionalism *cum* cold war politics. Truth on human rights had been discovered in the enlightenment and implemented primarily through the American revolution. Hence the U.S. commitment to civil and political rights constituted an example to others. That being the case, the United States had no need for international standards, which in any event were so broad as to permit the cover-up of communist violations of civil and political rights—the only true rights. The UN and most other international organizations not under significant U.S. influence were seen at best as unimportant and at worst as under the control of the Second and Third Worlds.[23] (In fact, initial Reagan foreign policies were so unilateralist that they attacked even the international organizations that *were* under significant U.S. influence and *were* important to many U.S. interests—for example, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.[24]

The early Reagan orientation toward rights was personified by Ernest Lefever,

[20] In addition to Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith* (New York: Bantam, 1982), esp. at 144, see Elizabeth Drew, "Reporter at Large: Human Rights," *New Yorker*, 18 July 1977, 36.

[21] See Richard B. Lillich, ed., *U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981).

[22] Compare Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Latham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986), with David P. Forsythe's review of this book in the *American Political Science Review* 81 (September 1987): 1047–49.

[23] In addition to Muravchik, *Uncertain Crusade*, see "Introduction," *Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1981*, report submitted to Committees on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations, Joint Committee Print, February 1982 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982), 1–11. Also see Jeane Kirkpatrick, *The Reagan Phenomenon and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983).

[24] See Robert L. Ayres, "Breaking the Bank," *Foreign Policy* 43 (Summer 1981): 104–120; and Richard A. Frank, "Jumping Ship," ibid., 121–138.

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nominated to be assistant secretary of state for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Lefever had criticized Carter for "trivializing" human rights by not seeing the subject as part of the cold war; he had further stated, before recanting during his confirmation hearings, that he was in favor of rolling back human rights legislation passed by Congress because of the same reasoning. He had also accepted money to circulate views favorable to white minority rule in South Africa.[25] The withdrawal of his nomination in the face of bipartisan opposition led to the confirmation of Elliott Abrams, which in turn led to a more polished version of much of what Lefever stood for.

At the UN the Reagan team was outspoken in its attacks on human rights violations by communist nations and in its defense of authoritarian allies like Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala. The Reagan administration engaged in a prolonged "review" of the human rights treaties submitted to the Senate by Carter. It gave similar treatment to human rights developments in the OAS. I have given the detailed evidence in another source in support of the proposition that the Kirkpatrick Doctrine on dictatorships and double standards guided human rights policy at the UN as elsewhere between 1981 and 1985.[26] The Kirkpatrick Doctrine advocated preferential treatment for authoritarian allies over communist adversaries. Unlike the Nixon-Kissinger team, the Reagan forces wanted to raise the human rights issue loudly and clearly when competing with the Soviet Union and its clients, but not when working with anticommunist allies.

There was some measure of change on these policies toward international standards and multilateral diplomacy during the second Reagan Administration, especially after 1985. For example, the United States introduced and lobbied for a resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission critical of the Pinochet regime in Chile. Reagan also came to support ratification of the Genocide Convention. I remain unpersuaded, however, that the second Reagan administration took community standards or international regimes on human rights very seriously.[27] It still manifested at the UN a clear preference for discussing communist violations, notably Cuba's,[28] and remained largely indifferent to many other international rights developments. For example, it was largely passive in the long struggle to approve a new UN convention on torture.[29]

During this era of pronounced American exceptionalism, a bipartisan majority in Congress frequently challenged administration human rights policies. Through both general and specific legislation the Congress maintained an interest in at least some internationally recognized human rights. It altered some aspects of U.S. foreign policy in places like South Africa, Chile, and Guatemala. And where Con-

[25] "Nomination of Ernest W. Lefever," *Hearings*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 18, 19 May, 4, 5 June 1981 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981).

[26] See Forsythe, *Congress Reconsidered*.

[27] The fuller argument is presented in Forsythe, "The United States, the United Nations."

[28] *New York Times*, 24 March 1987.

[29] Peter R. Baehr, "The General Assembly as Negotiating Forum: The Treaty on Torture" in Forsythe, ed., *The United Nations*.

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gress did not control policy, it nevertheless was an important influence on human rights policy in places like El Salvador, the Philippines, and Liberia. The Reagan administration proceeded on the basis of American exceptionalism and cold war politics from 1981 to 1985, but Congress maintained some balanced implementation of international human rights standards, however tenuously, in the face of executive power.

Bilateral Diplomacy

Close observers of the international human rights scene know well that international regimes beyond Western Europe are weak. As Jack Donnelly has written, most are declaratory or promotional rather than enforcement oriented.[30] Even when speaking of Western European states, the human rights regimes associated with the Council of Europe cannot handle all human rights problems in their foreign policies. Consequently, it is important to inquire into the place of human rights in bilateral policies. This is especially true of the United States, which is not fully a part of most human rights regimes. Space limitations compel a comparison of only the Carter and Reagan administrations.

The Carter Period

With the advantage of some years distance, the Carter administration's bilateral human rights policies are amazingly easy to summarize. It never developed a central concept or overall strategy to guide its human rights policies, adopting a case-by-case approach with little thought to the overall impression that was being created.[31] It sought to act where major strategic or economic interests were not at stake. It thus wound up focusing on some Latin American authoritarian regimes like Uruguay, Nicaragua, Chile, and others; while it deferred strong action against comparable violators such as El Salvador, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. Other cases like Iran constituted a melange of human rights and other concerns. If immediate policies seemed to require it, the president appeared to have no difficulty in praising serious rights violators such as the Polish government. The overall impression created was one of great confusion and inconsistency.

The United States intervened frequently on behalf of individuals but was not so clear in its commitment to structural or fundamental change. It often appeared

[30] Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Approach," *International Organization* 40 (Summer 1986): 599–642.

[31] See especially Caleb Rossiter, "Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction," (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, September 1984). Also Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "From Ideology to Program to Policy: Tracking the Carter Human Rights Policy," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 2 (Fall 1982): 1–12; see also Sandra Vogelgesang, *American Dream, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy* (New York: Norton, 1980); and Muravchik, *Uncertain Crusade*.

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to emphasize negative approaches such as public condemnation or reduction of foreign assistance, although Carter himself emphasized more positive approaches on occasion.[32] The United States sought to interfere with market forces as little as possible, believing that economic sanctions should not be a major tool of human rights policy.[33]

The overall results of Carter's human rights policies were decidedly mixed—and decidedly difficult to judge with precision. In some situations immediate goals were achieved: Somoza was removed from power in Nicaragua, Jacobo Timerman was released in Argentina, and the military in the Dominican Republic was deterred from seizing power. Perhaps even more importantly, the saliency of human rights issues gave impetus to individuals and groups around the world to push for more attention to their rights. It is impossible to determine, however, the extent to which the Carter administration is responsible for the strengthened rights movements in the Western Hemisphere, the Philippines, and other places.

It is less problematic to assess the extent to which the Carter administration's emphasis on human rights undermined U.S. power vis-à-vis Soviet-led communism, as charged by the Reagan camp. Certainly in places like Iran, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, U.S. ignoring human rights problems contributed to the political instability that erupted during the Carter administration's watch. Thus it was not the Carter emphasis on human rights that undermined these U.S. allies as much as it was the oppressive domestic conditions that had been festering unattended for decades. The prominence of foreign human rights rhetoric does not produce instability unless the domestic conditions are ripe for instability. And it should be noted that Carter, too, contributed to this unfortunate U.S. tendency on occasion: his administration increased foreign assistance to Marcos in the Philippines during the time of martial law and gross violations of human rights.[34]

As might be expected, Carter's policies varied considerably on the question of how to cope with instability once it arose. One searches in vain for the supposed emphasis on human rights which purportedly undermined the shah of Iran.[35] On the other hand, Carter worked extensively to oust Somoza, then tried intermittently and despite congressional complications to coopt his successors with a sizable foreign assistance program. In El Salvador he followed still a third course, providing extensive economic assistance to the shaky government but increasing military assistance only slightly in the quest of pressure for human rights reforms. Whatever the record of Carter policies in the midst of social revolution, it remains true that the neglect of human rights issues by Nixon and Kissinger was ultimately

[32] The Carter Library, Atlanta, has on display a presidential memo directing subordinates to use positive approaches to human rights issues whenever possible. It is not clear to date what further information might be contained in presidential papers on these subjects.

[33] Vogelgesang, *American Dream*.

[34] On the Philippines see Jack Donnelly and Rhoda Howard, *International Handbook of Human Rights* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987).

[35] The laying to rest of this popular myth is attempted not only by Muravchik, *Uncertain Crusade*, but also by James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

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more damaging to U.S. interests in the world than the uneven renewed interest in those rights by the Carter team, especially when one is aware of how difficult it is for a foreign power to impose its will on a nationalistic ruling elite.

Moreover, it is highly likely that U.S. rhetorical emphasis on rights made its communist competitors uneasy, even if the Carter team did not focus on communist violations as much as candidate Reagan and his supporters wanted. Parts of the Carter administration, however, represented by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, did maintain precisely that focus.[36]

The Reagan Period

Attacking the Carter record for the reasons already indicated, the Reagan administration initially intended to collapse human rights policy back into strategic (and moral) anticommunism. Particularly after the demise of the less than eloquent Secretary of State Alexander Haig and after the rise of the intelligent and assertive Elliott Abrams, the Reagan team composed a clear policy on human rights in foreign policy that was nicely elucidated in a little noted essay by David Heaps.[37]

Beyond the usual lip service to an even-handed approach to human rights issues, the Reagan forces did not as a general rule take public or forceful action against authoritarian violations of human rights. They reduced neither military nor economic assistance, regardless of gross and persistent violations of human rights. Nor did they oppose loan applications in the international financial institutions, U.S. law notwithstanding. Indeed, it was Reagan policy to work as closely as possible with governments like Chile and Argentina, and with South Africa, unless prevented from doing so by Congress, While "constructive engagement" was used officially vis-à-vis South Africa, it accurately explained the Reagan approach to all authoritarian allies. The positive approach and reinforcement in the supposed quest of friendly persuasion and change was explicitly argued with reference to a few countries like Guatemala. Most of these friendly approaches were without benefit for the human rights situation. The clearly positive changes that occurred in places like Guatemala were more the result of congressional restrictions on foreign assistance than of friendly persuasion by the administration.

Deteriorating rights situations went unopposed in places like the Philippines, Haiti, and for a time in South Korea, despite congressional attempts to focus on such situations. And in salient trouble-spots like El Salvador and Nicaragua, administration spokesmen as well as the president himself made clear that nothing could be worse than a communist government; noncommunist violations of human rights (whether by the contras in Nicaragua or the military and related death-squads in El Salvador) would be seen in that light.[38]

[36] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983).

[37] David Heaps, *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: The First Decade 1973–1983*, paper for the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, 1984.

[38] The evidence is marshaled in Forsythe, *Congress Reconsidered*.

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The Reagan administration preferred to emphasize the power struggle with the Soviet Union—viewed, to be sure, as part of a moral struggle—rather than to implement either international or American standards on human rights. The exceptions to this generalization are three. The administration did intervene with authoritarian allies on behalf of individuals such as Kim Dae Jung in South Korea. It restricted the transfer of crime control equipment to certain authoritarian violators of human rights in a quiet process as required by U.S. law. However, notable exceptions were transfer of electric shock batons to South Africa and South Korea (eventually terminated after negative publicity) and the transfer of equipment that could be used for torture to Turkey. Through the Agency for International Development and as required by U.S. law, the administration redirected some economic assistance away from general economic development projects and toward basic human needs projects, and required special supervision of the distribution of assistance, because of human rights violations in certain countries.[39] In these three aspects the Reagan administration followed precedents set by the Carter team. Otherwise, as David Heaps observed, Reagan human rights policies were clear but exceedingly narrow, focusing as they did on communist violations of human rights.

The Reagan team ran up against the perennial problem of how to exercise influence on communist regimes that did not receive foreign assistance from or trade extensively with the United States. Aside from implementing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which denies Most-Favored-Nation status in trade for communist countries with unreasonable emigration procedures, and aside from economic sanctions on Poland, which did not change the legal banning of Solidarity until the late 1980s, the administration fell back on Carter policies of publicly embarrassing communist countries in the Helsinki Follow-up Conferences and in other international meetings.

The Reagan team did differ from the Carter team in at least two further controversial respects. It forcefully raised the question of coercive birth control in the Peoples Republic of China, and for this and other reasons it terminated funding to international agencies active in family planning. Also, the Reagan administration renovated an old idea that had first been aired by Representative Dante Fascell and other congressional Democrats in order to push for the Endowment for Democracy. But then at one point the Reagan team interpreted this positive support for democratic private groups to mean that conservative and perhaps even nondemocratic entities in both France and Panama would be the recipients of secret U.S. largesse—at least until Congress and the press forced a change in policy.

Ironically the Reagan administration made the same mistake of earlier U.S. governments in effectively ignoring noncommunist violations of human rights in the name of strategic competition with the Soviet Union. But having elevated this mistake to the level of the Kirkpatrick doctrine, it suddenly found itself during its second term with a series of rebellions on its hands that jeopardized its security arrangements. In the Philippines, Haiti, South Africa, South Korea, and Panama—not to mention the continuing problems in El Salvador—domestic rebellions

[39] Ibid.

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erupted or intensified against governmental repression, oppression, and corruption. In places like the Philippines, Haiti, and South Africa, events outpaced a U.S. policy wedded to the status quo. Particularly in the Philippines Reagan tried to explain away the realities of the impending revolution against Marcos, and only at the eleventh hour and under the friendly pressure of Republican Senators Paul Laxalt and Richard Lugar did he shift policies and support the forces for democracy and change. The same outline of policy pertained equally well to Haiti and to the ongoing revolt in South Africa.

Stung by these events, which called into question the fundamental basis of U.S. strategic policy (with human rights policy as an appendage), officials of the administration after 1985 began to exert pressure on friendly authoritarians to try to head off other building revolts. This was the case in both Chile and Paraguay, and more belatedly in South Korea.

Some observers saw these changes as a shift in Reagan human rights policies.[40] From a narrow point of view it was, but more fundamentally it was a shift in strategic thinking that secondarily entailed a shift in human rights policies. What still preoccupied the Reagan administration was communism in places like Chile and Panama and South Korea – or at least a virulent anti-Americanism that could disrupt strategic calculations. U.S. concern about the resurgence of the Left in Chile, the stability of the Panama Canal, and a change in the balance of power on the Korean peninsula chiefly motivated the Reagan administration. This type of concern motivated overall U.S. policy toward these countries, which necessitated some pressure on the strong man to make concessions to democratic forces. In Paraguay, of little strategic significance, a genuine shift in strictly human rights policy seems to have occurred on the part of the United States. In other places like Liberia and Zaire, the traditional policy of sweeping human rights abuses under the diplomatic carpet continued unabated.

A full accounting of the reasons for these shifts in policy has yet to be provided. No doubt the obvious deficiencies of past Reagan policies, particularly in the Philippines and Haiti, played a role. Congressional pressures were also at work. Moreover, there were changes in administration personnel. Jeane Kirkpatrick and some of the other ultra-conservatives departed, and the more moderate Richard Schifter had replaced Abrams in the Human Rights Bureau. In summary, while the outset of the Reagan administration showed clear differences from the Carter approach to human rights, by the end of the second Reagan term there were a number of similarities between the two governments.

The Congress

It is traditional as well as convenient to speak of U.S. foreign policy and human rights strictly in terms of an administration and its multilateral and bilateral policies. Running throughout those pages as a leit motif, however, are references to

[40] Tamar Jacoby, "Reagan's Turnaround on Human Rights," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Summer 1986): 1066–1086.

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the role of Congress. A fuller understanding of U.S. foreign policy necessitates considerable attention to the congressional impact, certainly in the 1980s.[41]

The courts, on the other hand, can still be treated as a marginal consideration when examining human rights in U.S. foreign policy. In the 1980s there have been a few cases impacting on how the political branches approach human rights in foreign policy. Worthy of mention are *Filartiga v. Pena* and *INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca* among others. Still other recent and interesting cases that touch on a question of the international law of human rights have more to do with internal U.S. administrative decisions than with foreign policy—for example, *Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson.*[42]

Congress compelled the executive to retreat from a partially supportive position in the development of international human rights regimes during the Truman administration. In this matter Congress did indeed codetermine foreign policy, thus bearing responsibility with the subsequent Eisenhower administration for the debilitating collapse of human rights policy into the strategic policy of anticommunism.

After congressional somnolence and the development of the Imperial Presidency, Congress, not Jimmy Carter, sought to place internationally recognized human rights as a relatively distinct issue back on the foreign policy agenda. And Congress sought to coordinate U.S. bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Even when the Carter administration sought to take the lead on human rights matters, and even if true that *some* Democratic members of Congress tended to defer to executive leadership on the question, Congress as a whole remained active. It passed Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions (IFI) Act, which required the introduction of human rights considerations into IFI transactions, against the wishes of the Carter team. Congress forced Carter eventually to support an economic embargo on Uganda. It pressured the Carter team to take action to protect human rights in countries like the Philippines and South Korea. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, supposedly governing provision of security assistance, was made legally clear and binding despite the usual executive pleas for flexibility in diplomacy. Congress voted a number of bans on direct or indirect provision of assistance to particular counties (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, and Uganda) at one time or another for apparent or partial human rights reasons, despite Carter opposition.

More striking was the continued congressional assertiveness on human rights matters from 1981 until 1987, when the popular Reagan was in the White House and when the Republicans controlled the Senate. I have argued elsewhere that this period can be summarized somewhat unexpectedly as a time when a relatively cos-

[41] For the full argument, see Forsythe, *Congress Reconsidered.*

[42] For a concise summary, see Richard B. Lillich and Hurst Hannum, "Linkages Between International Human Rights and U.S. Constitutional Law," *American Journal of International Law* 79 (January 1985): 158–163; see also Farooq Hassan, "The Doctrine of Incorporation," *Human Rights Quarterly* 5 (Winter 1983): 68–86; and see Howard Tolley, Jr., "International Human Rights Law in US Courts," paper prepared for the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1987.

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mopolitan and internationally aware Congress fought a running series of battles with a parochial and unilateralist administration. Starting with the battle over the Lefever nomination, and continuing in debates over El Salvador, Chile, South Africa, and the Philippines, at least a significant part of the Congress tried to get the Reagan team to focus on internationally recognized human rights, either because it was morally correct or because in the long run it was in the national interest.[43] (It is ironic that this was the same Congress that followed Reagan's lead in bashing the UN on numerous subjects, including debilitating cutbacks in funding UN programs and its regular budget.)

That the Reagan Administration was able to persist in its initial orientations as long as it did with some self-defined success can be attributed not only to the firmness of its convictions, but also to the existence of two stages in the congressional process. In the first stage, various subcommittees on human rights matters, especially in the House where the Democrats were in control and where a human rights subcommittee existed, the administration was badgered more or less constantly. But in the second stage, where voting on the floor occurred, Congress was too fragmented by party and faction to hold the administration's feet to the fire. Thus while earlier Congresses had been able to put human rights legislation on the books, later Congresses had great trouble in maintaining effective oversight because of party and ideological divisions in voting.[44]

However, on some issues there *was* majority sentiment at this second stage of voting, and thus the Reagan administration was restricted in its policies toward such countries as South Africa, Chile, Argentina, Guatemala—and periodically and erratically in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Congress also overwhelmingly censured the Reagan administration for its vote in the World Health Organization against humane standards for the marketing of infant formula.

There is no doubt but that problems arise because of this continuing congressional assertiveness on human rights. Congressional concern is highly personalized rather than institutionalized, especially in the Senate. Congress focuses on some human rights issue not because it is the most egregious situation, or where the United States has the most influence, or where other interests are most adversely affected via human rights problems. Rather, Congress acts because some member or staff person becomes concerned with a situation and successfully builds a coalition to do something about it. Moreover, different parts of Congress frequently ride their human rights horses in different directions, leading to much confusion. This problem was particularly evident in the late 1970s. Additionally, there are the standard problems consisting of slowness in action, necessity for action by compromise, and playing to the gallery.

Whatever the balance sheet concerning congressional action on human rights in foreign policy, Congress still seems determined to play a major role in this as-

[43] Forsythe, *Congress Reconsidered.*

[44] For a detailed examination see David P. Forsythe and Susan Welch, "Human Rights Voting in Congress," *Policy Studies Journal* 15 (September 1986): 173–188.

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pect of foreign policy. The general decline in respect for Reagan's foreign policy in the wake of the Oliver North affair and the other information gleaned through the Iran-contra hearings in 1987 certainly reinforced congressional assertiveness on foreign policy matters, including human rights. If true that in the history of the Republic congressional assertiveness on foreign policy ran in cycles of about a generation, the end of this cycle was not yet in sight.

Conclusions

It is easier to write analytic description than to compile axioms on human rights and foreign policy that will be accepted as true by a variety of people of different historical experiences and political persuasions. According to Cecil Crabb and Pat Holt, the issue of human rights became "possibly the most tangled web in American foreign policy."[45] According to Lincoln Bloomfield, "What can be doubted is whether the U.S. government will ever be able to express those [human rights] values in its foreign policies in any form that is either coherent or sustained."[46] According to Sandra Vogelgesang, "There is no simple or enduring domestic consensus behind concern for human rights in U.S. foreign policy – by the executive branch, the Congress, or the American people."[47] And according to Elliott Abrams, normally the personification of self-assurance, "The human rights problem is so complex that mistakes will inevitably be made."[48]

Are there no lessons from the history of the past forty years of U.S. foreign policy and human rights? With the bravado of academic innocence, I suggest there are.

First, it is clear that international regimes exist on human rights, will continue to exist, and are in fact and in general growing more effective relative to their own past.[49] Whether they are effective enough, now or in the future, to prevent a consistent pattern of gross violations of rights is another question. If the United States keeps itself apart from these regimes, as it has done on the core human rights regime, it will not be able to exercise much leadership or influence on the multilateral dimension of global human rights. Even other democratic states that normally cooperate with if not defer to U.S. leadership, like Sweden and the Netherlands, will learn to act without the United States as they in fact did with regard to the convention on torture.

Both Brickerism by the Congress and a jingoistic view of American exception-

[45] Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 187.

[46] Bloomfield, "From Ideology to Program to Policy," 11.

[47] Vogelgesang, *American Dream*, 111–112.

[48] Elliott Abrams, speech at Georgetown University, 12 October 1983, quoted in Forsythe, *Congress Reconsidered*, 152.

[49] See, for example, Donnelly, "International Human Rights"; Forsythe, "The UN and Human Rights," 11; Tom J. Farer, "The United Nations and Human Rights: More Than A Whimper Less Than A Roar," *Human Rights Quarterly* 9 (November 1987): 550–86.

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alism by the Reagan administration, to cite two obvious examples, led to the giving up of influence in multilateral affairs on human rights. To use an oft-cited example, the United States cannot shape the functioning of the UN Human Rights Committee if it is not party to the Civil-Political Covenant.

Hence future U.S. administrations will need to struggle to convince the Senate that consent to ratification of human rights treaties is in the broad national interest. This should not be an insurmountable hurdle given existing views in the Senate, the changed position of the American Bar Association, the readiness of other private groups and expert witnesses to support ratification, and if necessary the use of the argument that ratification will provide another channel to use against communist violators of rights. The Reagan administration's support for ratification of the Genocide Treaty may turn out to be a benchmark in this regard. Moreover, where the United States has participated more fully in rights regimes, as on refugees, it is clear that the United States has considerable influence on the functioning of such regimes.

If the United States genuinely desires an international environment conducive to human rights, it should become a full participant in international human rights regimes. This will entail struggle with the more parochial and jingoistic elements in the Senate. But to act otherwise is to abandon at the multilateral level democratic allies and moderates in the Third World and to give extraordinary influence to those who would use the language of rights for their own repressive ends. Since rights regimes are here to stay, which is another way of saying that human rights will remain on the global agenda, and since the United States lacks the power to force its views unilaterally on most parties, to hold the United States apart from these regimes is to throw away both influence and impact. And it can be shown empirically that international rights regimes can be improved, albeit slowly and through struggle.

Second, human rights as a relatively distinct issue is also here to stay on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Nixon-Kissinger preference for a policy of pure geostrategy, with human rights either a strictly domestic issue or window dressing, has been repudiated – as much by Republicans as by Democrats. Equally importantly, the attempt by the first Reagan administration to return to cold war politics by collapsing human rights into anticommunism has also been rejected, again as much by Republican members of Congress as by their Democratic colleagues.

Indeed, in the final years of the second Reagan administration, any number of staunch anticommunists discovered that an active and even-handed attention to human rights *contributed* to containment of the Soviet Union. One does not fight communism by ignoring the reasons for growth of the New Peoples Army in the Philippines, or by ignoring the reasons for widespread opposition to Somoza, or by ignoring the reasons for the resurgence of the violent Left in Chile. (There is, admittedly, still the problem of how to encourage an orderly process of change away from repression toward stable protection of rights in different political, cultural, and economic conditions.)

The Reagan administration has made valuable contributions to enhancing the

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position of human rights in U.S. foreign policy by first demonstrating the bankruptcy of the effort to erase the subject as a distinct issue, and secondly by showing the importance of human rights to actively containing communist influence. No future government will be in a position to repeat the first Reagan administration's initial desires. In any event, Congress has placed numerous human rights statutes on the books and holds at least the threat of oversight, which it sometimes does indeed exercise, although in somewhat unpredictable ways.

The congressional legislation requiring State Department reports on human rights conditions and later reports on State Department overtures concerning torture have had a political socialization effect within the Foreign Service and larger State Department culture.[50] Compared with the mid-1970s, the community of foreign affairs managers is now much more sensitive to human rights issues. It tends as a group to accept more readily human rights as part of the legitimate agenda. At a minimum, the top echelon of the State Department under both Democrats and Republicans has recognized that if the department does not act on human rights concerns, Congress will proceed without it.

It has been said, at least by theorists, that human rights are trumps, that they override other policy considerations.[51] This may be true in stable domestic polities, where the central government monopolizes legitimate use of force and where independent courts exist to pronounce on conflict of policies and conflict of rights. In the nation-state system, however, human rights can rarely be trumps when pursued in foreign policy. As an empirical matter, national security will be trump. But it does matter to what extent and how human rights considerations are folded in with security policy. In much past U.S. policy, specific human rights have not been folded in but ignored. Recent experience shows that in many situations concern for human rights can be compatible with U.S. security interests. There is likely to remain, however, a good deal of inconsistency on the matter. The subject of economic interests also needs to be addressed.[52]

Third, the Congress for the foreseeable future will remain attentive to human rights. Having contested Kissinger, Carter, and Reagan on the subject, the Congress shows no signs of growing weary of the fray. Human rights is frequently a high visibility issue bringing political rewards to members of Congress. Stephen Solarz and Richard Lugar did not hurt themselves politically by having high profiles on human rights in the Philippines. Christopher Dodd and Nancy Kassebaum have not hurt themselves politically by sponsoring legislation on South Africa or Liberia. And the disarray of Reagan policies in the mid- and late-1980s invites further behavior of a similar nature.

With a statutory basis for attention to human rights having been laid, with a human rights committee on the House side, with publicity to be gained by members

[50] See Judith de Neufville, "Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An Examination of the State Department Country Reports," *Human Rights Quarterly* 8 (November 1986): 681–99.

[51] Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).

[52] See Forsythe, *Human Rights and World Politics*, 2nd ed., 1989, chap. 3, for discussion of human rights and economic interests.

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of both parties through attention to human rights, with private secular and church groups prepared to work with attentive members, with expanded congressional staff with expertise on the subject, and with an elite press also more attentive to rights issues, it is inconceivable that Congress would turn away from the subject in the near future. Short of an administration that comes up with a near-perfect human rights policy, and especially given the political socialization that has occurred within Congress on human rights since 1973, Congress will remain an important maker of policy (and sometimes taker of influence from international rights regimes).

Finally, the U.S. difficulty in accepting international human rights is part of the difficulty in adjusting to an interdependent, nonhegemonic world in which American exceptionalism is a self-image radically at variance with declining U.S. power and prestige. To be sure, those emerging from gross misbehavior and mismanagement by Stalinist governments look to the democratic West and even the United States for new blueprints. Many are impressed with the West's commitment to civil and political rights.

But most of the human rights movements in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America demand rights that go beyond the American tradition. They demand entitlements to adequate food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education. To argue that these demands on public authorities are not as essential to human dignity and welfare as demands for civil and political rights is to fail to understand and relate to less affluent, less individualistic societies. Such a U.S. posture of denial also creates another split with our democratic allies, all of whom accept a broader conception of rights than the United States. The United States should take socioeconomic rights more seriously and should join with democratic allies and others in striving to make those standards more specific and more important in international diplomacy.[53]

It is even possible to think the unthinkable. If the United States were to move further away from American exceptionalism, it might even learn some important lessons from international standards on human rights and from rights practices of other countries that would improve American society. Whether on the subject of access to higher education, provision of health care to the non-affluent, implementation of the death penalty on juvenile offenders, provision of child care for working citizens, or any number of other subjects, there are not many around the world who look to American society for positive examples.

In some circles of American society it is provocative enough to suggest that international standards on human rights could teach the United States something important on traditional foreign policy subjects pertaining to containment of communism, maintenance of reliable allies, and promotion of economic development

[53] On the importance of socioeconomic rights, in addition to the well-argued book by Henry Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), see Cyrus Vance, "The Human Rights Imperative" *Foreign Policy* 63 (Summer 1986): 3-19; see also David P. Forsythe, "Socioeconomic Human Rights: The United Nations, the United States, and Beyond," *Human Rights Quarterly* 4 (Fall 1982): 433-449.

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with dignity. But could it be that those community standards might actually teach the United States something important about itself? That is both an international and a domestic issue at the same time.*

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Liberal Democracy in Africa

ROBERT FATTON, JR.

Richard Sklar in his presidential address to the twenty-sixth meeting of the American African Studies Association has contended that "developmental dictatorships" have failed rather miserably in the economic and political tasks that they had set for themselves. Instead of inducing unity and harmony they generated ethnic favoritism and divisions; instead of ushering in social equality they led to corruption and injustices; instead of promoting economic development they fostered material stagnation and decline; and instead of establishing viable political orders they engendered divisive tendencies, military coups, and civil wars. The dismal performance of developmental dictatorships signals in Sklar's view that the absence of democracy and accountability in African politics can no longer be defended on pragmatic or moral grounds. And indeed, if they were given the choice, African men and women would prefer the vicissitudes, doubts, and imperfections of democracy to the corrupting and paralyzing brutality of dictatorships. The development of democratic mechanisms of accountability and representation is the means with which Africa can begin to arrest its descent into hell and squalor.[1]

The democratic project or the process of redemocratizing African politics is thus becoming the hegemonic issue in African studies,[2] not only because of a the-

[1] Richard L. Sklar, "Democracy in Africa," *African Studies Review* 26 (September/December 1983): 11–24.

[2] Ibid. See also Patrick Chabal, ed., *Political Domination in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Michael Crowder, "Whose Dream was it Anyway? Twenty-Five Years of African Independence," *African Affairs* 86 (January 1987): 7–24; Zaki Ergas, "In Search of Development: Some Directions for Further Investigation," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24 (June 1986): 303–333; Robert Fatton Jr., *The Making of a Liberal Democracy: Senegal's Passive Revolution, 1975–1985* (Boulder,

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oretical and moral search for an alternative to the existing authoritarian predicament, but also because there are indications that peasants, workers, and intellectuals of Africa are no longer prepared to put up with being the victims of despotic regimes. These people are exiting the public realm and creating new private spaces in which they hope to construct their own independent and parallel systems of survival. Such exit symbolizes their rejection of existing forms of governance and their desire for a new deal embedded in more democratic structures of accountability.[3] The purpose of this article is to decipher how and why such structures can emerge from authoritarianism and what are their material, social, and political limitations.

The emergence of modern authoritarianism in Africa stems from a series of interrelated phenomena rooted in the burdensome and contradictory colonial legacy, the intense and Hobbesian process of class formation, and the severe crisis and dislocation of the structures of production. The weight of culture and history, the struggle for wealth and privilege, and the vicissitudes of scarcity and poverty have all generated despotic forms of personal rule.[4] These despotic forms, however, are difficult to sustain; they are showing signs of increasing bureaucratic incompetence, material corruption, and political vulnerability. This is not to say that their collapse is inevitable or conducive to more accountable and democratic methods of representation. On the contrary, such a collapse might contribute to a "war of all against all," a battlefield where everyone's individual private interest confronts everyone else's and where chaos, civil strifes, and insecurity become a hellish way of life. Paradoxically, this very possibility might facilitate transitions to "uncertain" democracies, democracies "with tears and reservations."[5] Thus, the manifest failures of authoritarian and the fears of a further descent into hell might well create opportunities for more egalitarian, popular, and representative systems of governance. How these opportunities come into being, whether they can be seized, and whether they constitute a strong foundation for the full flourishing of democracy are the major questions this article seeks to answer.

Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987); Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Barry Munslow, "Why Has the Westminster Model Failed in Africa?" *Parliamentary Affairs* 36 (Spring 1983): 218–228; Dov Ronen, ed., *Democracy and Pluralism in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986); Richard Sandbrook, *The Politics of Africa's Stagnation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[3] Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988).

[4] Jean François Bayart, *L'Etat Au Camérоun* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985); Thomas M. Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa.*

[5] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Sklar, "Democracy In Africa."

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The Legacy of History and the Disintegration of the Colonial-inspired Model

Africa inherited liberal democracy in its British, French, or Belgian version from the accelerated and panicky processes of rapid decolonization. It was only in the last decade of colonialism, when independence became a certainty, that the imperialist powers gradually began to institute democratic reforms in what had hitherto been structures of exploitation, despotism, and degradation.[6] As Michael Crowder has argued:

> . . . the colonial state was conceived in violence rather than by negotiation. This violence was often quite out of proportion to the task in hand, with burnings of villages, destruction of crops, killing of women and children, and the execution of leaders. . . . The colonial state was not only conceived in violence, but it was maintained by the free use of it. Any form of resistance was visited by punitive expeditions that were often quite unrestrained by any of the norms of warfare in Europe.[7]

The transition from colonial despotism to liberal democracy was expedited in a few years without any fundamental transformation in the economic, cultural, or bureaucratic domains. The transition was in fact reluctant, repressive, and opportunistic. In addition, African leaders never fully accepted the precepts of the European political model, few were enthusiastic about it, and most tolerated it as means to a different end. The African commitment to liberal democracy was shaky, hesitant, and ultimately short-lived.

Such doubts about the viability of liberal democracy reflected not only a lack of commitment to imported European political systems, they were also grounded in the material matrix of African societies. Africa lacked those objective criteria that have historically been associated with the rise of bourgeois forms of representation elsewhere. Because of its colonial legacy and its peripheral-dependent nature, African capitalism has failed to generate the development of both a hegemonic bourgeoisie and a strong proletariat—the two classes whose conflicts and confrontations are critical in striking the political compromises and bargains necessary to the establishment of liberal democracy.[8] The absence of these confrontations and conflicts has prevented the growth of liberalism with its ideological and legal emphasis on individual rights, civil liberties, and freedom of association. In other words, the nascent African bourgeoisies have lacked the hegemony that makes possible liberal democracy and the subordinate integration of the dominated classes into the system of bourgeois representation.[9]

[6] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1968); Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).

[7] Crowder, "Whose Dream Was it Anyway?" 11-12.

[8] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. and trans. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 57-60; Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: Verso Edition, 1978), 87-88.

[9] Robert Fatton Jr., "Bringing the Ruling Class Back In: Class, State, and Hegemony in Africa," *Comparative Politics* 20 (April 1988): 253-264; Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, 206-276.

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Not surprisingly, the European model that Africans inherited on independence day disintegrated rapidly and without much popular opposition. The superimposition of alien forms of governmental accountability on an environment that had hitherto been embedded in violence, racism, and repression, and that had produced neither an indigenous bourgeoisie nor a large proletariat, could only lead to political failures and catastrophes. The liberal "gift" of an aging, decadent, and departing imperialism could not erase the more profound and pervasive legacy of decades of colonial domination, coercion, and degradation. During these decades Africans had been "infantilized"; stigmatized by their color; and with no recognizable rights, they had become powerless units of labor who had been deprived of the basic attributes of adult social beings.[10]

This infantilization of Africans facilitated the imposition of the colonial dictatorships and contributed to the relative hegemony of a submissive culture of obedience and compliance to authority. There was little room for resistance, challenge, and revolt, and even less for democratic accountability. Africans were treated as children who had yet to acquire the necessary maturity required for considered judgment and political decision making. They were socially dead and removed from history. As Albert Memmi put it:

> The colonized . . . feels neither responsible nor guilty nor skeptical, for he is out of the game. He is in no way a subject of history any more. Of course, he carries its burden, often more cruelly than others, but always as an object. He has forgotten how to participate actively in history and no longer even asks to do so. No matter how briefly colonization may have lasted, all memory of freedom seems distant; he forgets what it costs or else he no longer dares to pay the price for it.[11]

Frightened, Africans were inclined to accept their situation; the sense of inevitability had conquered their hearts and minds;[12] and they were paralyzed and mesmerized by the might of their oppressors. It was only when this sense of inevitability stopped informing their historical conduct that African men and women began to articulate the idea of decolonization and emancipation. The emancipation of African consciousness, however, was a slow and gradual process that crystallized in the 1950s; it stemmed from the opportunistic convergence of interests between the small petty-bourgeois elite and the masses. The elite knew that its aspirations for winning national power had little chance of materializing without the support of the masses. Colonial authorities would not slacken their will to maintain control and would not concede without an upsurge of popular demands. The masses, on the other hand, knew that their hopes for a better social deal depended on the elite's capacity to articulate their grievances and organize their struggles.[13]

[10] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*; Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized.*

[11] Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, 92–93.

[12] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1978).

[13] Basil Davidson, *Let Freedom Come* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 227–228.

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The historical bloc that resulted from this opportunistic convergence of interests between the petty-bourgeoisie and the masses was built of the common aspiration to end colonialism and alien rule; but it was also fragmented by diverging material goals and conflicting ethnic loyalties. The bridge linking the petty-bourgeoisie and the masses across the wide social and political gap separating them "remained always liable to collapse into mutual distrust or worse."[14] This, however, was inevitable; how could the petty-bourgeoisie bent on becoming a national bourgeoisie reconcile its own class project with that of the popular sectors? How could one imagine the metamorphosis of the petty-bourgeoisie into a national bourgeoisie without the coercions, corruptions, and despoilments of subordinate classes that have historically characterized the phase of "primitive accumulation"? How could one expect the persistence of foreign forms of bourgeois representation when there was no bourgeoisie, no liberalism, and when there was only a heritage of political authoritarianism and utter social neglect of the popular sectors? Things were indeed bound to fall apart.

Thus the colonial legacy confronted Africa with a fundamental contradiction between the imperatives of democracy and the imperatives of building bourgeoisies. It was a contradiction that Africans failed to resolve. What emerged from the debris of the parliamentary model were varied forms of personal rule that achieved varied degrees of successes with varied degrees of coercion. Where there was success, however, it was precarious, temporary, and crippled by its class and ethnic limitations; where there was failure, it was egregious, massive, and tragic. Where there remained civil liberties, they were fragile, vulnerable, and under constant threat of sudden death; where despotism prevailed, it was cruel, murderous, and incompetent.[15]

Class, Authoritarianism, and Patrimonial Rule

The rapid disintegration of the inherited parliamentary model generated the rise of personal rule shaped by the idiosyncrasies of the ruler and his entourage rather than by effective political institutions and regulations. As Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg have emphasized:

> Personal rule is a system of relations linking rulers not with the "public" or even with the ruled (at least not directly), but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the "system." If personal rulers are restrained, it is by the limits of their personal authority and power and by the authority and power of patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and—of course—rivals. The system is "structured," so to speak, not by institutions, but by the politicians themselves. In general, when rulers are related to the ruled, it is indirectly by patron-client means.[16]

The reality of personal rule and patron-client relationships should not, however,

[14] Ibid., 228.
[15] Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa.*
[16] Ibid., 19.

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obscure the processes of class formation and class closure that envelope such rule and relationships.[17]

Patron-client relationships reflect great inequalities of exchange and thoroughly lopsided structures of power, and they entail bonds of coercive dependence rather than ties of genuine reciprocity. Coercive dependence, however, does not entail or necessarily call forth the consciousness of suffering or exploitation or a sense of moral outrage. Patron-client relationships contribute to the routinization and legitimation of coercive dependence by projecting a form of benevolent paternalism; they facilitate the establishment of the moral authority of obedience and stifle the sense of injustice. They tend to freeze the emergence of class conflict and enshrine as natural the existing hierarchy of domination and subordination. Coercive dependence has yet to generate massive popular resistance, but it is an objective reality.

This objective reality reflects the unequal transfer of commercial resources from clients to patrons: a significant portion of the clients' economic surplus is channeled to the patrons.[18] Patron-client relationships are, therefore, processes of resource extraction and capital accumulation. In this sense, their economic structures and paternalistic ethos strengthen and enhance the material and political power of the patrons. They simultaneously disorganize and individualize the resistance and struggles of the clientele against its bonds of coercive dependence. Hence, patron-client relationships contribute to the transformation of patron authority into class authority, and they repress the collective challenge of subaltern classes. As such, they are means of political control and financial aggrandizement.

Patronage and clientelism transform political domination into a type of hierarchic paternalism that masks the coercive bonds of exploitation structuring the relationships between ruling and subordinate classes. It is as if class conflicts were nonexistent. This is so because patron-client relationships prevent the political organization of subordinate classes as classes by maintaining and accentuating their isolation and individualization. On the other hand, they unify the dominant classes by linking them to a framework of cooperation closely associated to the state. In this sense, patron-client relationships integrate the patrons into and exclude the clients from the centers of national power. Clients are personally dependent upon members of the dominant classes for their very survival; they receive petty favors for obedience and in the process are ultimately isolated from their own wider class as atomistic individuals who defer to local displays of wealth and power. Thus, patron-client relationships undermine solidarity among the oppressed by ligating them as individuals to their oppressors; clients are hard put to identify with each other as a class and tend to behave as individuals incapable of cohering their grievances into collective resistance.

[17] Robert Fatton Jr., "Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal," *The African Studies Review* 29 (December 1986): 61–78.

[18] Laura Guasti, "Peru: Clientelism and Internal Control" in Steffen W. Schmidt et al., eds., *Friends, Followers, and Factions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 423.

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Patronage contributes, therefore, to maintain afloat the political order and personal rule; but precisely because the whole system rests on persons and the discretion of powerful notables, it lacks the institutionalized coherence required for long-lasting viability. In other words, since the process of class formation is still in the making and since class closure is still gelatinous, the personal ruler and his associated patrons are incapable of imposing their hegemony and of constructing the bureaucratic and legal trenches of rational domination. As a consequence, African political orders constitute patrimonial forms of governance that are incapable of generating the development of a productive capitalism. Being an unpredictable and arbitrary type of political rule, patrimonialism has a strong anticapitalist effect. As Max Weber emphasized:

> . . . the patrimonial state lacks the political and procedural *predictability*, indispensable for capitalist development, which is provided by the rational rules of modern bureaucratic administration. Instead we find unpredictability and inconsistency on the part of court and local officials, and variously benevolence and disfavor on the part of the ruler and his servants. It is quite possible that a private individual, by skillfully taking advantage of the given circumstances and of personal relations, obtains a privileged position which offers him nearly unlimited acquisitive opportunities.[19]

Not surprisingly, African patrimonialism rests on a vast unproductive network of corruption lorded over by presidential monarchs who dispense favors, resources, and money to gain loyalty, obedience, and submission. Accountability in this environment depends on neither popular legitimacy nor rational bureaucratic norms; it is the child of corruption. In Ryszard Kapuscinski's masterful study of Haile Selassie's despotic rule in Ethiopia, a member of the court emphasized the central function of corruption in the maintenance of imperial patrimonialism:

> In a poor country, money is a wonderful, thick hedge, dazzling and always blooming, which separates you from everything else. Through that hedge you do not see creeping poverty, you do not smell the stench of misery, and you do not hear the voices of the human dregs. But at the same time you know that all of that exists, and you feel proud because of your hedge. You have money; that means you have wings. You are the bird of paradise that everyone admires.
>
> . . . [Haile Selassie] liked the people of the court to multiply their belongings, he liked their accounts to grow and their purses to swell. I don't remember His Magnanimous Highness ever demoting someone and pressing his head to the cobblestones because of corruption. Let him enjoy his corruption, as long as he shows his loyalty! Thanks to his unequaled memory and also to the constant reports, our monarch knew exactly who had how much. But as long as his subject behaved loyally, he kept this knowledge to himself and never made use of it. But if he sensed even the slightest shadow of disloyalty, he would immediately confiscate everything and take the bird of paradise away from

[19] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1095; see also Thomas Callaghy, "The State and the Development of Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical, Historical, and Comparative Reflections" in Rothchild and Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance*, 67–99.

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the embezzler. Thanks to that system of accountability, the King of Kings had everyone in his hand, and everyone knew it.[20]

The patrimonial ruler's favor and disfavor, gift and confiscation, generate privilege and wealth, and simultaneously ruin and poverty. The ruler's insatiable appetite for ever increasing shares of economic surpluses transforms society into his own personal hunting ground. The vast majority that is kept purposefully unorganized and powerless is compelled to pay the tributes that enrich the ruler and his retinue. This production of wealth that seldom finds its way into productive investments is generally wasted in ostentatious patterns of consumption and in self-aggrandizing projects. The ultimate result is economic stagnation, political malaise, and moral cynicism. Not surprisingly, African patrimonialism is a highly unstable form of governance. Presidential monarchs, however powerful they may be, live in the permanent fear of conspiracies; courtiers continuously agonize over their uncertain present and immediate future; and the people in their general indifference and contempt toward authority withdraw from the public realm to search for alternative forms of survival.

Such patterns of systemic instability created the condition for a Hobbesian quest for power, as well as for its violent and coercive maintenance. In addition, instability is exacerbated further by the high premium that ruling classes place on their monopolistic control of the state. This is so because the state in Africa is the prime instrument with which a class can hope to become a ruling class. To be absent from the state is to be condemned to a subordinate and inferior status. In Africa, class power is state power; the two are fused and inseparable.

The nonhegemonic character of African ruling classes has compelled them to take direct charge of the state itself, to staff it, and consequently to obliterate the political space required for the effective exercise of statecraft. Paradoxically, because state power and class power are one, the state has lacked the relative autonomy necessary to effect those reforms and concessions necessary for the preservation of the rule of the ruling class. With their eyes fixed on immediate and selfish interest and their hands in direct control of the levers of the state apparatus, African ruling classes have been unable to take the long view and organize in an appropriately flexible way the conditions of their own continued dominance. Because those staffing the main agencies of the state form the ruling class and are part of the ruling class by virtue of this very fact, their relative independence in deciding how to serve the long-term interest of their own class is fatally inhibited.

The nonhegemonic status of African ruling classes deprives the state of the relative autonomy that makes reform possible, despotism unnecessary, and liberal democracy viable. The state is almost exclusively an authoritarian structure of dominance; expressing the narrow corporate interests of the ruling class, it has failed to become integral. The integral state is the state of an hegemonic ruling class and as such it is capable of "expansion."[21] It is capable of integrating and coopting

[20] Ryszard Kapuscinski, *The Emperor* (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 45–46.
[21] Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, 52.

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into its own institutions potential allies and even antagonistic elements. The integral state is thus relatively autonomous, since it can extract certain sacrifices from the ruling class and make certain concessions to popular classes. The integral state, however, is not above society; it is integral precisely because the ruling class has achieved hegemony. In other words, the integral state can emerge only when the ruling class has consolidated its rule to the point that its material, intellectual, and moral leadership is unquestioned or at least consensually accepted by the subordinate classes. Thus, hegemony makes possible the integral state.

Although there are exceptions, for most African ruling classes the hegemonic moment is not near.[22] These classes are in the process of formation and their rule is thus fragile, contradictory, and yet repressive. In the absence of a hegemonic bourgeoisie, patrimonialism embodies the logical form of political representation. In fact, African patrimonialism has striking similarities with Karl Marx's notion of Bonapartism. The similarities, however, should not be exaggerated; there are important differences as Thomas Callaghy has argued in his study of Sese Seko Mobutu's Zaire. Absolutism fits African conditions more closely than Bonapartism

> primarily because socioeconomic and class development is much less advanced and patrimonial forms of politics, leadership, and especially administration are more important than in Bonapartism. The class situation is simply more fluid, more in flux, under absolutism . . . [than under Bonapartism]. In absolutism, there was a rising and consolidating, but not yet dominant, bourgeoisie, which was both protected and closely controlled by the state, and a very small, emerging proletariat. In Bonapartism . . . the bourgeoisie is well-consolidated and the proletariat has developed into the other economically and politically important class.[23]

In spite of these limitations Bonapartism—the despotism of an individual resulting from an equilibrium of forces in which no social group is strong enough to impose its own social project on others—can serve as a useful heuristic tool to uncover existing African realities. The static equilibrium between contending classes vying for power that defines Bonapartism is conducive to the rise of a providential and charismatic Caesar who emerges as a temporary savior of the republic. To that extent Bonapartism embodies maximal state autonomy. As Marx explained in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, the coup d'état that brought Louis Bonaparte to power represented "the victory of Bonaparte over parliament, of the executive power over the legislative power, of force without phrases over the force of phrases." France "renounce[d] all will of its own and surrender[ed] itself to the superior orders of something alien, of authority." It "escaped the despotism of a class only to fall back beneath the despotism of an individual and, what is more, beneath the authority of an individual without authority. The struggle seem[ed] to [have settled] in such a way that all classes, equally impotent and equally mute, [fell] on their knees before the club."[24]

[22] Fatton, *The Making of a Liberal Democracy*.

[23] Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle*, 21.

[24] Karl Marx, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, Robert C. Tucker, ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972), 513.

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Hence, under Bonapartism "the state seem[s] to [make] itself completely independent" from class power; it reaches its maximal autonomy in so far as it seeks to raise itself above and against the interests of the bourgeoisie. But however independent it may be from these interests, the Bonapartist state remained ligatured to class: "state power is not suspended in mid-air. Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous class of French society at that, the small peasants."[25]

Bonapartism, however, is not the exclusive instrument of the small peasants; it serves them only up to a point. Marx explained:

> As the executive authority which has made itself an independent power, Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard "civil order." But the strength of this civil order lies in the middle class. He looks on himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class and issues decrees in this sense. Nevertheless, he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it anew . . . . But by protecting its material power, he generates its political power anew. . . . This contradictory task of the man explains the contradictions of his government, the confused groping hither and thither which seeks now to win, now to humiliate first one class and then another and arrays all of them uniformly against him. . . .[26]

Because of its contradictory character the Bonapartist state, as well as its maximal autonomy, cannot endure for long. Both are transitory and exceptional, and they soon confront the hard realities of class power. "Bonaparte would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes. But he cannot give to one class without taking from another."[27] Bonapartism representing a coup d'etat and not a revolution is never able to establish its antagonistic autonomy from the traditional ruling class. Marx wrote in *The Civil War in France*:

> In reality, [Bonapartism is] the only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie [has] already lost, and the working class [has] not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation. . . . At the same time [it constitutes] the most prostitute and the ultimate form of the State power which nascent middle-class society [has] commenced to elaborate as a means of its own emancipation from feudalism, and which full-grown bourgeois society [has] finally transformed into a means for the enslavement of labour by capital.[28]

In the contemporary African context the maximal autonomy of the Bonapartist state is thus a function of the crisis of hegemony. African Bonapartes emerge when incipient ruling classes fail to maintain their hold over state power because they lack the material, political, and moral leadership with which they could gain the consent of subaltern groups. African Bonapartism is a political phenomenon marked by the relative absence of hegemony. And yet the Bonapartist state in spite of the despotism of a presidential monarch remains ligatured to society and to classes. It cannot free itself from the weight of class power—however weak, im-

[25] Ibid., 515.
[26] Ibid., 522-523.
[27] Ibid., 523.
[28] Ibid., 553-554.

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mature, and fragile such class power may be. It seeks to soar high above society, but it has to maintain the social continuity of life and civil order. Thus it has to produce and enhance the economic, political, and cultural dominance of the emerging ruling class.

The maximal autonomy of the Bonapartist state – expressed in a strong presidential monarchism – does not impart to the state the capacity of challenging and threatening the fundamental interests of the emerging ruling class. It displaces temporarily the antagonistic contradiction of society from conflict between ruling and subordinate classes to conflict between society and bureaucracy. As Friedrich Engels explained: "Bonapartism distinguishes itself by preventing [workers and capitalists] from coming to blows. . . . [And yet it] exists only to keep the workers under a tight rein with respect to the bourgeoisie."[29] In Africa, the Bonapartist state's maximal autonomy saves a temporarily incapacited ruling class from extinction.

Bonapartism thus defends and guards the material interest of an endangered ruling class, but it is also moved by the self-interest of those in office and in particular that of the presidential monarch, the supreme office-holder. Indeed, Bonapartism is the vehicle through which the despot uses state power to extract from the popular masses those resources required to nourish "an enormous bureaucracy, well dressed and well fed . . . an artificial caste, for which the maintenance of his regime becomes a bread-and-butter question."[30] The maximal autonomy of the Bonapartist state implies neither a fissure from society and class nor a fundamental antagonism to the critical interests of the ruling class; rather it implies that the state momentarily suspends the exhausting confrontation of conflicting social classes. Thus, it is the stalemate of contending classes and of classes in the process of formation that makes possible the maximal autonomy of the Bonapartist state.

Such maximal autonomy favors the development of a unique center of power concentrated in the person of the presidential monarch who cannot tolerate the emergence of pluralistic sources of authority. In this perspective the presidential monarch is at ease only when surrounded by the silent mediocrity of a submissive entourage. As one of Haile Selassie's subjects revealed to Kapuscinski:

> . . . the King of Kings preferred bad ministers. And the King of Kings preferred them because he liked to appear in a favorable light by contrast. How could he show himself favorably if he were surrounded by good ministers? The people would be disoriented. Where would they look for help? On whose wisdom and kindness would they depend? Everyone would have been good and wise. What disorder would have broken out in the Empire then! Instead of one sun, fifty would be shining, and everyone would pay homage to a privately chosen planet. No, my dear friend, you cannot expose the people to such disastrous freedom. There can be only one sun. Such is the order of nature, and anything else is a heresy.[31]

[29] Friedrich Engels as quoted in Hal Draper, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution I: State and Bureaucracy*, 2 vols, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 404–405.

[30] Marx, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 520.

[31] Kapuszinski, *The Emperor*, 33.

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In a certain sense, however, the African sun is caught in his own trap. By sending forth his rays over his courtiers he inevitably grants them some autonomy and power. But since he seeks to remain the only source of light, he must continuously darken the courtier's beaming radiance. At this level the rule of African presidential monarchs can only be capricious, inconsistent, and full of freakish impulses. Courtiers are always confronted with the dangers of sudden demotion, exile, or worse; their loyalty is therefore fragile and opportunistic. And yet, the courtier's loyalty is indispensable to the maintenance of a successful and long-lasting presidential monarchism. At this level the relationship between courtiers and monarch must have a certain degree of institutionalization; it must generate universally accepted rules of political conduct. The presidential monarch and his courtiers are inevitably drawn into a pact based on private agreements and understandings that must be mutually beneficial and respected by both. This pact contains the seeds of constitutional arrangements that may eventually flourish into more accountable and democratic forms of governance.

Toward Institutionalization and Democratization?

The antinomies of presidential monarchism may paradoxically contribute to the development of competing centers of power that are both necessary for and subversive to personal rule. Thus the conditions that define the existence of presidential monarchism undermine its continued functioning. Princely rule legitimizes the struggle for spoils that the presidential monarch regulates and controls. Such regulation and control tend to become an uncodified and invisible constitution that governs political conduct. Rosberg and Jackson point out:

> It is this incipient constitutionalism of princely rule—this emphasis on agreements, understandings, and promises—which suggests that it is long-standing princely regimes, more than any of the other forms of personal rule, that have the best chance to become institutionalized, for the private compacts between ruler and oligarchs can become the foundation of an institutional principle of government if the ruling class is prepared to accept them as such, and if these compacts can gain legitimacy from the larger society.[32]

The process of institutionalization is also reinforced because the prince and in particular his followers have a vested interest in the routinization and rationalization of princely rule itself. The charismatic attributes of the presidential monarch's statecraft have to be institutionalized if political stability is to be maintained, and if the material privileges and ideological supremacy of his "community of disciples" are to be preserved. Max Weber remarks that

> charismatic authority may be said to exist only *in statu nascendi*. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both.

[32] Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, 84; see also Donald Rothchild and Michael W. Foley, "African States and the Politics of Inclusive Coalitions" in Rothchild and Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance*, 233–264.

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> The following are the principal motives underlying this transformation: (a) The ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and continual reactivation of the community, (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples, the party workers, or others in continuing their relationship. Not only this, but they have an interest in continuing it in such a way that both from an ideal and a material point of view, their own position is put on a stable everyday basis.[33]

Paradoxically, the success of princely rule may ultimately imply the institutionalization of politics and consequently the abolition of princely rule itself. The courtiers' search for more predictable political behavior and expectations can only erode the capricious absolutism characterizing presidential monarchism. Similarly, the severe economic crisis and its entailing drastic reduction of resources contribute inevitably to the shrinkage of the patronage system and thus to the possible emergence of more rational-bureaucratic methods of governance. Finally, if the presidential monarch is to strengthen his authority, he must develop processes and means of accountability that would curb the extent and arbitrariness of his power. Thus, as John Lonsdale has explained, political accountability constitutes

> part of the moral calculus of power; it concerns the mutual responsibilities of inequality. Because it raises questions about the control of power and its purposes, accountability must also be concerned with political organisation. For if power is not to some extent shared there can be no effective base from which it may be controlled, nor any protected right to discuss its purposes. So political accountability, or public morality, is the chief end of political freedom. Whether it also guarantees social justice and economic development is an altogether thornier question.[34]

Paradoxically, the legitimization and consolidation of presidential monarchism calls for the emergence of new forms of accountability grounded in more democratic methods of representation. These new forms, however, do not necessarily give rise to parliamentary liberal democracy; but they may well constitute the first leg in the journey leading to its realization. They constitute what Rothchild and Foley have called the politics of inclusive coalitions and they offer "the prospect of enhanced state influence and even the possibility of strengthened legitimacy. By coopting leading class and ethnic representatives into the ruling elite, it is possible to reduce the scale and intensity of their demands and to maintain the political system. . . ."[35] In this vein, the democratizing transition that the legitimization of presidential monarchism entails characterizes the making of a passive revolution.[36]

The concept of passive revolution is rooted in Antonio Gramsci's work and it "relates changes in politics, ideology and social relations to changes in the economy.

[33] Weber, *Economy and Society*, 246.

[34] John Lonsdale, "Political Accountability in African History" in Patrick Chabal, ed., *Political Domination in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 128.

[35] Rothchild and Foley, "African States and the Politics of Inclusive Coalitions," 233.

[36] See Fatton, *The Making of a Liberal Democracy.*

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[It indicates] the constant reorganization of state power and its relationship to society to preserve control by the few over the many, and maintain a traditional lack of real control by the mass of the population over the political and economic realms."[37] This process of reorganizing the relationship between state and society is on the one hand passive, because the "traditional split between leaders and led [is] re-articulated in new forms." On the other hand, it is revolutionary, because simultaneously "substantial changes [are] being instituted in social, economic and political life."[38]

In the specific African terrain passive revolutions institutionalize presidential monarchism by diluting its arbitrary and capricious power. They enhance the stability and authority of the ruling class as they integrate subordinate classes into political and economic structures that protect and serve the fundamental interests of the ruling class itself. While passive revolutions are generally initiated as a result of popular resistance against the privileges and powers of the ruling class, it is the ruling class itself that channels them into forms of representation appropriate to its continued domination. This is not to say that the ruling class is always contented with the processes unfolding from the making of passive revolutions, but rather that such processes are necessary for the maintenance of its power. These processes contribute to the cooptation of the popular masses into more or less democratized frameworks of bourgeois governance. The result is the establishment of a new political contract that legitimizes and organizes the great asymmetries of power, status, and wealth between rulers and citizens. This in turn constitutes a form of class compromise that structures and molds political accountability, and delineates what is possible and permissible within the boundaries of a "democracy with tears and many reservations."

Passive revolutions effect transitions to greater democratic accountability, but they fail to affect in any fundamental way the distribution of wealth, the structure of ownership, and the acquisition of privilege. In fact, it may be that passive revolution as a historical phenomenon can be achieved only if the norms and methods governing the production and the appropriation of the economic surplus remain unaffected by the convulsions of the political realm. As Adam Przeworski contends with considerable force:

> A transition to democracy can be made only at the cost of leaving economic relations intact, not only the structure of production but even the distribution of income. Freedom from physical violence is as essential a value as freedom from hunger, but unfortunately authoritarian regimes often produce as a counterreaction the romanticization of a limited model of democracy. Democracy restricted to the political realm has historically coexisted with exploitation and oppression at the workplace, within the schools, within bureaucracies, and within families.[39]

[37] Anne Showstack Sassoon, "Passive Revolution and the Politics of Reform" in Anne Showstack Sassoon, ed., *Approaches to Gramsci* (London: Writers and Readers, 1982), 129; see also Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, 106–120.

[38] Sassoon, "Passive Revolution and the Politics of Reform," 129.

[39] Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy" in Guillermo

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The oppression and great inequalities that are entailed in the relations of class power are not only compatible with the transition to democracy; their survival is the necessary and ugly precondition of a successful transition. The new wave of laissez-faireism that is sweeping African nations can only contribute to the further exacerbation of such inequalities and thus to social conditions that are not conducive to democratic practice. Both the call for state disengagement from the economy and the inevitable erosion of an already debilitated welfarism that this entails are bound to have devastating consequences for the worst-off segments of the population. Unleashing the forces of the market in African conditions can only invite popular resistance to increased food prices and/or force the vast majority of the population into severe malnutrition.[40] Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the transition to laissez-faireism can generate the type of political constituency that it necessitates. It is highly unlikely that African ruling classes will choose to adopt the principles of market rationality when they know full well that their power depends on their capacity to use the state as a predatory means to acquire wealth and build political clienteles. John Ravenhill has argued:

> To advocate capitalism as a solution to Africa's problems is merely to move the argument one step backwards to the question of how political coalitions can be constructed that will favour giving a greater role to markets. . . . [There] is a probability that state power will be used not to promote market efficiency but to sustain oligopolistic advantages and generate economic rents. Faith in the "market" solution makes the major and questionable assumption that Africa's business elite will not choose the easier path and become rentier capitalists.[41]

The introduction of laissez-faireism into Africa will most likely be contradictory, ambivalent, and piecemeal; and instead of generating democratic forces it will promote popular alienation and withdrawal from the public domain. There is, therefore, every reason to expect that the crippling patterns of class domination and the vicissitudes of underdevelopment will continue to besiege African societies whether or not they implant liberal democratic structures of governance. The implantation of such structures, however, would offer better opportunities for developing and improving material as well as cultural and moral conditions. This is why the transformation of presidential monarchisms in Africa into less arbitrary and more accountable political systems cannot be dismissed as mere sham and fraud. The struggle for democratization, however limited may be its gains, is as crucial as ever before. But this struggle should not be confused with the search for a radical revolutionary rupture from existing socioeconomic integuments.

This, Africans of subordinate classes know well. Alternating between resigna-

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O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 63.

[40] Sayre P. Schatz, "Laissez-Faireism for Africa?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25 (March 1987): 132–133.

[41] John Ravenhill, "Africa's Continuing Crises: The Elusiveness of Development" in John Ravenhill, ed., *Africa in Economic Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 27–28.

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tion, despair, withdrawal, and survival, their mood no longer captures the hopes generated by *Uhuru* (independence). Too many times they have seen and suffered the consequences of broken promises; too many times they have experienced a politics of coups and countercoups that alters nothing except the faces of embezzlers; too many times they have been devoured by causes and leaders that they supported and embraced. No longer at ease with their environment, subordinate classes have retreated into their own invented spaces of survival. In their desperate quest to elude their incarceration in the regimented network of state control, subordinate classes are seeking solace in the private spaces that civil society offers them. Far from constituting the victorious revenge of civil society over the state, this withdrawal from the political arena represents a painful escape from the oppressive enclosure of squalor and despair presided over by the wardens of the state.[42] The exit of the subordinate classes from the public realm represents, therefore, a defensive reaction against state violence and exploitation.[43] It is also a return to old methods of producing, consuming, and surviving; in fact, the withdrawal of subordinate classes from state-centered spaces embodies inevitably the resuscitation of past traditions of self-reliance.[44]

This resuscitation alleviates the plight of subordinate classes; it facilitates survival in an environment of death and despair. Hence it may also be the harbinger of a new, more humane, and more egalitarian society that lessens state control and empowers citizens to develop original forms of self-government. Freed from the constraints of immediate material needs, communities would generate a shift to the production of foodstuffs, indigenous technology, and intracommunal trade. While the emergence of such parallel communities offer some hope for grassroots survival and might nurture utopian thoughts of a brave new world of unalienated villagers, it is unlikely that these communities would consolidate and expand to the extent of becoming viable alternative economies and polities to the existing state domain. Sandbrook emphasizes:

> The fact is that local self-reliance, though a creative response, is nonetheless a coping or survival strategy. It is not really a long-term substitute for the creation of a healthy national economy with orderly, responsive political institutions at the centre. Further, if the formation of national identities and national classes are prerequisites for national reconstruction, then village self-reliance obstructs such social changes. For the buttressing of local communities is likely to consolidate communal not class or national identities and action.[45]

A return to communal self-reliance will therefore not resolve the acute problems of material underdevelopment and political authoritarianism. In fact, it may

[42] Rothchild and Chazan. *The Precarious Balance.*

[43] Gilberto Mathias and Pierre Salama, *L'Etat Surdéveloppé. Des Métropoles au Tiers Monde* (Paris: Maspéro, 1983), 125–126; see also Jean-François Bayart, "Civil Society in Africa" in Chabal, ed., *Political Domination in Africa*, 109–125; Jean Copans, "Une Crise Conceptuelle Opportune," *Politique Africaine* 26 (Juin 1987): 2–14.

[44] Sandbrook, *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*, 148–151.

[45] Ibid., 151.

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well intensify the salience of ethnicity and consequently promote conflict, nepotism, and traditionalism. The urban and rural masses' powerful attachment to ethnic sentiments would heighten the competition for scarce resources between kinship communities; it would also lend itself to the selfish manipulative appeals of the elites. Enclosed into its own protective shell, the peasantry would be particularly affected by these phenomena. Indeed, politicians would inevitably seek to hijack the organization and leadership of successful self-reliant peasant communities. This in turn would exacerbate social relations, as politicians pursuing their own private interests would seek to mobilize the peasantry along ethnic lines. Having lost its leadership and representation to alien political forces, the peasantry would soon regain its unenviable status as "Africa's silent majority."[46]

In addition, withdrawal from the state is never complete, never total. The peasants' informal economy and countervailing power arising from their parallel spaces of political and material survival are always organically linked to the dominant state system and its capitalist mode of production. Janet MacGaffey has argued:

> Simple commodity producers retain control over the means and organization of production and, therefore, are not proletarians. But they are in varying degrees dependent on the exchange of commodities for the reproduction of the producers and the unit of production. The independence of the producers is thus circumscribed not only at the level of exchange through prices, but also at the level of production. Falling prices for commodities produced, relative to those bought, result in reduced levels of consumption or intensified commodity production or both. Capital can thus put a "squeeze" directly on production by forcing the household, or another unit, to intensify its labor to keep up the supply of commodities necessary for its reproduction.[47]

To this extent, popular disengagement from the predatory African state into parallel spaces of survival is inevitably and always circumscribed and incomplete. Furthermore, there are clear indications that such parallel spaces of survival have themselves been penetrated by state agents and personnel. In their quest for ever larger gains, these agents have used their strategic political position to consolidate and expand their involvement in the illegal activities of the parallel economy. Through varied forms of corruption and fraudulent practices, state personnel have accumulated considerable wealth that may contribute to their consolidation and reproduction as a class. Hence, while the processes of the informal economy may fail to enhance significantly the life chances of the worst-off segments of society, they clearly contribute to the further embourgeoisement of the powerful and well-off members of the "statocracy."[48]

The popular classes's withdrawal from the state-dominated spaces amounts to a strategy of survival; it has little to offer in the long term, and it may have unin-

[46] Roger Tangri, *Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1985), 92.

[47] Janet MacGaffey, "Economic Disengagement and Class Formation in Zaire" in Rothchild and Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance*, 177.

[48] Ibid., 181–185; see also Kwame A. Ninsin, "Three Levels of State Reordering: The Structural Aspects" in Rothchild and Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance*, 278–279; and René Lemarchand, "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems," in ibid., 149–170.

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tended negative effects for the popular classes themselves. Withdrawal is Janus-faced; it is not only a form of popular resistance to predatory state policies, it is also a response of the state itself to its own incapacity to enhance the well-being of the majority of its citizens and to maintain a viable economic infrastructure. As Kwame Ninsin has argued, withdrawal is a "mechanism by which the state gradually abandons its legal and moral obligations toward the weaker sections of society as a result of its own growing incapacity to discharge them effectively."[49] Indeed, withdrawal implies the breakdown of the rules of normalcy and the dissolution of traditional legal structures; it breeds the cruel conditions of severe insecurity that nurture the ghastly emergence of African *macoutes* (bandits) and the potential war of all against all. As René Lemarchand has emphasized, the atrophy of the state in Zaire and Uganda that gives rise to withdrawal and the parallel economy can have profoundly perverse effects on the weakest segments of society:

> [It] translates into acute poverty and plundering activities on a major scale. At the root of this situation lies the inability of the state to maintain a viable economic infrastructure. . . . But it also reflects the inability of the state to provide a minimum of security. In fact, it is the state and its local agents—*agents d'execution* (an appropriate designation), military men, police officers and security officials—who often create the very conditions of insecurity that make for dependency upon their caprice and good graces. The inability of the state to pay its employees means that official tolerance of plunder and extortion is the nearest equivalent of patronage. Exoneration of legal sanctions is the cheapest way to reward local officials.[50]

Hence, instead of offering a heaven in a heartless world, withdrawal may ultimately be nothing but hell.

Withdrawal is no substitute for processes of systemic transformation and democratization. It may, however, enhance the prospects for passive revolutions by propelling the growth of a nascent bourgeoisie that is both rooted in the material structures of the parallel economy and relatively independent from the state.[51] The consolidation of this class as a "true economic bourgeoisie" would contribute to the expansion of a private realm on which could rest the foundations of liberal democratic governance. The establishment of this mode of governance, however, is by no means inevitable, since the potential true economic bourgeoisie is "as yet small and with an undetermined future."[52] Whatever may be the future of this class, changes in Africa are more likely to take the form of passive revolutions rather than radical structural ruptures with existing realities. Despite their clear democratic limitations, passive revolutions may offer certain opportunities for greater popular empowerment and representation.[53] It is precisely because of this

[49] Ninsin, "Three Levels of State Reordering: The Structural Aspects," 273.

[50] Lemarchand, "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems," 163.

[51] Ibid.; and MacGaffey, "Economic Disengagement and Class Formation in Zaire."

[52] MacGaffey, "Economic Disengagement and Class Formation in Zaire," 185.

[53] Robert Fatton Jr., "The Democratization of Senegal (1976–1983): 'Passive Revolution' and the Democratic Limits of Liberal Democracy," *Review* 10 (Fall 1986): 279–312.

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that most African ruling classes fear the consequences of passive revolutions and are reluctant to embark upon them. They fear that such revolutions might open up a Pandora's box and be particularly hazardous to their privileges and interests.

Far from curbing discontent and legitimizing the rule of the dominant class, passive revolutions might well enhance opposition and further raise popular expectations. Because their outcome is full of uncertainties, passive revolutions are unlikely to become the preferred political strategy of African ruling classes. The organic crisis in Africa is therefore more favorable to the accentuation of existing authoritarianisms than to the development of liberal democracies. This is not to say that such democracies cannot take root and flourish in the African terrain, but that their implantation confronts multiple obstacles and that their successful crystallization would not put an end to inequality, poverty, and class domination. Thus, while the struggle for democratizing African regimes is essential, it cannot be equated with radical change, let alone revolutionary socialism. An exaggerated belief in the strength and achievement of liberal democracy and particularly of democracy with tears and reservations belies the democratic limitations and class impairments that cripple such democracies.

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Book Reviews

The Economics of Apartheid *by Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990. 208 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

Not very often does a college president publish an academic book that can be commended to specialists. Stephen Lewis, since 1987 president of Carleton College, is a welcome exception, in somehow combining CEO burdens with at least the final stages of composing this trim and informative volume. Equally heartening is the discovery that the "dismal science" of economics still has practitioners with a gift of clarity of exposition.

Lewis had a privileged observation post for scrutinizing the South African political economy through his service between 1975 and 1987 as economic consultant to neighboring Botswana. In this role, he was privy to the insider perspective on South African developments, but also directly involved in policy debates concerning regional African state responses to apartheid regime economic pressures. The book also clearly benefits from the variety of advice and counsel received during its preparation from those associated with its sponsor, the Council on Foreign Relations (for example, Michael Clough and Jennifer Whitaker). Washington policy specialists (such as Helen Kitchen), and colleagues at the University of Sussex Institute for Development Studies (Reginald Green and others).

The first half of the volume is historical and traces the impact of the ideology of apartheid on economic development. Here the study shows that although the apogee of apartheid as institutional framework of racial domination did coincide with a period of rapid growth in the 1950s and 1960s, by the 1970s and especially the 1980s a steady shrinkage in expansion rates exposed deepening contradictions. The apartheid system imposed growing rigidities in labor markets, human resource skills, and investment choices whose costs became increasingly clear. Capital, if it had ever required apartheid, now found it a clumsy obstacle and defected. In turn, the end of the high growth era sharpened the social and political impasse and contributed to the pulsating surges of protest and resistance that have punctuated the last two decades.

Particularly insightful are the chapters devoted to unraveling the impact of ex-

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ternal pressures (the sanctions debate) and speculation concerning the nature of a post-apartheid economy. The judicious and dispassionate balance sheet drawn up on sanction and related international action is an invaluable contribution to a debate too often flawed by passion and polemic. Lewis points out the complexity of the interaction between economic distress and political change, and delineates the variety of sanction-busting countermeasures available to the South African regime. At the same time, it is clear that in the long run external pressures do play an important role. More broadly, Lewis argues that over the longer haul the disintegration of the South African economy is inevitable if apartheid is not abandoned.

The parallels between the South African situation and the extraordinary transformations in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the domain of state socialism are striking. After a long postwar quarter-century in which the fatal contradictions of both apartheid and state socialism were concealed by apparently vibrant economic growth, an era of stagnation set in. The mythologies serving as legitimating ideologies for the two systems silently corroded. Ultimately those in command themselves came to recognize that *perestroika* was required, although initially both ruling groups sought to retain through reform the inner core of the political system. But in so doing, the tissue of falsehood and injustice that enclosed both systems became more starkly revealed. A political dynamic began to generate its own momentum with its final resting point still invisible. For the South African case, Lewis provides us with an indispensable analytical guide for understanding the economic dimensions of this epic drama.

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The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order *by Ian Clark. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 253 pp. Cloth, $44.50; paper, $12.95.*

This book combines a discussion of theoretical perspectives on the nature of international relations with an examination of international history since 1815. Neither of these ventures entails entering new and unexplored territory, but even the most experienced student of the modern international system will find in Clark's work some original perceptions and some interpretations that deviate sufficiently from conventional wisdom to induce reconsideration.

The theoretical section promises more innovation than it delivers, for its introductory delineation of whig and tory positions is soon revealed as a rerun of the familiar comparison between utopianism or idealism and realism; and the author in fact tends to discard his new vocabulary for the old. His treatment of the realist-idealist positions is, nevertheless, a valuable one. He is on sound ground in characterizing realism as generally pessimistic and idealism as generally optimistic, and in drawing from this contrast the conclusion that their most fundamental differ-

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ence relates to the potential of the international system for significant reform. The temperaments are partially reversed: the realist is more optimistic than the idealist about the capacity of the system to operate with reasonable success in the absence of major reform, while the idealist proclaims gloom and doom unless such change is effected. For the realist, drastic change is impossible but perhaps unnecessary; for the idealist, it is urgently necessary and perhaps possible. That latter "perhaps" is important. Clark shares the tendency of realists to exaggerate the utopianism of the other school, using a quotation from Robert M. Hutchins that "world government is necessary and therefore possible" (p. 59) as the basis for the conclusion that this logic underlies the entire reformist enterprise of idealism. What is missing in this interpretation is an appreciation of the distinction between the Hutchins position and two others that figure prominently in idealism: "drastic reform is necessary and we must therefore work hard to achieve it if we can" and "if we can make people recognize the need for reform, this will increase the chance that reform can be achieved."

The author divides international history since the Congress of Vienna into four periods, which he treats in separate chapters entitled sequentially "From Balance to Concert," "Balance without Concert," "Concert without Balance," and "From Concert to Balance." This preoccupation with the two concepts of balance and concert is indicative of Clark's conviction that despite the audacity of much idealistic thought, actual efforts at reform of the multistate system have been quite modest; for Clark sees concert as a mere embellishment of the balance-of-power system. The cyclical aspect of these chapter headings, the movement from balance to concert and back again suggests his conclusion that the result of this modest reformist effort has been negligible, that the realist's denial of the possibility of genuine change has been generally confirmed.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Clark's historical survey is his emphasis upon the notion of the concert as a potentially useful modification of the traditional balance-of-power system. In his usage, concert implies the assertion by the great powers of authority and responsibility for joint management of the system, coupled with acceptance of arrangements and norms for maintaining good working relations among themselves. He treats the League of Nations as an attempt to formalize such a concert, which failed because the actual distribution of power created a fundamental disequilibrium. Oddly enough, he denies the appropriateness of the concert label for the post-1945 era, on the ground that the system has lacked formally accepted rules for regulating major powers' relationships with each other. He bases this view on the fact that the permanent members of the UN Security Council are permitted a veto on substantive decisions of that body, which he interprets as emancipating the major powers from any norms of behavior and constituting "an explicit rejection of any notion of concert diplomacy" (p. 185). I would suggest that the League, in which all members enjoyed the veto power in both Council and Assembly, made even less pretense than does the UN at subjecting great powers to enforceable rules. Neither organization has conceded that the impossibility of coercion implies freedom from legal obligation. Indeed, what is in-

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formally called the veto provision is technically a rule of unanimity, an endorsement of the idea that important international decisions should stem from a great-power consensus—which sounds very much like an explicit acceptance of Clark's notion of concert diplomacy. A case can be made that despite the prominence of discord between the USSR and the United States in the era of the cold war, the leading powers have in fact created, largely through informal processes, an effective regime for managing their relations with each other as well as for giving joint direction to the global system. Perhaps, after all, concert and balance have been successfully joined in the latest period of international history.

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The Politics of Development: Perspectives on Twentieth-Century Asia *by Robert A. Scalapino. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1989. 137 pp. $19.95.*

In three succinct but comprehensive essays Robert Scalapino explores the common challenges and diverse responses that have catapulted Asia from pre-modern societies to complex nation-states poised to enter the twenty-first century. Refreshingly comparative in scope, this slim volume tackles big issues such as Japan's successes and China's failures, the differential colonial legacy, and ongoing elite political tutelage—common to Asian Leninist, democratic, and authoritarian regimes alike. Scalapino recognizes historical and cultural variation, but in these 1988 Edwin O. Reischauer Lectures he seeks to identify the major trends linking twentieth-century Asian economic and political development.

During the first half of the century, Scalapino distinguishes between colonial and noncolonial countries; for the second half between Leninist, authoritarian/pluralistic, and democratic ones. These distinctions provide an analytical framework that might seem oversimplistic; in Scalapino's hands, however, they facilitate exploring the complex tension between economic development and political structure. For example, he generalizes that colonialism perpetuated traditional economies, while simultaneously stimulating participatory politics, thus sowing the seeds of its own demise. He goes on, however, to differentiate between the residual political legacies of the European powers, reminding us, for example, that four of the five "older democracies" of Asia—India, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Malaysia (Japan being the fifth)—were former British colonies.

The role of first-generation Asian political leaders in shaping post World War II Asian independent nation-states is highlighted. Given the relative immaturity of modern political institutions, personal leadership—usually charismatic leadership—shaped politics. Mao Zedong, Kim Il-song, Mahatma Gandhi, Ho Chi Minh, and Syngman Rhee all brought unique ideological and cultural leadership styles which continue to influence patterns of national development.

By the 1960s Scalapino finds, however, that this personalized leadership failed

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for the most part to establish political stability or coherent economic development. His last and most insightful essay analyzes the remarkable recent turnaround. Economic realities, especially the market economy, and participatory politics are transforming much of Asia. According to Scalapino, Leninist states are moving, not toward democracy, but toward authoritarian/pluralist systems; whereas authoritarian/pluralist systems are becoming somewhat more democratic. In foreign relations, Asia is becoming more independent politically but more interdependent economically. Horizontal Asian regional relationships are emerging, supplementing if not yet replacing the cold war alliance structure.

Scalapino is optimistic about Asia's future, because he sees the beginnings of convergence between appropriate, responsive political regimes and effective economic development. The leadership for this transition has primarily come from political elites. Scalapino does not see political democratization as inevitable or unilinear, fully recognizing the fragility and volatility of the process. In concluding, he also acknowledges the uncertain future role of traditional religious, ethnic, and cultural tensions. This admission comes somewhat belatedly, since major Asian religious and ethical systems—Buddhism, Confucianism, and Islam—are never specifically mentioned. It is perhaps a measure of our century, as well as Scalapino's writing, that only toward the end do we perceive the still formative power of race, region, and creed that has lurked all along beneath the veneer of modernism.

It is difficult to quibble with the coverage of such an insightful, short book, which is particularly good on China and Japan, but one would like to have seen more on South Asia, especially India. Unfortunately, Scalapino's framework excludes one of the most instructive of all comparisons—India and China. Few have the grasp of the region or the specialist literature even to begin what Robert Scalapino has masterfully accomplished. This is a broad synthesis for Asianists and generalists alike, for all who seek a better grasp of the relationship between politics and development in the twentieth century and beyond.

MARY BROWN BULLOCK
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

The Comparative History of Public Policy *edited by Francis G. Castles. New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. 340 pp. $45.00.*

As readers of these reviews know, academic environmentalism—the recycling of old material in order to conserve energy—has given edited volumes a rather bad name. That stigma is generally unwarranted in the case under review here. To be sure, there is a fair amount of rehashing from certain contributors' previously published work; one wonders if the editor's purpose would not have been better served by including a few more junior scholars with a penchant for fresh thinking. The important point, however, is that this is a joint volume with an important intellectual purpose behind it. And despite the inevitable lapses in certain chapters, that purpose is sustained throughout most of this book.

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The editor's basic contention is that the aggregative, quantitative approach has reached a point of diminishing intellectual returns and that the way forward in comparative policy studies lies in an historical analysis of carefully chosen cases. What is at issue here is not the fruitless old debate between statistically-minded behavioralists and narratively-oriented case writers. Castles and his colleagues are quite comfortable with statistical analyses of the ubiquitous Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data. In fact this volume represents the second stage of an earlier aggregate data project that resulted in Castles's 1982 book, *The Impact of Parties*. The argument here is that such findings are shallow and abstract unless they are complemented by investigations of concrete cases that seem at odds with the aggregate generalizations. By trying to explain the important deviant cases—puzzles, as they are termed—one can achieve a comparative focus that is sensitive to both the general and the particular, the regularities among advanced capitalist democracies and their distinctive differences. Such is the aim of the volume.

The seven country chapters, each by a senior scholar in the comparative policy field, try to show how and why that particular nation fails to fit the conventional wisdom as propounded in crossnational studies. Chapters by Michael Shalev on Israel, Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol on the United States, and Castles on Australia seem especially enlightening and in keeping with the intentions of the volume. But there are also worthy contributions by Manfred Schmidt on West Germany, T.J. Pempel on Japan, Göran Therborn on Sweden and the Netherlands, and Patrick Dunleavy on Britain. In all these instances the focus is on the determinants of policy outcomes and, more specifically, why countries vary in the extent and character of public policy interventions (mainly on matters of economic and social policy).

On the whole, the book succeeds in addressing important theoretical issues by bringing particular national experiences out of the blur of aggregate analysis. Unfortunately, the book does share one characteristic of more commonplace edited works. It is heavily front-loaded with aims and rationales for the volume but lacking any conclusion or other evaluation of the overall results. The individual chapters are interesting, but it is left for the reader to try and figure out what they all add up to. This disconnected, monographic quality was, of course, one of the central criticisms levelled against the older case studies and historical narratives in the literature. At best we are left with the editor's suggestive but sketchy introductory observations concerning the value of historical analysis. The historical process of learning from particular national experiences, the strategic choices made by human agents, the shaping power of institutional contexts understood as a whole—these are important features of political reality that easily escape aggregate cross-national studies. The truth is that we are only at the earliest stages of understanding what might truly be called the comparative history of public policy.

HUGH HECLO
George Mason Univeristy

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Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy *by Gregory D. Cleva. Lewisburg, Pa., Bucknell University Press, 1989. 280 pp. $39.50.*

The floodgates have opened for scholarship on Henry Kissinger. One category of works on Richard Nixon's national security adviser and secretary of state takes the form of analyses of Kissinger's scholarly writings and their relationship to his statesmanship. Interested readers may now add Gregory D. Cleva's new book to several other worthwhile contributions on this subject, including Peter Dickson, *Kissinger and the Meaning of History* (Cambridge University Press, 1978); Stephen R. Graubard, *Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind* (W. W. Norton, 1973); and Harvey Starr, *Henry Kissinger: Perceptions of International Politics* (University Press of Kentucky, 1984). Cleva's approach is descriptive; in chronological order he describes and comments on the main features of Kissinger's published works, beginning with his remarkable B.A. thesis on the meaning of history, and then, somewhat sparingly in the last chapter, compares the Kissinger scholarly and diplomatic records.

While rarely departing from natural description, Cleva does put forward several theses, the first of which is simply that analysts of Kissinger's diplomatic record have not paid enough attention to the published and unpublished Kissinger corpus of 1947–1968, much of which consisted of critiques of American policy. In office, according to Cleva, Kissinger usually put past thought into contemporary action. Dwelling on Kissinger's historicism—that is, his view that guidelines to successful policy are to be found in the record of the past—Cleva asserts that the core of Kissinger's critique was that American policy making was insular—the exceptionalist and isolationist approach to world politics of an "island nation." Among Cleva's most original contributions is his view that Kissinger rejected the outlook of American "realists," sharing neither their mechanical sense of the balance of power or, more vitally, of what is "real." Like many who have studied him, Cleva finds Kissinger's thinking static—thus his ability in the 1970s to draw on the intellectual capital of the 1950s. In an intriguing aside worth further development, Cleva also comments: "In Kissinger's criticism of American leaders, one detects an underlying element of satire" (p. 117). And in his most trenchant criticism of Kissinger's diplomatic record, Cleva accuses him of applying a "concept of legitimacy" from a nineteenth-century European "community of nations with shared political values" to "the extreme heterogeneity" of the late-twentieth-century world (p. 200).

Space does not permit mentioning many other features of Cleva's exploration of Kissinger's thought. Among the more interesting are his assessment of Kissinger's traditionalist view of both scholarship (rejecting behavioralism, quantification, and logical positivism) and of history (the story of great European states and their great-men leaders). One might add that Kissinger's view of history as neither heading toward a particular end nor pushed onward by an external force helps explain his inability to envision an international order significantly different from the one formed in 1945.

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Cleva's odd rejection of a psychological analysis is perplexing. Stating that Kissinger "was so self-consciously an intellectual that it is unlikely that he would advance his most important arguments on the basis of unexamined psychological traits" (p. 16) simply begs the question. Some readers, in addition, will probably find Cleva too insistent on the centrality of Kissinger's critique of American insularity. Nor is he altogether convincing about the gulf between Kissinger and the "realists"; indeed, some of what Cleva labels the "continental" critique of insularity stems directly from the realist vocabularies of George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and Walter Lippmann. But these criticisms detract little from a serious and careful new book on the Kissinger record.

ROBERT L. BEISNER
The American University

State, Market and Social Regulation: New Perspectives on Italy *edited by Peter Lange and Mario Regini. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 295 pp. $42.50.*

A recent conceit indulged in by those with only a rudimentary mastery of the political science literature of this century is the claim that the state has been rediscovered and for this reason must be "let back in." The general meaning of such declarations is that sociological reductionism is in disgrace, Marxism is dead or moribund, and—lo and behold—the state, that is, the institutions of government and those who run them, does make a difference. Time- and space-bound declarations of this kind then lead to misapprehensions that contemporary research has produced insights into the political process that were not available before now.

There is some of this unfortunate posture in this otherwise fascinating symposium. Thus, we learn in these pages that far from being either "superstructural" or merely the arena in which political conflict among deeper societal interests is played out, the state has interests of its own; it intervenes in favor of those interests; it forms and reforms alliances with other actors in the policy-making process; it can and does limit the influence over public policies exercised by other institutions; and this and similar aspects of the behavior of the state are to be discerned at every level in society at which there exists governmental authority. No one seems aware that not a shred of such knowledge was unknown to political scientists who ages ago wrote memorable but now apparently unread major works on such matters.

This symposium also addresses the topic of interest groups. Here, too, it is fair to ask whether there is anything here that an earlier generation of scholars like David Truman, Earl Latham, Oliver Garceau, Harold Lasswell, Pendleton Herring, Bertram Gross, Gabriel Almond, Charles Merriam, and others all the way back to Arthur Bentley had not already discovered. The answer is, very little. Yet these scholars knew and tried to teach us that solidarity systems (whatever they

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may have been called earlier) and interest groups, in addition to state and market, weigh on policy outcomes. They were well aware that some pieces of the state's institutional apparatus are more "permeable" than are others to interest group interventions. Not one of them would raise an eyebrow on "learning" from this volume that some sectors of government can be "colonized" by groups, that the executive is harder to colonize than the legislature or the bureaucracy, that policy is never the expression of the influence of any one factor but rather something that tends to vary with particular combinations of them.

The real trick, not pulled off here, is to show some strong relationship between certain of these combinations and something significant on the public policy side. If, as the editors claim in their very good introduction, the more recent literature displays little consciousness of the interaction between interests and institutions, it might be helpful to direct the offenders to a more careful reading of an earlier literature that might be passé on other grounds, but certainly not on those suggested in these pages. In any event, hypotheses that turn out to be truisms should not be dressed up to look like social science theory.

As for the chapters that treat the Italian case, they are often first-rate. Chiesi and Martinelli provide a devastating demonstration as to why the so-called neocorporatist model will not work for Italy. This reminds one of a distinguished political sociologist who once formulated a model of fascism that did not apply in the Italian case. Massimo Paci provides a short and brilliant explication of the development of the Italian welfare state, Bruno Dente and Gloria Regonini, as well as Gerald Epstein and Juliet Schor, array powerful case-study evidence to show that if nothing else, the technical complexity of public policy will determine which institutional or other factors will weigh the heaviest in policy outcomes.

Two additional observations are in order. First, as the editors note, these outcomes are more often than not unintended—in the sense that rarely does any single protagonist or group get its own way. Second, the Italian political parties weigh not just heavy-handedly on this political system; they also provide it with a good deal of its predictability and coherence. In both of these senses, pace the political party detractors and the would-be regulators or deregulators, wherever they may be, the Italian Republic seems to function quite admirably as a pluralistic democracy.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada *by Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1989. 298 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $17.50.*

The outbreak of the Palestinian uprising on the West Bank and Gaza Strip in December 1987 took many Western observers by surprise. In their insightful analysis, Ann Lesch and Mark Tessler, two respected scholars of the Middle East, convey

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the depth of frustrations that erupted in the Palestinian *intifada*, out of a "steadily deteriorating situation" (p. 255) in the territories occupied by Israel since the June 1967 war.

Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians offers a critical assessment of the Camp David Accords orchestrated by President Jimmy Carter in 1978. From the outset, the diplomacy at Camp David was faulted by Arab critics for not adequately taking Palestinian interests into account—an omission for which the price is currently being exacted in the *intifada*. The distinctive contribution of this volume is that the authors assess the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the vantage point of the parties themselves, in a differentiated and convincing manner. In a compilation of essays written as University Field Staff International reports between 1980 and 1986, with an epilogue on the *intifada*'s outbreak, Lesch and Tessler view the long-range impact of Camp David through the prism of domestic politics in Egypt and Israel, as well as of the fragmented Palestinian community.

Lesch is generous in her judgment that Egypt from the outset "sought to support the Palestinian struggle to attain statehood" (p. 61). President Anwar al-Sadat was bitterly criticized for presuming to represent Palestinian interests at Camp David and ultimately paid with his life for deviating from the Arab consensus and signing a treaty with Israel. Nevertheless, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, has "worked hard to reestablish Cairo's credibility in the Arab world" (p. 43), and the bilateral relationship between Egypt and Israel will remain "circumscribed and cool" (p. 82) unless Israel is more forthcoming in meeting Palestinian demands.

Israel has taken a narrow interpretation of its commitments at Camp David, seeking "to compel Palestinians to accept the Israeli version of autonomy" (p. 196). Tessler believes that Israel "emptied the [Camp David] accords of what Egypt and the United States regarded as their intended content" (p. 140) due to the predominance of the Likud Party in Israeli coalition governments. His nuanced treatment of the domestic policy debate in Israel helps explain why the outbreak of the *intifada* is "shaking the assumptions on which current Israeli policies are based" (p. 247). Yet the authors overall assessment of Israel's record is harsh, detailing Israel's policy of "creeping annexation" (p. 25), while Palestinian voices were "muzzled and then suppressed" (p. 257).

Most useful to the student seeking to understand the origins of the *intifada* is the depiction of ongoing Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation. Whereas most analysts have focused primarily on events in the West Bank, Lesch explains in convincing detail why Gaza "screams with anger" (p. 223). In 1981–1982, persistent strikes and demonstrations were a warning signal of widespread dissent, voicing "a solid consensus among Palestinians on the rejection of autonomy and on the need for Israel to withdraw completely from the West Bank and Gaza" (p. 257). Yet the reader is left uncertain about the relative influence of competing currents in Palestinian thought, and the book's interpretations are necessarily dated in view of subsequent developments within the Palestinian Liberation Organization and in the territories themselves.

Tessler and Lesch clearly endorse a "two state" solution to the Israeli-Palestinian

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conflict, entailing the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. This prescription represents the "mainstream nationalist consensus" (p. 259) in the West Bank and Gaza and an articulate but minority view within Israel. Although the authors do not indicate what America's role should be in promoting this outcome, the reader may surmise that a greater attention to Palestinian voices in the wake of the *intifada* may help remedy the deficiencies of American diplomacy at Camp David.

NAOMI WEINBERGER
Barnard College

Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam *by William Colby with James McCargar. New York, Contemporary Books, 1989. 438 pp. $22.95.*

William Colby here joins the ranks of those who believe that victory was possible in the Vietnam war. He does not stand with other "revisionists" who believe that Vietnam should have been fought like Korea, but rather settles on what Lyndon Johnson would call the "other war" as his battleground of choice. Basically, the United States made its worst mistake, Colby argues, by sending out troops, both American and Vietnamese, in an endless series of futile search-and-destroy missions. Instead, the object should have been to defend the villages. Ironically, it was after the Tet offensive, contends Colby, that Washington finally tried to implement the proper strategy to win.

Unlike those who suggest that America's undoing came with the secret maneuvers that led to the coup d'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, Colby sees possibilities for ultimate victory as late as 1972. His account of the political situation in 1959, however, well describes the predicament American policy makers found themselves in with the Diem regime. He calls the election that year in South Vietnam a turning point, because Diem's minions turned it into a farce: Communists became convinced that the legal path to power was closed to them, while, more significantly, various non-Communist nationalists saw that they could have little or no role in a Diem regime.

This conclusion does not prevent Colby, on the other hand, from denouncing the American role in the coup as ill-conceived, not least because it was a prelude to America's taking over military management of the war and sending large numbers of troops off into Big Muddy. Diem started the strategic hamlet program; and that was what Colby, from the time he operated in Vietnam as CIA station chief until he became director of Far East operations for the agency and then deputy to the American commander in Vietnam, believed was the only possible strategy for defeating the guerrillas.

When he raised questions about the American military take-over in early 1965, protesting that too much time was being taken up in White House discussions

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of how to calibrate the next incremental increase in the bombing campaign, and not nearly enough on the crucial village-level struggle, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy answered: "You may be right, Bill, but the structure of the American Government probably won't permit it" (p. 179).

Colby took Bundy's statement to mean that despite all the emphasis in the Kennedy administration on devising an effective counterinsurgency strategy, in the end the United States had not learned how to fight such a war. This indictment, while it does not vitiate Colby's later assertions that American strategy made a complete turn-around after Tet, does raise questions about the possibility of victory. As he himself admits, the failed military strategy in the middle of the decade meant that however one regarded the 1968 Tet offensive, everything after that was a race between troop withdrawals and establishing stability at the village level.

Along the way, Colby has some interesting things to say about the Gulf of Tonkin events in 1964. Operation 34-A, for example, which helped to set the stage for the North Vietnamese attack(s) on American warships, had been taken over from the CIA by the military and was quickly turned into a more aggressive format by the Pentagon. Colby complained to Robert McNamara that these operations were almost totally ineffective, but the secretary of defense was too excited about a successful mission carried out by a raiding team that had shot up a couple of trucks to give him serious attention.

Colby lavishes praise, on the other hand, on Operation Phoenix, describing what has been criticized as basic "hit-man" tactics, as a much maligned political operation that sought to make live converts of Viet Cong rebels. In the end he is not convincing about Operation Phoenix, nor on the general assertion that victory was possible. Nevertheless, there are many things in this book to chew over. Vietnam specialists will profit most, because the controversies Colby discusses and his role in the ongoing debate requires more than casual acquaintance with the history of America's longest war.

LLOYD C. GARDNER
Rutgers University

Intergovernmental Relations in the American Administrative State *by David Welborn and Jesse Burkhead. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1989. 324 pp. $40.00.*

The Reagan years might have dimmed public enthusiasm for an aggressive governmental role in attacking society's problems and for strong national leadership in that role. In this remarkable book, Welborn and Burkhead demonstrate nevertheless that the basic changes wrought by Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society endure. They also show quite clearly that the parade of "new federalisms" since the 1960s has done little to solve the problems that plagued Johnson's programs.

Welborn and Burkhead have written the definitive history of the Great Society. Through an exhaustive survey of the scholarly literature as well as of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library's enormous archives, they explain how the

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Great Society transformed the American administrative state. The authors demonstrate that while Johnson and his advisers never deliberately planned such a transformation, their values produced a consistently intergovernmental approach in the administration's programs. The Great Society in their view was not so much a grand scheme but rather a series of pragmatic responses to pressing national problems. The responses all were loosely linked by a sense of centralized leadership but reliance on decentralized – principally intergovernmental – means.

In that linkage, Welborn and Burkhead find the explanation for the Great Society's problems. State and local governments frequently had to develop new capacities to manage the programs effectively. More generally, the Great Society programs' administrative arrangements – at all levels of government and between the levels – proved extremely complex and troublesome. Moreover, the programs created new political constituencies that often frustrated administrative control. The result was a mass of programs dumped at a turbulent time into the intergovernmental system. Administrators constantly struggled to keep up with the innovations. They battled to keep the promises of programs whose implementation often received little advance thought.

This book is at once a remarkably detailed study of the development of the Great Society and an examination of the broader flow of American federalism. Through the Johnson Library documents, the reader gets to peer with Welborn and Burkhead over the shoulders of Johnson's advisers as they battle over each new program. The reader is treated to a strong taste of Johnson's genuine concern for society's underprivileged, which contrasts sharply with the distasteful image some biographers have created of the president. At the same time, they thoughtfully probe the troublesome sides of the president's legacy.

Despite intergovernmental reforms advanced by every president since, Welborn and Burkhead argue persuasively that the basic structure of the Great Society endures. Furthermore, they contend, the renewed strength of state and local governments owes itself to the base established in the Johnson years. Ironically, however, while the Great Society could only have been the product of a strong and vital presidency, the programs worsened the problems of presidential management. They raised national expectations but placed much of the burden for meeting them on subgovernments over which the president had little control.

Through it all, the Great Society leaves its most important legacy: the "unresolved tension between centralizing and decentralizing tendencies in the American system, leading to intergovernmental programs in which both are manifest" (p. 256). Even though the Great Society proved unsuccessful in resolving this tension – and perhaps in the process worsened it through the mismatch of promise and performance – the reader cannot escape the overriding dedication to serving the public interest (as least as seen by Johnson and his advisers) that permeates the book as it did the Great Society. Indeed, the greatest tragedy of the Johnson years was the frustration of that good will and of the nation's inability to recover it since.

DONALD F. KETTL
University of Wisconsin-Madison

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The Transformation of the U.S. Senate *by Barbara Sinclair. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. 233 pp. $28.50.*

Barbara Sinclair has written an excellent book on the modern Senate. The strategy of analysis is first to identify and account for the defining characteristics of the 1950s Senate; second, to identify the forces that disrupted existing patterns of structure, behavior, and performance; third, to identify and account for the defining characteristics of the 1980s Senate; and fourth, to examine the operation of the modern Senate in more detail and reflect on the consequences of institutional change for representative government in the United States.

Such a strategy has much to recommend it and in the author's capable hands yields rich payoffs. Historical grounding, combined with an eclectic mixture of organizational and rational choice perspectives, provides a useful foundation for explaining why the Senate operated as an oligarchical, ordered, and inward-looking institution in the 1950s and why it became the individualistic, disorderly, and outward-looking institution of today. Sinclair deftly combines quantitative and qualitative research approaches with insights drawn from organization and rational choice theory to provide an appealing analysis of institutional change and to speculate wisely on its broader normative significance.

Altogether this book is an impressive piece of work—so much so that the remainder of this brief review will be devoted to highlighting a number of issues that might easily be obscured. One set relates to the Senate per se. Party voting is as high, if not higher, in the new Senate as the old. However, the bearing of party on the character and contours of the "individualism" that now prevails is not explored. Similarly, given the more frequent defeat of incumbents in the Senate, the primacy the author accords to policy and influence goals calls for more analysis of the dynamics of Senate elections. A second set of issues concerns the House. Given the author's emphasis on policy and influence goals in the Senate, has the emphasis on reelection and constituency service in the House been overdone? Or do basic and distinct institutional features account for the differences? Similarly, how does one account for differences in the degree of specialization? In the Senate the author explains the decline of specialization in terms of changes in the policy environment, which affected the satisfaction of member goals so as to erode norms and alter structure and behavior. In contrast, the author believes that specialization remains far stronger in the House, and she identifies distinct institutional or organizational features as primarily responsible. Yet, the House and Senate share large aspects of the same policy environment. We therefore may ask whether it is differences in institutional features, differences in context, or some ordered combination of both that should be emphasized in explaining variations in House and Senate operation.

A final set of issues concerns legislative analysis generally. The author seeks in the current fashion to ground explanation at the individual level in the personal goals of the members. However, she is also highly attentive to context and argues that decisions based on personal goals that altered structure and behavior were

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decisively influenced by changes in the policy environment and party composition. Such a position is quite intelligent, but it still leaves analysis in a situation in which it can easily become circular or inconsistent. Equally important, the author's goal seekers are not the goal seekers of the distributive model of politics applied by most rational choice theorists. Though "maximizers," they share broad policy concerns and do not arrange themselves on committees in a manner that satisfies the "outlier" hypothesis. In short, whatever the utility of theoretical eclecticism at some levels of analysis, it is always limited at others by the ambiguities and contradictions the theories themselves involve. Finally, though the author does an admirable job of indicating the contribution of the modern Senate to representative government, her analysis is limited by deficiencies in normative theory that hamper attempts to measure or assess performance. That problem, however, like many others I have highlighted, is not hers alone. Rather, it is common to all students of Congress and needs to be commonly addressed.

JOSEPH COOPER
Rice University

Regulation and the Reagan Era: Politics, Bureaucracy and the Public Interest *edited by Roger E. Meiners and Bruce Yandle. New York, Holmes and Meier, 1989. 304 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $19.95.*

One of the Reagan administration's major strategies to reduce the federal role in the domestic economy was a broad-scale assault on federal regulation. Interest in the legacy of this deregulation effort, ironically, appears to have heightened following the end of Ronald Reagan's presidency as some politicians seek to lay the blame for savings industry failures, HUD scandals, and environmental pollution at Reagan's doorstep.

In this volume some of the economists and lawyers who were architects of deregulation have come together with a post-mortem. This is not the book for those searching for a vigorous debate or analysis of the theoretical rationale or value of the deregulation initiatives, since the substantive value of the initiatives is largely assumed to be self-evident. Rather, the authors focus on understanding the politics surrounding their efforts to slow the federal regulatory leviathan. In a nutshell, they are decidedly downbeat, as their initial hopes for reducing the reach of federal regulatory programs foundered on the shoals of political reality. As one of the disappointed authors notes wistfully, "The real estate market in Washington did not collapse" (p. 4).

The book chronicles some of the more important deregulation initiatives taken in the 1980s by the administration. The case studies of the reforms attempted at the Federal Trade Commission, antitrust policy, telecommunications, and the privatization of federal lands are the strength of the book. However, the authors are not of one mind in drawing political lessons learned from these case studies. Some

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essays suggest that effective leadership can make a positive difference, noting the headway made at the Federal Trade Commission under the effective leadership of James Miller. Other essays, however, suggest that leadership alone fails to institutionalize changes, leaving deregulation initiatives vulnerable to the new brooms of succeeding administrations. Indeed, most of the deregulation attempts left Congress out of the picture, and the failure to codify the changes left any successes vulnerable to subsequent legal challenge and congressional reversal.

There is a similar conflict about the role of ideas and interests. Some essays suggest that a growing body of economic analysis questioning the cost effectiveness of many regulatory programs created sufficient momentum to alter agendas and overcome political resistance in some notable cases, such as the airline deregulation of the late 1970s. However, other essays dispute this; Lloyd Cohen's piece on the International Trade Commission concludes that deregulation made little or no headway on free trade issues in the Reagan era, in spite of the fact that free trade is one of the few issues about which nearly all economists can agree.

The several essays offering broader and more explicit theoretical explanations for the political failure of deregulation are among the book's most provocative, but analytically most unsatisfying sections. These authors rely on the economic theory of regulation that suggests that regulations have their origins in industry-inspired attempts to help business compete against their rivals in the market. Spurning traditional economic and political views of regulation as correcting market imperfections, it is argued that regulation serves in fact to further distort the full and efficient functioning of markets in serving powerful private interest.

However, a stimulating theory is taken much too far to taint all regulation as serving as a Trojan horse for a private interest. Regulation that happens to promote certain private interests can also simultaneously serve the broader public; controls on acid rain can help the low sulfur coal industry *and* clean the air. It is probably very difficult to find any program that does not in some way, either intentionally or otherwise, benefit some private interest in a pluralistic society, but this does not necessarily argue that the program lacks redeeming social value.

Finally, I found it difficult to square the author's assessment of the limited impact of deregulation with the political rhetoric of 1990, which lays a host of ills at the door of Reagan's deregulation program – from the savings and loan crisis to the HUD scandals. One explanation is that the focus of this book is on policy initiatives attempted under the deregulation umbrella, many of which were stalled by effective political opposition. Stymied by policy disagreement, the administration nevertheless pursued deregulation in a de facto manner by reducing the resources and tools used by federal regulatory agencies to carry out their missions. It is this latter disinvestment in the federal oversight apparatus that bears the brunt of so much criticism today. Unfortunately, the book largely overlooks this more hidden trend, thereby perhaps missing a bigger story.

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The People's Religion: American Faith in the 90's *by George Gallup, Jr. and Jim Castelli. New York, Macmillan, 1989. 278 pp. $19.95.*

Let us begin this review with a quote that all political scientists and Democratic politicians should commit to memory: "White Catholics are the least appreciated elements of the Democratic party base; they will bolt the party, but they do so reluctantly. No Democrat can be elected president without something approaching 60% of the Catholic vote. When all Catholics are considered, Dukakis won a majority in 1988, but it was not big enough."

Thus Gallup and Castelli reflect on the Gallup data for the 1988 (and previous) elections. Their descriptive study of American religion based on the vast Gallup data archives may well be worth purchasing, if only because of the preceding gem of political wisdom, which is unquestionably true and just as unquestionably unperceived by the national Democratic political leadership – so obsessed with not offending Jesse Jackson for fear of losing the black vote, but utterly unconcerned about losing Catholic votes. In fact, if Michael Dukakis had won all the Catholics who voted for Democratic congressional candidates, the 1988 race would have ended in a dead heat.

One would like to be able to say that the rest of the book is filled with many similar insights about American religion. Unfortunately, while the book is useful as an antidote to the myth that Americans are becoming less religious, it suffers from serious weaknesses, all the more unfortunate because the Gallup data base could be such a powerful resource. The thesis of the book is that Americans are a religious people, but both pluralistic and independent in their religious actions and decisions. With this general contention there can be no debate. There are, however, two problems with the elaboration of this thesis, both of which will infuriate scholars who read it.

The analysis is simplistic, not to say juvenile. While two variable cross tabs may be useful for presenting election survey findings in the daily press, they are not appropriate for a serious monograph on so broad a subject as American religion. Thus Gallup and Castelli commit the age correlation fallacy so dearly loved by European students of religion: young people are less religious than older people; therefore the influence of religion seems to be declining. But this correlation represents a trend if and only if it can be proved that older people are not only more religious now than younger people, but were also more religious when they were the same age as younger people.

Gallup and Castelli do not address this problem. Indeed, it does not seem to have occurred to them. Yet with their massive data files they could have followed several cohorts through the stages of the life cycle to determine whether young people become more religious as they grow older and whether the present generation of young differ significantly from their predecessors when the predecessors were the same age. Such age/cohort analysis would be difficult but it can be done. And it has been done. The finding? The null-hyphothesis that the life cycle curve of religious behavior has not changed for the last forty years cannot be rejected.

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Those in their twenties are no less religious than those who are currently in their forties were twenty years ago, nor those in their sixties were forty years ago. The age correlation does not represent a trend of religious decline.

This brings us to the second weakness of the Gallup/Castelli analysis. They pretend that no one else has analyzed American religion and that there are no data sets other than their own. Thus research findings that are different from Gallup/Castelli or that would challenge their conclusions are not so much dismissed as ignored. They argue that there has been a 40 percent increase in the last several decades in the proportion of Americans who are Catholic—from 20 percent of the population to 28 percent. They attribute this increase to Hispanic immigration. But this would have required an immigration of almost 30 million Hispanics. Moreover, no other research organization shows such a change. Nor does the annual Catholic count in the *Official Catholic Directory* show any such increase. But Gallup and Castelli do not respond to criticism of their data or even admit that virtually every other data source in the country reports that Catholics have consistently been a quarter of the population over the last three decades. (Gallup and Castelli undercut their own assertions about the Spanish increment in Catholicism by reporting that less than three-quarters of the Hispanics in America are Catholic—a finding that confirms other research, which they also ignore.)

Perhaps there is some reason why a monographic analysis prepared by a commercial research organization should be guided by different ethical principles than an analysis prepared by academic researchers. But Gallup and Castelli offer no justification for their solipsist behavior. Hence one must conclude that their work, while on occasion useful, is fundamentally irresponsible and often perverse.

ANDREW GREELEY
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The University of Arizona

Congress, the President, and Public Policy *by Michael L. Mezey. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989. 255 pp. Cloth, $42.00; paper, $14.95.*

The new institutionalism posits egoistic legislators unable to overcome collective action problems unless constrained to do so by structures that induce cooperation. The old institutionalism, as reflected in this book, perceives a world of more well-meaning actors, but less benign structures. This is a text on legislative-executive relations, designed for upper-level courses on either Congress or the presidency. As such, it succeeds admirably. Mezey covers the key points in legislative-executive conflict and does so with considerable grace. He also has a point of view. He establishes criteria for effective and democratic policy formation, holds to them, and finds the current balance of power between Congress and the president incapable of producing sound decisions. He then offers his own proposals for reform.

Mezey gives students a good overview of the history of legislative and executive

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bases of power and how each has changed over time. He also examines several ways in which the two branches have tried to overcome stalemate and provides case studies of each. Neither bipartisan commissions (social security), automatic devices (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the War Powers Resolution), the legislative veto, nor presidential "imperialism" (Nicaragua) are satisfactory devices for resolving stalemate.

Mezey suggests upgrading the role of the executive, though reducing the key role of the president. The executive would formulate policy. The legislature, as a "representative body," would serve as a debating forum and an oversight body. Debates would serve as guidelines to the executive on the contours of policy. I am hardly convinced that this system is any more "democratic" than what we have now. The proposals are rather nebulous. We are given no clues as to how to combine the president and the bureaucracy into a single, more coherent executive. Nor are we told what the legislature might do should an imperial president ignore Congress altogether. Indeed, Mezey begins with the assumption that contemporary policy making is incoherent and that this is necessarily bad. I happen to agree with him, but even I would have preferred greater documentation. Others might not be convinced at all.

Is our "constitution against government" responsible for these problems? Institutionalist accounts give considerable blame (or credit) to formal structures. If we could only change them, the world would look different. Yet, David R. Mayhew's work in progress shows little difference in policy success between situations of single and divided control of the legislative and executive branches. Mezey himself argues that "[p]olitical institutions and what they do are shaped by the larger political and social environment within which they operate" (p. 56). He considers how varying contexts (including party strength in the legislature and presidential popularity) affect presidential success and recognizes that party voting has varied tremendously over time.

If context is so important, what independent, timeless role can we attribute to institutions? Congress dominated the president in the mid-nineteenth century. We had a responsible party system in the late nineteenth century at least as coherent as one finds in any British-inspired Westminster system today. Our constitutional structure has remained stable for more than 200 years, but the legislative-executive conflict, as Mezey amply shows, has not.

To put the blame on the division of powers is to miss the mark. It is, according to Representative Barney Frank (D.-Mass.), in 1985 *Op Ed* article in the *Washington Post*, a "reverse Houdini" in which "a politician [ties] himself up in knots (legislative rules) and then [goes] before the public and [says], 'Gee, I wish I could help you, but I can't because I'm tied up in knots.'" The determinants of policy making are far more contextual than structural. We have moved to an era of rampant egoism marked by a collective loss of our sense of humor, in contrast to the cooperative spirit that Alexis de Tocqueville underscored in his notion of "self-interest rightly understood."

Even though I strongly disagree with Mezey, he has written a most provocative

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book, far more interesting and useful than the usual text. Those vague sections can be useful exercises for students: fill in the blanks. Perhaps the best testament I can give is that I expect to adopt this book.

ERIC M. USLANER
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Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies *edited by Joseph V. Montville. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1990. 558 pp. $58.95.*

This book grew out of papers presented at a series of meetings in 1986 organized by the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs. It is a fine contribution to our knowledge of ethnic conflicts in various parts of the modern world. The bulk of the book consists of twelve case studies of ethnic conflict in Europe as well as in Canada, Asia, and Africa. The chapters dealing with these conflicts are largely descriptive rather than analytical, but they are all highly informative. The non-specialized reader is likely to be more interested in studies of locales on which relatively little has been published rather than in fairly well plowed territory in the case of Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland. I found the essays on the Sudan by Francis Deng, Nelson Kasfir, and John Voll especially appealing. I cannot go into any detail about the other chapters in this short review but feel that all are worth reading with care.

Although the authors of the case studies do not present a general theoretical scheme, they make shrewd observations that come from theoretical sensitivity. So Kenneth McRae writing about Canada observes: "English-speaking Catholics often played a bridging and mediating role between [Francophone Catholics and Anglophone Protestants] which sustains the familiar proposition of political science that cross-pressures arising from crosscutting cleavages helped to reduce intergroup tensions" (p. 200). Or, Donald L. Horowitz stresses the context-bound nature of ethnic identifications by saying about the Ibo of Nigeria: "An Ibo may be . . . an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian. In New York, he is an African" (p. 121).

The second part of the volume is more deliberately analytic. The outstanding essay by Arend Lijphart is devoted to a very sophisticated presentation of what the author now calls the "power-sharing approach" to the resolution of interethnic violence. The editor stresses that Lijphart's work has "permeated this volume," and this is indeed the case. Yet other "lessons to be drawn for Ethnic Conflict Management" also have a good deal of merit. I especially liked the essays by David L. Horowitz, which in conjunction with his earlier book on ethnic conflict makes a valuable contribution to this general topic.

I would have preferred more attention to the analysis rather than the resolution of ethnic conflict, but the collaboration between conflict theorists and area

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specialists would probably not have worked had the volume stressed purely theoretical issues.

If the conflicts between the two superpowers are to be diminished in the time to come, it is likely that less deadly yet by no means minor conflicts among lesser powers will preempt much of the scene. This will also mean that ethnic contentions that were up to now overshadowed by the major confrontations will move to the center of attention, not only of academic students but also of journalists and newspaper commentators. If this is indeed so, this book will be of use for a long time to come. I tend to be rather skeptical of publishing ventures that attempt to summarize oral presentations at academic conferences, because most of them tend to be tedious. But this book is an exception. While surely not bedside reading, it holds one's attention throughout.

LEWIS A. COSER
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The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World *by Roy Allison. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 298 pp. $39.50.*

During the cold war period the developing world was a significant arena for competition between the superpowers. Some of the developing countries formed alliances with the United States, others with the Soviets. But a large number declared themselves nonaligned – expressing a desire to avoid alliance with either superpower.

This volume deals primarily with the Soviet attitude towards nonalignment during the cold war years. It states that Soviet attitudes were affected by the broader competition with the West. The Soviets accepted and supported nonalignment in the 1960s and 1970s to deny the Third World states to the West. They hoped and expected that socioeconomic changes in the Third World over time would result in an improved Soviet position and perhaps de facto alignment between Moscow and the nonaligned countries. Moscow was successful in the 1960s and 1970s in improving relations with developing countries, as indicated by support for Soviet positions at the United Nations.

The author argues correctly that the Soviet influence among the nonaligned states began to decline in the late 1970s and the 1980s. He attributes this development to economic factors – especially to Soviet refusal "to accommodate to structural development needs of Third World states" (p. 246). However, the author ignores two other factors. First, the Soviets became increasingly interventionist in their dealings with the Third World. This was clearly indicated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a nonaligned country. A second factor was the failure of some Soviet-supported nonaligned regimes, with a number of these regimes confronting popular internal opposition. Soviet support for regimes such as those in Afghanistan and Cambodia not only diminished the Soviet claim to be the cham-

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pion of the Third World, it also became a significant drain on the Soviets and a burden on Soviet ties with the West.

The volume does not deal with the significant changes undertaken in Soviet policy under Mikhail Gorbachev. Improving relations with the West and overcoming Soviet economic problems have become the key features of his foreign policy. Soviet ability to help the Third World has declined, while Moscow has sought to improve relations with pro-Western Third World states. The Soviets have withdrawn their forces from Afghanistan, although they continue to support the communist regime there, and have accepted the defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

As the Soviets focus on internal matters and on improving relations with the West, the relative importance of the Third World to Soviet foreign policy is likely to decline. Similarly, the ability of Third World states to play the superpowers against each other has also declined. Nonalignment will also lose its relative importance. Allison's volume does not deal with the fate of nonalignment after the cold war. It is, however, a useful addition to the literature on Soviet policy towards nonalignment during the cold war.

ZALMAY KHALILZAD
The RAND Corporation

The Truman Presidency *edited by Michael J. Lacey. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 458 pp. $37.50.*

Here in a largely post-traditionalist, post-revisionist vein are thirteen stimulating analyses of various aspects of the Truman years brought together by editor Michael Lacey of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Studies. Some, most notably Alonzo Hamby's lead-off reminder of Harry Truman's authentic qualities, celebrate the humanity of that crucial presidency. Others take aim at contradictions and orthodox interpretations. Businessmen, for example, fought to overcome New Deal "statism," but as Robert Griffith also shows, their efforts included some heavy orchestration as they mobilized to create a congenial intellectual and cultural climate. An essay by Robert A. Pollard demonstrates that captains of commerce were nevertheless hardly implacable cold warriors with dreams of profits from the uses of "military Keynesianism." Truman, meanwhile, the truculent successor to the accommodating FDR, resisted NSC #68 until after the start of fighting in Korea and was a reluctant subscriber to its doctrines.

Most striking in all this was the lack of firm direction. One exception was in Southeast Asia, where FDR was previously shown as having abandoned notions of anticolonialism and independence, and where, according to Robert J. McMahon, Truman turned the region into a cold war battleground. Truman was far less certain what to do about the atomic bomb in the future. The man who continued to justify his own actions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki never did come to terms with nuclear weapons. If, as Paul Boyer has written, Truman's perplexities about

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the bomb constituted "a bundle of contradictions" (p. 200), it was not much more coherent than much of what passed for policy during those pre-Korean War years. Nor, in deciding what to do about aggression in Korea, does Barton Bernstein show Truman as one ready to shoot from the hip.

John Lewis Gaddis questions the thesis of an American overreaction to the Soviet threat, pointing out that the U.S. government never did take seriously the possibility of an invasion of Western Europe. He stresses that balance of power geopolitics were not necessarily aimed at Moscow, but, as did FDR before the war, he feared any European power that might develop aggressive capabilities beyond Europe. FDR had hoped to convince the Russians that their needs for security could be preserved by continuing the system of wartime alliances. Moreover, contends Charles S. Maier, the U.S.–European relationship was more like consensual hegemony than traditional imperialism.

At home, the culture of cold war and red scare was inhospitable to social reforms. Gains by women and blacks failed to approximate the advances made by society's mainstream, concludes William H. Chafe, who stresses that the overall rate of progress was characterized by "ambiguity and paradox" (p. 171).

At least it may be argued that, however great the lag, the mobility was upward, which was not true for organized labor. Nelson Lichtenstein views Truman as an accommodationist who as a border state conservative Democrat aided the process of undermining unionism. The shriveling of unions, together with the weakening welfare state, left two opposing classes of workers, one unionized and the other the predominantly young, minority, and female; one paid union dues and taxes, and the other was taxed but also the beneficiary of welfare state assistance. The resulting double assessments from unions and the government, points out Lichtenstein, helped to exacerbate the resentments that pitted the organized workforce against those dependent upon public assistance.

Lacey's historians have contributed some valuable insights about a much debated time.

HERBERT S. PARMET
The City University of New York

Hope and Folly: The United States and UNESCO 1945–1985 *by William Preston, Jr., Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I. Schiller. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 367 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $16.95.*

With friends like Preston, Herman, and Schiller, UNESCO does not need any enemies. Their effort in *Hope and Folly* to set the record straight regarding the United States withdrawal from UNESCO in 1985 is mired in polemics, fettered with illogic, and fatal with flaws. The real pity in the authors' unconvincing presentation is that their story is basically true. If Americans had been able to pay close attention between 1981 and 1985 they would have observed a single-minded

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campaign on the part of ideologically-driven partisans in the Reagan administration to pull the United States out of UNESCO. Administration insiders were egged on and aided by Heritage Foundation outsiders, and the Heritage people were lavished with money from conservative foundations. Misinformation and disinformation from Washington subdued, silenced, and sank all efforts to save the historically constructive relationship between the United States and UNESCO. Americans were not able to pay close attention to the UNESCO affair because western journalists saw UNESCO as the hatchery for the "sinister" New World Information and Communications Order; they accordingly accepted the Reagan administration's diatribes and dismissed alternative views.

The UNESCO story is told in *Hope and Folly*, but poorly. The authors use a style and vocabulary reminiscent of the radical 1960s. Their story becomes a Manichean melodrama. The United States, its foreign policy, all Republicans, the Reagan administration, the State Department, the International Organization (IO) Bureau, Gregory Newell, and the Heritage Foundation are the forces of darkness. They ruthlessly overcome the forces of light—Amadou-Mahatar M'Bow, Sean MacBride, John Fobes, James Holderman, the UNESCO Commission, some Democrats, the UN, the Russians, and the Third World—to precipitate the tragedy of U.S. withdrawal. This is great theater.

But much of it is bad scholarship. The authors' case lacks balance. One simply cannot dismiss "criticisms focused on UNESCO as a mismanaged, top-heavy, overly centralized, inefficient organization mired in elitism, favoritism, cronyism and low morale" as "usual atrocity stories that circulate in any large bureaucracy" (p. 11). All of these conditions prevailed in M'Bow's UNESCO. He was less than the "astute" administrator that Preston, Herman, and Schiller so unreservedly admire. What is presently thwarting Federico Mayor's efforts to reform UNESCO is the M'Bow legacy of forests of administrative dead wood. Similarly, one cannot brush away the outlandish demands and invectives hurled at the United States in the United Nations and in UNESCO during the 1970s by calling them "moderate ambitions for justice" (p. 120). Third World statesmen today are looking back on the 1970s as a diplomatic decade lost because of their own immoderation. One cannot argue that restrictions on the activities of foreign correspondents were never intended by the proponents of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). They were! One cannot condemn the United States for objecting to a NWICO draft that called for publicizing the "Zionism is Racism" resolution (p. 126). Logically, one cannot contend, as this book's authors do repeatedly, that because the United States has historically failed to behave up to its own ideals, it thereby forfeits the right to hold others to high standards. Ultimately, one cannot rewrite history, even though the authors of *Hope and Folly* try hard to do this.

DONALD J. PUCHALA
University of South Carolina

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The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets in the Middle East *by George McGhee. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990. 224 pp. $35.00.*

No American observer is better equipped than George McGhee to provide information and insight into the tangled United States-Turkish-NATO connections with the Middle East in the early cold war. As coordinator for aid to Greece and Turkey in the State Department from 1947–1949, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs from 1949–1951, and ambassador to Turkey, 1951–1953, McGhee has much to offer NATO scholars and Middle Eastern specialists. Yet the promise that his career and abilities portend does not yield the results that a reader would expect from a memoir of this genre.

McGhee intended to give an insider's view of major events in the Truman administration in which he played an important part. He carefully gathered memorandums of conversation and internal communications that he assembled in his years of service and that were to be the raw material of a book. He even developed the technique, as he says in his preface, of concealing notes taken surreptitiously at meetings and transcribed them immediately afterwards. He also shows how an imaginative diplomat can circumvent the State Department bureaucracy to get a message to the secretary of state overnight.

Too much of this slight book is given over to information others have provided over the years. The author graciously has acknowledged his debt to scholars. Part of his problem stems from his effort to do too much, as his awkward title indicates. He covers an overview of the history of the United States in the Middle East: a review of the Truman Doctrine; the development of the Greek-Turkish aid program; Turkey's entry into NATO; and the complicated links between the United States, Britain, France, and Turkey with a Middle East Command and a Middle East Defense Organization. Finally, he takes U.S.-Turkish relations from 1953 to 1989. All of these activities are squeezed into fewer than 200 pages of text, resulting in thin and sometimes questionable generalizations. In his effort to touch on areas beyond his own personal involvement he has slighted issues that deserve more attention. Greece appears either in lockstep with Turkey, as petitioner to the United States or as applicant to NATO. But there is scant reference to differences between the countries and none at all to the Balkan Pact, which for a time reflected a special relationship between Greece and Turkey.

Arguably, the most vulnerable portion of the book emerges from his strong partisanship. McGhee likes and admires the Turks and pays appropriate attention to the role Turkey played in containing the Soviet Union. But his bias weakens his case, as it becomes more an apologia than an historical analysis. There is only vague mention of Turkey's displeasure with American favoritism toward Greece and even less to the military's role in Turkey. He writes of his appreciation for Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and only as an aside mentions that "unfortunately he was to become a victim of the revolutionary colonel during the 1960 coup" (p. 94). Some of his judgements may raise a reader's eyebrows. For example,

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it is doubtful if United States relations with Latin America, "cooperation on a basis of equality," is either an accurate statement or an appropriate model for Turkey's relations with the Arab Middle East (p. 140).

The most valuable portions of this book deal with McGhee's close relations with Turkish leaders and with his role as intermediary between the Turks on the one hand and the British and French on the other as the United States pressed Turkey to serve as a bridge between NATO and some of the Middle East defense organizations. Regrettably, these contributions are too sparingly presented in these memoirs.

LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN
Kent State University

Between Lausanne and Geneva: International Conferences and the Arab-Israeli Conflict *by Abraham Ben-Zvi. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1990. 185 pp. $24.50.*

It is a rare book that manages to compete with the headlines. This study of international conferences as a means for negotiating a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was written at a time when the idea of an international conference was overtly supported by most Arab states, the American secretary of state, and the foreign minister of Israel. A mere two years later, the possibility of an international conference seems remote. Nonetheless, the topic merits research and this could have been a useful case study.

The author sets out in a skillful way to show that the underlying concept of an international conference was radically different in Washington and Jerusalem, where a minimalist view of the role of a conference was held, and in most Arab capitals (except Cairo) and Moscow, where a maximalist view held sway. No surprises here. The weaker, more numerous parties will obviously try to use the procedures surrounding negotiations to strengthen their hand.

The most interesting part of the book concentrates on a subtle diplomatic effort mounted between late 1985 and spring 1987 to reach agreement on convening an Arab-Israeli peace conference. The culmination of this effort was a direct meeting between Jordan's King Hussein and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, which led to agreement on the so-called London Document. But Israel's prime minister was dead set against an international conference; the Americans were reluctant to intervene in an internal Israeli dispute; so the accord led nowhere.

Ben-Zvi's analysis would lead one to expect that a conference would have been a dead end in any case, since the parties are so far apart in their expectations of how a conference would function. But here his analysis seems too mechanistic to capture the realities of fast-moving events in the Middle East. Nothing in his study prepares the reader for the shift that has taken place in the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) position on peace with Israel and readiness for direct,

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bilateral informal talks prior to an international conference. Ben-Zvi notes the decisions made by the PLO in Algiers in November 1988, but seems not to take them seriously.

How can one explain the PLO's readiness to go along with an American-inspired, Egyptian-brokered alternative to an international conference? One possibility is to treat this all as propaganda. Alternately, one could look at the effects of the Palestinian uprising, the contours of inter-Arab politics, and the decline of Soviet influence in the region and reach the conclusion that the PLO recognized the dead end of clinging to a policy—the international conference in its maximalist form—that would lead nowhere. But the author does not believe that the PLO is capable of political realism, only "intransigence" and "dogmatism" (p. 42).

Apart from not preparing readers for the events of 1989–1990 in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the author makes a number of needless errors of fact and a larger number of questionable interpretations. For example, his explanation of why Egyptian President Anwar Sadat went to Jerusalem in November 1977, while oft-repeated, has by now been refuted enough times that it should not simply be repeated as a home truth. More to the point, why was the author unable to provide the real text of the London Document, which was published in January 1988, instead of the somewhat misleading account by Shimon Peres in his September 1987 United Nations speech? In short, this is a disappointing book.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

Tribune of the People: The Minnesota Legislature and Its Leadership *by Royce Hanson with the assistance of Charles Backstrom and Patrick McCormack. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 278 pp. $29.50.*

In 1983 the politicians who ran the Minnesota legislature approached the professors at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota to find how their "pretty good" institution might be made even better. How revealing of the political culture of this quintessentially midwestern state is this impulse toward self-improvement, this recourse by legislative leaders to the experts at their flagship state university to find ways to make things better!

Interestingly, the person the politicians approached was not a familiar local professor, but Royce Hanson, recently arrived in the state from Washington D.C. to become associate dean at the Humphrey Institute. With some public money, additional financial backing from over forty key Minnesota civic leaders and institutions, and assurances of both access and independence for his work, Hanson assembled a research team and undertook a comprehensive three-year look at the Minnesota legislature.

This book is the final result of that effort. It is built upon a thorough review of the recent political history of the state; upon separate smaller studies of specific

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issues—for example, the size of the legislature, the function of conference committees, the unicameral option; upon a survey of state legislators about their jobs, careers, and institution; and most importantly, upon a number of long group interviews with current and former legislative leaders. The numerous reform proposals offered in the final chapter to foster competence, legitimacy, leadership, and accountability in the Minnesota state legislature are thus well grounded in careful empirical analysis.

Hanson and his colleagues are especially worried about the short circuiting of the legislative process through the emergence of conference committees as powerful "third legislative houses" in Minnesota. Most key decisions are made in conferences, where new substance (legislative "garbage") is introduced that members must then accept on the floor in an up or down vote. To remedy this and simultaneously make the legislative process more visible, deliberative, and accountable, the authors urge adoption of a unicameral legislature.

It is surprising that unicameralism for states has not been more widely discussed in the quarter century since *Baker v Carr*, which by establishing one-person-one-vote as the representative basis for all American legislative houses except the U.S. Senate fundamentally damaged the underlying rationale for bicameralism. This progressive era idea deserves to be seriously revisited, but the debate on it should be more informed by experience with unicameralism in Nebraska and in local governments across the nation than it is in this volume.

Hanson and his colleagues are also strong advocates of professionalization of the legislature. But here a distinction is needed between the essentiality of institution building and the desirability of fostering lengthy legislative careers. Though they say they favor the idea of "citizen legislators," the authors pose changes—longer terms, higher pay for leaders—that undermine this notion. With incumbency one of the major barriers to competitiveness in elections, we need to find ways to build legislatures without entrenching individuals in office.

However much one might argue with specific prescriptions in this volume, it remains an extremely valuable contribution to the literature on state legislatures for two reasons. The first is the authors' subtle understanding of the "centrality . . . [of legislatures] . . . in democratic governance." The second is their appreciation of the essentiality of the rare political skills that the best legislative leaders bring to bear to make their institutions work.

GERALD BENJAMIN
State University of New York, New Paltz

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe: The Stockholm Conference *by Carl C. Krehbiel. New York, Praeger, 1989. 388 pp. $55.00.*

From January 1984 to September 1986, the thirty-five participating states of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) met in Stockholm

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to negotiate an agreement on confidence- and security-building measures, or CSBMs. CSBMs are intended to "reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe resulting from miscalculation, misperception, or misunderstanding; bring more openness to military activities in Europe; and inhibit surprise attack and the threat or use of force or of political intimidation" (p. 1). Carl C. Krehbiel, a career army officer and member of the U.S. delegation to the Stockholm conference, has written a very detailed and carefully thought out account of the Stockholm negotiations, and his book should be read by anyone who believes CSBMs—or the CSCE process in general—can help ensure Europe's security in the 1990s.

Krehbiel's perspective as an adviser to NATO is unabashed, and his version of events unfortunately sometimes reads more like a litany from the cold war than an impartial analysis. He tells us that "only the Western participating States were truly interested in building confidence and security at Stockholm" (p. 306), that "the Soviet Union stood in the way of measures . . . that could have contributed to building confidence and security in Europe" (p. 127), and that the Soviet positions were "[without] logic" (p. 177), "obstructionist" (p. 216), and "anti-NATO propaganda diatribes" (p. 269). Still, after reading some of the very weak or even silly arguments put forth by Moscow during the talks—for example that a low notification threshold for military maneuvers would require notification of "too many activities" (p. 81), or that mobilization "is no threat to anyone" (p. 118)—it is difficult not to agree with Krehbiel's conclusion that "the NATO proposal . . . was by far the best" (p. 303). The Soviet attitude in Stockholm was marked by posturing and disingenuousness, and Krehbiel's account reminds us how difficult it was to deal with the Kremlin in the pre-*glasnost* era.

More important in the present context are the lessons that can be drawn from the book about the usefulness of CSBMs today. While Krehbiel readily admits that "no piece of paper" can prevent a country from using or threatening to use force (p. 5, p. 30, p. 153, p. 313), he does argue that "increasing the openness of the way in which military activities are conducted in Europe . . . could, over time, contribute to the goal of building confidence and security" (p. 6). Even this limited assertion remains to be proven. The CSBMs of the Helsinki accords of 1975 hardly led to confidence and security in Europe, and this was not only due to the weakness of their provisions. States that suspect each other's intentions are unlikely to feel secure so long as the underlying conditions of security are not present and unresolved disputes remain outstanding. Krehbiel argues that CSBMs are useful, for example, because a country that wanted to mobilize or undertake unannounced military exercises would have to violate a thirty-five nation agreement and would thus "provoke a reaction among other participating states" (p. 313). But would it not be the military activity *itself*, if anything, that would induce other states to respond (and not the violation of the agreement)? Increased openness and political barriers to the use of force are doubtless better than nothing, but their usefulness should not be exaggerated (and they are not exaggerated in this book.)

In the future, CSBMs are likely to be easier to negotiate, violated less often, and more prominent in East-West affairs. They will probably play a major role

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in the CSCE process, which many see as the primary forum for European security in the 1990s. But like both domestic and international law—and even more so because they cannot be enforced—CSBMs tend to be most effective precisely when they are least necessary. Today's politicians and diplomats should know that CSBMs reflect security and confidence as much as they build them. Whatever present decision makers believe, they would benefit from reading Krehbiel's interesting book.

PHILIP GORDON
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Roosevelt and Hitler: Prelude to War *by Robert Edwin Herzstein. New York, Paragon House, 1989. 500 pp. $24.95.*

Unlike Winston Churchill's celebrated pudding, this book does have a theme; but a literary pudding it remains—gelatinous, amorphous, and overcooked. From a larder richly stocked with research in both American and German sources, Herzstein chucks into his cook-pot bulky lumps of data on anti-Semitism in Depression-era America, German propaganda efforts in the United States, and the activities of far-right political groups like the German-American Bund and the Silver Shirts of William Dudley Pelley (whose chief claim to notoriety consisted of his having spent seven illuminating minutes in Paradise in 1928). The mixture is leavened with some contestable and contradictory assertions about Hitler's diplomatic perceptions, and it is spiced with occasional revisionist allegations about Franklin D. Roosevelt's own grand geopolitical designs. It is also peppered with editorial infelicities like superscript references to endnotes that are nowhere to be found and the author's inexplicably cozy denomination of diplomats like William Bullitt and Anthony Biddle as Bill and Tony. This concoction does not in the end rest harmoniously on the reader's palate.

Herzstein declares that "FDR's German policies cannot be understood apart from their Jewish context" (p. xiv). He seeks to exonerate Roosevelt from the charges of moral callousness that many recent writers have levelled at FDR for his treatment of refugees from Hitler's Holocaust. Herzstein, in contrast, praises FDR for skillfully frustrating Hitler's attempt to buttress American isolationism by mobilizing anti-Semitism. FDR contained the forces of organized American anti-Semitism, even while abandoning Europe's Jews to the larger cause of defeating Hitler. "Jewish refugees," Herzstein concludes, "were tragic pawns, for FDR sacrificed them to a strategy calculated to ensure American global hegemony in a world free of the Nazis" (p. 404).

The phrase about global hegemony is one of several obeisances to the evanescent revisionist argument that World War II represented a triumphal climax in the deliberate development of American "imperialism." But though Herzstein rather

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casually acquiesces in arguments about American imperial designs, he adds: "With all our mistakes, arrogance, and blunders, the world created by 'Roosevelt's warmongering' is better than any imaginable alternative" (p. 405). What's more, he suggests that Roosevelt "rather than the deified Winston Churchill, was the most purposeful and consequential anti-Nazi leader of his time" (p. xvi), the man Hitler hated "more than all his other political enemies put together" (p. 293).

Several serious difficulties afflict this argument. First, a sufficient account of American isolationism and its operational political consequences can be constructed without reference to American anti-Semitism, which surely blighted the American scene in the interwar decades, but did not materially augment the already deep and pervasive sentiment of isolation. Second, most Germans familiar with the United States knew this and knew further that clumsy efforts to stimulate or exploit anti-Semitism were counterproductive. Thus German Ambassador Hans Dieckhoff ordered all German nationals in the United States in 1938 to dissociate themselves from the antics of the German-American Bund and its transparently lunatic leader, Fritz Kuhn. In light of this, Herzstein's interminable anecdotage about the doings of several tiny, peripheral hate groups is egregiously overwrought. Third, even Herzstein's diligent research cannot sustain the claim that Hitler regarded Roosevelt as the most consequential and far-sighted anti-Nazi in the 1930s. Abundant evidence powerfully suggests that Hitler through the decade saw little to fear from America the Unready. Herzstein himself quotes a remark of Hitler's as late as 1940 to the effect that the United States would not be a world power until 1970 or 1980.

Readers of this book will learn more than they need to about the history of the whacko American radical right in the 1930s and much less than they should about the painful vacillation and frequent fecklessness of Roosevelt's foreign policy.

DAVID M. KENNEDY
Stanford University

Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes by *Richard N. Haass. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 184pp. $22.50.*

As suggested by the title, the author's theme is that conflict between states is a fact of life, that only a few will be resolved when conditions are appropriate, and that most can only be managed. This is certainly a novel approach. Americans have long assumed that all problems are resolvable if sufficient goodwill exists. The question was not whether a problem was resolvable, only how.

Haass's central point is that conflicts are diplomatically resolvable only when they are "ripe." He specifies four conditions that need to be present for fruitful diplomacy. First, all parties must want an agreement. Second, political leaders must be sufficiently strong domestically to be able to compromise or sufficiently weak to be unable to resist pressures for compromise. Third, these leaders must

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be able to present the resulting agreement as being in the national interest. Lastly, there must be a mutually acceptable process so that if the parties cannot resolve their differences among themselves, they can enlist help from a third party.

But the absence of ripeness is as important as its presence. It alerts all parties to the risks of allowing the situation to drift and to the need to manage the conflict to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and launch actions that may change the participants attitudes and calculations, perhaps making a future resolution of the conflict feasible. Thus, while diplomatic solutions are not feasible at the time, it is not a time for inaction either. Clearly, modesty and caution are the guides. Time and effort should not be spent trying to solve unripe problems; to do so would be futile, indeed counterproductive, only worsening the situation.

In support, Haass presents a series of case studies, devoting one chapter each to the Middle East, Cyprus, India and Pakistan, South Africa, and Northern Ireland. Each chapter includes a section on the background to the particular dispute and further sections on the range of possible solutions, an assessment of why solutions are beyond reach, and recommendations for what the United States and other parties ought to to do in these circumstances. Not surprisingly, the author concludes that ripeness is "an important concept that deserves wider currency" (p. 145), because it represents a new way of thinking about diplomacy as more than a means of negotiations to solve disputes. But can the term "concept" really be applied to an idea that simply says that disputes are not resolvable until they are resolvable? Also, as important as ripeness is as a warning not to become involved in conflicts that appear intractable and more broadly to lower our expectations that problems are resolvable if only everyone is sincere, ripeness is hardly a novel idea. In fact, it is a tautology. The more critical question is whether political leaders and professional diplomats recognize whether a conflict is ripe at the time, not in retrospect, and take the appropriate actions. This is a matter of informed analysis and political judgment—and disagreement and controversy. Moreover, is diplomatic activism not warranted in some unripe situations that are so potentially dangerous to U.S. interest that intervention is required? Cannot a great power exercise its influence in those moments by creating a mixture of sanctions and incentives that constrain the parties' choices, alter their previously negative attitude toward negotiations, and enhance their interest in a compromise solution? It will be interesting to note in the future if Haass, who is currently on leave from Harvard University's Kennedy School and serving on the National Security Council as senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs, will in any way alter or modify the views he presents in this interesting book, clearly written for both scholars and practitioners of diplomacy.

JOHN SPANIER
University of Florida

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Friends and Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy *by George J. Borjas. New York, Basic Books, 1990. 274 pp. $22.95.*

Let me begin on an upbeat and appreciative note. This is a book that deals with a major policy issue that will remain on our national agenda for years, probably decades. George Borjas has achieved a well deserved reputation for being one of the nation's leading students of immigration. He has written an important book that is conspicuous for its point of departure, the quality of its analyses, and the fluency of his prose.

Borjas's central thesis is very simple. He demonstrates mostly through econometric analyses that there has been a significant deterioration in the *quality* of immigrants into the United States in the 1970–1980 decade compared to the two earlier decades of 1950–1960 and 1960–1970. The deterioration is reflected on many scales, the most important being the immigrants' relatively lower educational preparation, lesser skills, and reduced prior experience in a developed economy. As a consequence, recent immigrants are working less, earning less, and are more frequently on welfare than native-born workers, in sharp contrast to conditions in the first two post-World War II decades.

The precipitating factor of this deterioration stems directly from the 1965 immigration reforms that made "family reunion" the principal allocator of scarce visas, reinforced by easier admission for large numbers of "refugees." I will buy into this explanation, but only to a limited degree for the reasons noted below.

Borjas emphasizes that our two principal competitors for "skilled immigrants,"—Canada and Australia—have also been encountering substantial difficulties in attracting better qualified immigrants. He appreciates that Europe has been a strikingly reduced source of immigrants for each of the three principal receiving nations; the United States is not a special case. In short, Borjas has failed to confront a major dilemma, much less resolve it. Given the declining availability of "desirable" immigrants, is the U.S. economy better or worse off for having admitted so many less well prepared immigrants?

But there are other difficulties with Borjas's analysis. In my view he repeatedly fails to disaggregate the data that he presents that show marked variations among different groups of immigrants, not only those of European origin but more particularly the differences among Mexicans, Filipinos, Indians, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and others. While Borjas demonstrates that the immigrants from Mexico do not account for most of the so-called deterioration, that single exercise does not vitiate my criticism of his failure to exploit his detailed data that reveal astonishing differences in the economic progress of immigrants from different countries.

I have another cavil with the author. The words "scientist" or "engineer" do not appear in his index, and he fails to consider the continuing large-scale inflow of students of foreign origin who are pursuing graduate studies in the United States, a great proportion of whom remain and acquire citizenship. Just one piece of evidence: the majority of students studying for a doctorate in U.S. schools of en-

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gineering are foreign born, and a high proportion of the nontenured professors in these schools are of foreign extraction. While the figures for the national sciences and mathematics are somewhat less striking, foreigners account for a significant and growing proportion of graduate students and new entrants into these fields as well.

I want to end as I began, on an upbeat note. The fact that Borjas did not undertake all of the analyses that I would have liked him to pursue and that he remained largely within an econometric framework does not detract from the large number of new, interesting, and relevant facts that he extracted from his careful quantitative analyses. No one can read *Friends and Strangers* and not come away with new and important information about immigrants and their absorption into the U.S. economy. What is more, Borjas is no ideologue. He knows the limitations as well as power of the market to motivate human behavior.

I look forward to Borjas's next book on immigrants. Now that he has the results of his econometric analysis out of his system he should feel freer to deal with some of the nonquantifiable variables that were left submerged in his present effort. We can look forward to another insightful tome that will surely advance our understanding of a most complex and important phenomenon.

ELI GINZBERG
Columbia University

Development Aid and Human Rights *by Katarina Tomasevski. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989. 208 pp. $39.95.*

In the foreword to this work, Tomasevski tells the reader in so many words that this is a rush job. She was given only eleven months to produce the study, which "did not allow for more than mapping out" (p. xvi) some thoughts on human rights and development aid. The result is a disjointed and poorly reasoned treatise that is not likely to prove very helpful in thinking through the complexities involved in linking internationally recognized human rights and official development assistance.

We finally learn the central purpose of the book is that "human rights ought to be a corrective applied to development aid in its entirety." Tomasevski sees a need for the international community "to accord a priority to human rights in development aid" (p. 123). She believes that the international law of human rights provides clear rules for incorporating human rights standards into development aid. In her view, social services for the less well off in the developing countries should not be reduced, because the people have a right to them; also, those services should not be privatized, since that results in the same reduction.

The central thesis that human rights should be accorded more attention in development assistance might not seem surprising, at least to scholars interested in greater attention to those rights, except that previously the reader has been told

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this is impossible. Tomasevski writes: "Human rights concerns cannot be expected to become a dominant aim of development aid nor a key component of aid policies. Development aid cannot be built around human rights considerations. . . . The main aim of the aid which goes to the recipient countries is the establishment of the basic infrastructure and economic development [sic: economic growth]" (pp. 18–19). Presumably she means to say that given existing views of development aid, human rights values will be largely excluded; what is needed is a rethinking of the fundamental values that shape that aid.

It is difficult to understand how the international law of human rights can be seen as providing precise rules to inform development aid. That law provides general principles; it does not offer precise rules. Philip Alston, the rapporteur for the United Nations Expert Committee overseeing the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, has made clear in several publications that there are no universal and specific rules either in the covenant or in the decisions of the committee. The committee is trying to get each state-party to determine the meaning of the treaty in its own jurisdiction. International law itself contains only suggestive general principles.

In arguing against the reduction of social services to the poor within the less developed countries, Tomasevski never addresses the question of how the state is to pay for the goods and services it is supposedly obligated to provide. This is, needless to say, an important question. While the author is critical of stabilization programs demanded by the International Monetary Fund that cause states obtaining IMF drawing rights to reduce governmental expenditures, she never addresses the question of what situation brought the government to need such rights and to accept such programs. If there is negative economic growth per capita or if governmental expenditure exceeds revenue, the government must reduce public spending somewhere. One might develop an argument that in the light of human rights obligations accepted by the government, military expenditures should be reduced to implement economic and social rights; but that argument is not part of this study.

In summary, this is a disjointed, poorly reasoned, and disappointing book on an important subject. Some useful data are reproduced, mainly derived from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Some useful bits and pieces of information can be gleaned from the pages – for example, the influence of the European Parliament in pushing for greater attention to human rights in the development aid and trade policies of the European communities. It may turn out to be true that one should think of providing development assistance to promote human rights and not think of cutting off that aid as sanction for human rights violations. But the list of the book's problems and deficiencies is a long one – for example, information on the United States is thin and poorly researched (pp. 50–53); economic development is not consistently distinguished from economic growth (as at p. 124); there are factual misstatements (as at p. 130). There are better books dealing with this timely and important subject (such as *Human Rights and Development*, also available through St. Martin's Press, whose editors

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must bear some responsibility for publishing such an illogical and unpersuasive work).

DAVID P. FORSYTHE
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Intervention and Underdevelopment *by Jon V. Kofas. University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989. 215 pp. $24.95.*

This book focuses from a revisionist perspective on the effects of British and American intervention in Greece during the cold war. It is a serious, provocative, and admirable effort and the first of its kind to appear from an American publisher. The author passionately argues that there was an alternative for Greece other than becoming an American or Soviet satellite. This plausible alternative, described as unacceptable to the Foreign Office, the State Department, and the Greek elites was the formation of a social-democratic regime that would have pursued fundamental socioeconomic reforms to make the country more competitive in the international arena. Kofas faults the Truman administration for reducing Greece to a military satellite and an economic dependency. He also argues that American control over Greece's destiny halted the process of political reform, which was an imperative for socioeconomic reforms.

While an argument could be made for a plausible alternative, Kofas simply does not make it. Instead, he devotes much of the study to the efforts of Britain and America to prevent such an outcome, and at the same time he minimizes the role of the Greek Communist Party and its foreign allies. The alternative could only have been plausible if the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) could have been avoided. He fails to devote adequate attention to this crucial issue. While most scholars agree that the restoration of the monarchy by the British had a negative impact on Greek political development, there are serious questions concerning in the same period the feasibility of the formation of a broad independent center-left coalition government, which would have resulted in "a faster and better reconstruction process, a more democratic society, the avoidance of a bloody civil war in the late 1940s, and the absence of the preponderate American influence in Greece" (p. 14). To be sure, as the author argues, Britain did everything to prevent such an outcome to protect its strategic and economic interests in Greece. Yet one can legitimately ask, given the vulnerable state of Greek society and the fragility of its political authority, could such a development have taken place without Western intervention? The question is not probed in this otherwise informative account of British influence in a decisive period in Greek history. By the time of American intervention and the 1947 Truman Doctrine, the lines were drawn and Greek society was polarized. Both the Right and the Left were set on an irreversible course for the control of state power, which could only be secured by a resort to violence.

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It could be argued that civil war could have been avoided only if the expectations of victory were completely unrealistic for either side. They were not.

While it is true that the United States achieved a preponderant role in Greek affairs through control of the country's fiscal, monetary, and credit policies, a control far exceeding its prerogatives prescribed by the agreement on aid, one would be hard pressed to ascribe the lack of Greek economic development to some sort of grand imperialist design emanating from Washington. Yet it is the contention of this book that the United States sought to avoid restructuring the Greek economy and to preserve Greece as an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods. Kofas does not choose to recognize that there was a development agenda, implicit in the Truman Doctrine and fully explicit in the 1948 Porter Report. Yet the progressive dissipation of the development agenda is much of what this book is about. The United States failed to pursue a more equitable tax structure, to restrain the black marketeers, and to hold back the growth of state spending and the swollen bureaucracy that supplied sources of patronage to the Greek ruling elites. Moreover, the institutionalization of foreign aid encouraged the speculative behavior of the Greek capitalists. Perhaps the primary reasons for the dissipation of the development agenda were the lack of sufficient American aid and the inability of the United States to eliminate the mechanisms that would feed the vicious circle of capital reexport and hoarding on the part of the Greek bourgeoisie. The anticommunist dimension also undermined the modernization effort.

While this work is not the last word in intervention and development in postwar Greece, it is very useful in spite of its revisionist rhetoric.

HARRY J. PSOMIADES
Queens College,
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Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement *by Gregg R. Jones. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989. 360 pp. $26.95.*

Gregg R. Jones has written an exceptionally revealing account of one of Asia's last remaining communist guerrilla movements. Relying primarily on interviews and observations as a journalist based in Manila from 1984 to 1989, including eight forays into the countryside with units of the New People's Army (NPA) during 1987 and 1988, Jones has produced as full a view of the Philippine movement from the inside as we are likely to get.

The present Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was established only in 1969 by Jose Maria Sison, the son of an affluent rural landowner and himself a university lecturer in English literature. Its reigning theories were thus shaped initially by inequalities in Philippine society, by Maoist doctrine, by nationalist antagonism toward the United States, and by the counterculture revolution that was sweeping campuses around the world at the time. By 1989, the party had an

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underground army of about 24,000 fighting men and women, half of them armed with weapons captured from government forces; and it controlled or influenced some 8,000 of the country's 41,000 rural *barrios* and urban neighborhoods.

Much of Jones's account records the growth of this guerrilla army over the intervening two decades – its recruitment, training, deployment, operations, and relations with local citizens – in the words of dozens of guerrilla informants drawn from both the leadership and the rank and file. While the evidence is thus largely anecdotal, the sheer volume of his interviews and observations gives weight to Jones's conclusions; between 1984 and 1989, he visited forty of the country's seventy-three provinces.

The major question the research raises is whether the final product is balanced – whether the party leaders who approved Jones's access and the NPA guerrillas who served as his guides during 1987 and 1988 influenced unduly the evidence he obtained or the conclusions he reached. While that was possible, other elements in the situation appear to have worked against it, including intraparty disputes over strategy and tactics; disarray within leadership circles caused by past failures, arrests, and defections; misgivings of middle-level activists about weaknesses in a movement to which they were giving their lives; and Jones's own determined effort to retain his independence of mind. All these elements contribute to a picture of the guerrilla movement that is consistent with the views of many official and unofficial Philipine commentators, and at the same time is far and away the best documented account of the NPA in print.

Jones's principal conclusion is that by early 1989 the CPP and the NPA were, by the testimony of their own leaders, in a trough of inaction. They were stalled militarily because they could not organize operations on a larger scale without more funding and could not attack larger units of the armed forces of the Philippines without heavier weapons, both of which would have to come from abroad. While it was thought likely that some money was being raised by left-wing sympathizers in Western Europe and that some heavy weapons might have entered the country from North Korea, there was no evidence that anything like the needed support was being received. The CPP and the NPA also were stalled politically, because Corazon Aquino did not present them with as useful a target as had Ferdinand Marcos; the party's broad popular front, which appeared near at hand in the last Marcos years, was soon thereafter a distant prospect. Indeed, senior party leaders feared that it was only a matter of time until supporters would begin to ask if they were waging a war they could win.

At the same time, Jones does not expect the CPP or the NPA to disappear at any time soon. The Philippine armed forces, having failed to stop the NPA when it was much smaller, seem unlikely to be successful now. (This seems even more the case since last year's attempted coup, which occurred after Jones completed his manuscript; the attempt left deep divisions within the armed forces of the Philippines and raised major doubts about the ability of those forces to commit themselves to any major national purpose.) Meanwhile, the Aquino government, crip-

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pled by incompetence and corruption, has failed to make measurable progress in redressing the grievances of the population.

Recent attacks on Americans in the Philippines must be seen in this context. The underground movement is in serious need of a target that is politically vulnerable. Having in mind the numerous challenges to Marxism and Leninism since Jones completed his manuscript, one cannot help but think that the emphasis on nationalism might be the one option that the CPP and the NPA have left.

JOHN BRESNAN
Columbia University

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

Hadley Arkes argues in this book that it is necessary to move "beyond the Constitution," to the principles that stood antecedent to the text, if we are to understand the text and apply the Constitution to the cases that arise every day in our law. In the lucid and flowing style familiar to readers of his earlier works, Arkes explores classic cases in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as more recent legal problems. He recalls the concern raised by the Federalists in the original dispute over a Bill of Rights: that a Bill of Rights would actually work to diminish, or truncate, the range of rights protected under the Constitution because it would alter our understanding of the ground of our rights. As he unfolds his argument, he considers the tangle of legal puzzles cast up by the problem of federalism, as they were seen, quite notably, in the Baby Doe cases in the 1980s and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988.
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

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